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PART III.

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE BONAPARTES.

BEFORE entering on the investigation of our subject, it may be as well to enumerate the materials for our knowledge of it. We have, so to say, two editions of the Bonapartist system of policy: one as moulded and stamped by Napoleon I.; the other under the signature of the present Emperor. The two editions vary; for the combinations of two different epochs could never be perfectly identical: in fact, the position of things under Napoleon III. had no real or deep analogy with the circumstances of France and Europe at the beginning of the career of Napoleon I. The situation of Europe obliged the first Napoleon to make his policy turn on a system of conquest; a changed state of things forced from his successor the declaration that his empire was peace, and made him aspire to be the Napoleon of Peace, as his uncle was the Napoleon of War,—to play the Solomon to his predecessor's David.

What, then, is the principle which, in spite of the altered situation, identifies the two empires? This is the capital point, only to be properly understood and rendered intelligible by first fathoming the personal genius and character of the great Napoleon. Napoleon the man is the key to Napoleon the emperor, who is not only the founder of the dynasty, but has also inoculated the present representative of his family with his dynastic theory and his political method. To obtain an insight into the system, we must first study the man.

And where are we to find the key to the personal character of Napoleon I.? If we trusted his public declarations and official acts, we might confound appearance with reality,

outside with inside, pretext with motive, and find ourselves duped and deluded. Though his acts had been as true to his thoughts as body to soul, yet even then the act need not express the whole thought, but might sometimes be a mere mask to conceal its real nature. This is still more the case with words: words have never been taken at par, as every where and always equivalent to thoughts. Without being false, without being grossly insincere, they may yet serve to conceal the thought. Talleyrand considered them the best means for disguising ideas. Napoleon was not like this; he was far too vehement a person to practise the cunning of a Louis XI. But he found it necessary to keep up appearances, and for this purpose to deceive France and the world.

The official papers, then, do not furnish the key to the man; and, for want of a personal knowledge, all the historians of the empire have failed to exhibit his system in its true light. Antagonists and admirers, opponents and partisans, have equally fallen short. Even Thiers, with all his erudition and his unrivalled knowledge of the state archives, treats this side of his subject very weakly. His excuse is easy; few of the memoirs of Napoleon's private life and undisguised conversation were then known; his correspondence with his brothers and relations was unpublished, nor is it yet completed. Neither the memoirs of Louis nor those of Lucien have emerged into light; those of Jerome, the only survivor of that generation, must remain in his cabinet till he dies: the youngest of the brothers, he had, after his separation from Miss Patterson, his American wife, fewer quarrels with Napoleon than the rest, for he alone bowed to the Emperor's will, and sacrificed his domestic happiness at his bidding. But we have the memoirs of King Joseph, and those of Prince Eugene, the Viceroy of Italy. Though not printed without omissions, they contain enough to unveil the character of Napoleon. Both to Joseph and to Eugene he exhibits himself in his personal, not in his official character. Though less intimate with Eugene than with Joseph,—for Eugene was more punctilious in obedience, and therefore more like a stranger, more a servant than a confidant,—yet Napoleon spoke openly enough to him whenever his passion boiled over, or the necessities of his service required it. To Joseph, however, he blurts out bluntly whatever comes into his head. Though never feeling quite sure of his eldest brother, and often excessively angry with him, yet he could not forget that Joseph had known him from a child, and could understand his half words, so that concealment and insincerity were impossible.

We have none of the correspondence of Napoleon with his brother-in-law Murat, or his sister the Queen of Naples, or any other of his sisters. He could not have had much confidence in Murat as a politician; but he was probably more open with the Queen. But, in spite of all deficiencies, the family memoirs which we have furnish abundant means for penetrating the secrets of Napoleon's character.

Besides the family memoirs, we have those of Roederer and Miot, two men who knew him well; and those of Thibaudeau, who knew him early. They had all observed the general developing into the consul, and had been close spectators of the consul bursting forth into the emperor. Roederer afterwards became the friend and confidant of Joseph, and thereby forfeited the friendship of Napoleon, who wanted Joseph's ministers to be under his own thumb. But previously to this Roederer's aid had been indispensable to enable him to become consul, and had been serviceable in advancing him to the empire. Roederer had, however, committed a grand mistake. He had plotted with Lucien and Joseph against Josephine, had tried to diminish the Beauharnais influence over Napoleon, and had attempted to get Hortense and Eugene out of the way. The effect of the plot was, that Napoleon summoned his brother Louis to Paris, and made him marry Hortense, and began to advance Eugene step by step till he made him Viceroy of Northern Italy. Lucien was never restored to favour, in spite of the devotion he had exhibited at St. Cloud, when the blow that overthrew the republic was struck. Joseph was disgraced for a time; but Roederer was never forgiven. Not that the aim of the plot was in itself contrary to Napoleon's wishes, but he would not allow his independence to be compromised by his brothers' interference. He would not let them hurry him; he abided his own time. Though he had determined on divorce before he was emperor, he would not let his brothers bring it about for their own interests, but counteracted them by means of Hortense and Eugene. Roederer did not understand this. After enduring first the anger and then the sarcasms of the Emperor, he followed Joseph to Naples. But he had observed Bonaparte as general and as consul, and had assisted at the birth of the empire. Napoleon had been unable to disguise himself in his presence; he had allowed his feelings to boil over before him, and Roederer had noted them.

Miot, like Roederer, was also a confidant and minister of Joseph. Napoleon was even less guarded in his presence than in Roederer's. With neither of them was his conversa-

tion properly dialogue, but rather a monologue addressed to himself. He would never have spoken to Fouché and Talleyrand as he spoke to them; they were listeners and learners, the others he felt instinctively to be spies, who imposed on him the necessity of complete self-restraint. Thibaudeau occupies an intermediate position; Napoleon was less natural before him than before Miot and Roederer, less constrained than with Fouché and Talleyrand. Thibaudeau's memoirs contain some significant revelations, even when compared with the confessions of Roederer and Miot, for Napoleon was not quite every inch a king, like Louis XIV. Louis XIV. never for a moment unbent; in his bedroom, in the boudoir, and in the council-chamber, he was always and equally magnificent and royal.

Further details may be gleaned from the memoirs of Bourienne, Napoleon's secretary, and from those of Marmont, who was a favourite of the Emperor, and who sometimes makes a shrewd observation. And the collection of the correspondence of General Bonaparte, of the first consul, and of the emperor, now being published by the French government, is rich in political documents, through which we may sometimes catch a glimpse of the man, though far more feebly than in his private letters.

If we set ourselves to read, mark, and digest these documents, a shape gradually glimmers into consistency that had hitherto been hidden behind the flash of arms, the restless whirl of administration, and the pomp of public demonstrations. Those who would understand the real marrow of the Bonapartist policy must make themselves familiar with this esoteric idea of the man.

The first thing to be done is to distinguish between the man and the manner,—between the person and the personification which he puts on. The man is the moral and intelligent substance; the manner or appearance is the mask, the stage-dress, of the man. Napoleon was ever in duplicate. There was the hero or real man, and there was the actor or artificial man, who impersonated the hero; the real man, such as he was to himself—the actor, such as he displayed himself to France; the real man was Bonaparte the general, the actor was the first consul and the Emperor Napoleon. But ever under the hero's mask there was the real hero. When Cæsar disguised himself as Roscius, the real person was not Roscius, but Cæsar. Talma, when he played Sylla in Jouy's tragedy, copied all Napoleon's attitudes to the life. But though the imitation of the outside was perfect, Talma could never for a moment comprehend the man. Ge-

neral Bonaparte was a greater man than the first consul, for he did not act a part. The first consul was greater than the emperor, for he only half acted. The emperor was still great, though he never put off his mask or his boots. He knew how to dazzle France; he had looked through and through the Revolution, and had taken a lesson from the Catos, the Brutuses, and the Cassiuses of the Republic. Its Roman ideal was very suggestive to his Italian nature.

For Napoleon in his very core was a true Italian of the grandest type, akin to those great men of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries who founded the houses of Visconti, Scala, Sforza, and Medici. But he was built on a gigantic scale, and his views were higher and wider than theirs. His eyes were fixed on the Roman empire and on Julius Cæsar. His ideal, his aim, was a new Roman empire, ruling the destinies of the world, centred in France, and concentrated in his person. Such he was in his true Roman nature; but when he put on the Roman mask, he revived the legions and the eagles of the old empire, he dressed up a senate and tribunes, a prefect of his palace, and prefects of his empire. This was as thorough an affectation as the pompous magniloquence of Helvetius or Rousseau. But it masked a man of quite a different stamp. The Roman drapery with which he decked out his person, his army, his court, and his empire was not essential to his idea. He gave an energetic proof of this to the *corps législatif* after his return from Russia. He found them half in revolt; he spoke to them of his throne, his purple, and his spangles, and made them feel the nothingness of all this pomp and parade;—it was as if he had made them reach their fingers, and lay them on the greatness, the reality of the man. If he intoxicated his people and his army with his glitter, it was because his people and army were to be intoxicated with it. He would not let his court, his ministers, or his government adopt it; and, after his return from Elba, he laughed at his senators for wishing to dress themselves as peers. His parade was all for the masses, who had seen no grand sights since the fall of the old *régime*, and for them he organised his triumphant shows.

Here we see the duplicate; Napoleon was a real Cæsar for himself, a draped Cæsar for the army and masses. In the midst of his court he played a different part. There he reestablished the etiquette of the Bourbons and the ceremonial of Louis XIV. This was meant to impose upon the *émigrés*, the Talleyrands, the Roederers, and the rich *bourgeoisie*, who had split with envy at the former court of *noblesse*, and were now proportionately proud of walking side by side with the

old nobles, and of enjoying titles, pensions, decorations, and honours. His victories and his patronage of literature were two more points of contact with Louis XIV. and the ancient *régime*; points equally intelligible to the old courtiers who had accepted places in his palace and to the *bourgeois* parvenus. He petted all the poets of the Revolution, except Lemercier, who was intractable; he proclaimed to the diplomacy of Europe that he was following the old traditions, and carrying on the policy of ancient France. In reality, his policy was entirely new, but it was his manifest interest to assume the mask of the great king in order to conceal the lineaments of the great Cæsar.

This was not all; as conqueror of Europe, and as impersonator of an army, he had to satisfy the glory and the pretensions of his marshals, and to consolidate his system of conquest through them. Hence the third character in his performance—his impersonation of Charlemagne.

In the long-run, no great systems of conquest can be consolidated except by force of arms; armies must be maintained at the cost of great rewards to all ranks,—to generals, to captains, and to the rank and file. Each signal deed must be recompensed. At first honour suffices; as time goes on something more solid is requisite. Estates are confiscated from the conquered to enrich the victors. The conquerors sell them, and spend the money. To establish them in the conquered territory, a new tenure must be introduced. The estates distributed must be made fiefs, distinguished above the rest of the property of the country, and giving a preponderating power to the owners. Thus an order of men dependent on the conqueror will be established in the conquered state. But these estates must be held directly from the conqueror, and their owners must be the foreign vassals of his empire. Here is something like the feudal system of Charlemagne. When the Pope was invited to Paris, to place the mantle of Charlemagne on the shoulders of Napoleon, it was only a third disguise, full of significance for his army and for the countries he had conquered.

Such was the triple character of Napoleon: a Cæsar to his people and army; a Louis XIV. to the courtiers and diplomatists; and a Charlemagne, consecrated by the Pope, and surrounded with his vassals, to his tributaries.

In the personality of every man there is an absolute and a relative element. The absolute element is his positive power, his genius, his faculties. The relative element is the web of associations woven for him by the accidents of his birth and the circumstances of race, country, and family. He is

a child of the soil; from his cradle he assimilates the influences that surround him, and the fireside impressions that crowd upon him; these influences may narrow his circle, but they individualise his affections, and stamp a national character upon him. But take him away from home and country, and educate him outside the sphere of his fellow-citizens, he finds himself, as times go, no longer in contact with his country, but with his age. He becomes a child of the times. His angular individuality is rounded off by being steeped in the common opinions of an age; opinions not peculiar to one people but common to many, not national but European. The age of Napoleon's birth was of this kind; it was not patriotic, but cosmopolite; Europe of the eighteenth century was swayed by opinion, not by public spirit; by the opinion of the age, not by the public spirit of the different nationalities.

To form a correct idea of Napoleon the man, these three elements must be considered and combined—his personal genius or positive power; the influences of birth, country, and family; and the influence of the spirit of the age. We must examine how far he was ruled by these influences, and at what point their power over him ceased.

1. Personally nature had endowed Napoleon with a vast fund of force—a concentrated energy, intense passion, explosive feeling, all under the despotic dominion of his will. In the isolation of the military school he educated himself morally and intellectually; neither masters nor schoolfellows influenced him. That a youth's will should stand him in the stead of discipline is a rare sign of greatness. But his will, though practical and real, and exclusively directed to the strengthening of his character, proposed to itself no ideal, aimed at no end outside the sphere of its own nature. Napoleon would never be a hero of science, nor a martyr of opinion; his only real aim was his own personal strength, energy, and greatness.

In all this there was no vulgar, selfish pleasure-seeking. Riches, honours, advancement were nothing to him. His thirst for glory was Roman, and clear of vanity or brag. He cared not a fig for praise; if he tried to astonish or captivate, it was because he, perhaps unconsciously, wanted to domineer. Like some of the Italians of the Renaissance, he desired renown because he desired power. He tried to astonish and overawe mankind, because it was the way to fascinate them. This is the picture that Joseph gives us of his boyhood; he wished to be great because he wished to stand by himself; he did not care for any glory or greatness that

was to be shared with others. This ambitious direction of the will is characteristic of the intensest development of the Italian nature, as seen in the old Roman republic.

The ideal of Napoleon's young ambition, the aim of his early hopes, was personality in glory, glory for glory's sake, not for the mob, solitary grandeur, isolation from the rest of mankind: to be the object of the enthusiasm of the masses and of the respect of his servants; to be unique of his kind, the cynosure for the eyes of men, the man in whose bent brows the destinies of the world were written. He was not one of Helvetius' sham Romans, like the Girondins, nor one of Rousseau's, like the Jacobins. He had read Plutarch, but was no enthusiast for him; he had none of the Girondin rhetoric, or of the Jacobin fanaticism. He *was* naturally all that the others puffed and blew to transform themselves into by the guidance of the current literature. There was declamation enough in his youthful essays; but Machiavelli and Montesquieu had fixed his attention, and made him superior to the commonplace of big phrases. Though he might sip the teaching of Helvetius and Rousseau, he soon saw how utterly ignorant they were of the Rome whose panegyric they were pronouncing, how Utopian their visions, how impossible their men. Napoleon was Roman in his selfishness, in his individuality, in his asperity. The true Roman temperament was his by nature, he had no need to put himself in a fever to secure it. It was not by education; for he had no classical education, and was no classical Roman; it was in his blood; he was a Roman because he was a true Italian.

2. And here come in the influences of birth and country. Not that the true Italian belongs to this age any more than the true Roman; the modern Italian is usually a traditional and counterfeit classicist, a mere reminiscence. He tries to come out as a Roman after Machiavelli's prescription, but he fails. The Beccarias and the Filangieris were not of the antique stuff; born of Locke, modulated after the echo of the French Revolution, they were mere advocates or artists,—abominations to the young Napoleon. The truest examples of the Italians of the fifteenth century are to be found among the mountaineers of some of the nooks of Italy, especially the small proprietors of Abruzzi and Calabria, or among the monks, the best representatives of the people. These men would soon understand Machiavelli, if they could read him. Specimens of the same kind were under Napoleon's eyes in Corsica, where there might be found a remnant of the real Italian nature,—not only of the Italy of the Renaissance, but also of the violent, passionate, simple, energetic, audacious,

medieval, Guelphic and Ghibelline Italy, with its concentrated rather than ardent feelings, and its strong personal passions, such as were after Napoleon's own heart.

3. The influence of the age on Napoleon is not so readily seen. Nothing could be less modern than his genius, nothing more isolated. This was a great cause of his greatness and strength after he had got an army to support him: for Europe and France strove in vain to comprehend him, and failed to penetrate his meaning.

The era of his birth and education is already out of date to modern Europe. Though its after-taste lingers on the palates of the masses, who still relish the manna of what the Encyclopedists called its *lumières*, yet all minds of mark have shot ahead. Nobody now pins his faith upon Voltaire or Rousseau, Diderot or D'Alembert, Condorcet, Cabanis or Tracy, who arose one after the other to impress the stamp of their opinions on the principles of the Revolution. Deism, rationalism, materialism, social radicalism, scientific and intellectual radicalism, have proved as unsubstantial as Ixion's cloud beneath the scalpel of modern investigation and criticism. Christianity, unhappily, though she is every where recovering from the ruin of the eighteenth century, does not yet know how to make the most of this fact. Who now-a-days believes in the absolute goodness of human nature? Who thinks that all our vices, instead of having their roots in our hearts, are simply the products of our social institutions? Except some few socialists and communists, who now dreams of political Utopias? Who looks forward to the realisation of a terrestrial paradise? The bloody revolution of the eighteenth century proposed to itself the ideal of humanity, of goodness, of deistic philanthropy, and of industrial cosmopolitanism. There were to be no more separate nations, for all men are brethren: the army was to be an armed propaganda, whose duty was to protect the press, the propaganda of peace:—such was the lesson gradually evolved by the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies, by the Directory, and by the Tribunes, till Bonaparte came and gave the lie to the heap of illusions, to which neither the terrorism of the Convention nor the corruption of the Directory had opened men's eyes. This is, if not the single, the great lesson which Napoleon taught; and this proves how utter a stranger he was to his own age, and how insignificant will be his teaching to future times.

The ideal of a virtuous people regenerating itself beneath the dripping planks of the guillotine could have no attractions for young Bonaparte, whose mind was immersed in

visions of his own glory, and was fighting imaginary battles that were to raise him above Cæsar and Alexander,—such a man could have no liking for a cosmopolite philanthropy that would abolish war, fraternise all mankind, disband armies, reduce government to a minimum, replace political combinations by civil administration, and admit of no classes but labourers, artisans, manufacturers, and merchants, all under the direction of natural philosophers and chemists, who were to be charged with the administration of affairs. Napoleon's soul sickened at this *ideology*, as he happily nicknamed it.

Still the age had some influence on young Bonaparte, though not enough to make him a disciple of Rousseau or Condillac. Joseph's memoirs inform us that Napoleon once composed a romance of pure philanthropy, in which society was physicked with a soothing syrup, concocted in accordance with the ideas of the day. Yet even there we see the true Bonaparte at the bottom. His cosmopolite romance was not meant to write up cosmopolitism, but himself. He is his own hero; he is the centre of all political movement and organising action, the imaginary Crusoe of a political idyl. Joseph was deceived by it, but then Napoleon always laughed at the dash of sentimentalism in his character. But his great-uncle, to whose death-bed he was conducted, understood him better, and spoke of him as a *Uomone*,—something great, mighty, Cæsarean: he saw the eagle nestling in his breast and struggling in his brain; and the furrows that seamed his forehead appeared to the old man like the bars of a cage that the royal bird was striving to break.

Of all the brothers, Joseph and Louis alone seriously adopted the cosmopolite philanthropy of the age. Jerome had no ideality or ambition of any kind; but Lucien had a mind akin to Napoleon's, and proved himself capable of seconding his brother on two memorable occasions,—when he helped him to the first consulate at St. Cloud, and when he defended the throne of the Bonapartes at the fall of the second empire. At other times there was little affection between the two brothers; their ambitions crossed, and Lucien would never allow the emperor to domineer over him.

We must now consider the relations of Napoleon to the Revolution. Once in the territory of the republic, he soon began to show what he was made of. His astonishment was only equalled by his disdain when he saw Paris in the power of an insurrectionary mob; he scorned the throne that could not defend itself against so contemptible a foe,—a foe that could have no will of its own, no plan, no unity. Of all

human things, he considered a mob to be least human; it had no head, no heart; it was the most incompetent leader, the feeblest fighter. The man, he thought, was the chief who commands and the warrior who obeys. A mob was but an abortive blunder. The extent to which in after-life he carried this notion is notorious; any nation that revolted from him was at once a mob, a *foule*. The Calabrians, the Spaniards, the Portuguese, the Russians, were, all and each, mobs. He exaggerated this idea till he lost sight of nationality, and could not conceive a subject people to be any thing but a recruiting-ground for his victorious armies. Though he had a high idea of the English, he never attained to the true idea of a nation; he never could comprehend it as a coherent whole of political and social powers, he could never look at it as more than a machine for war, or the subject-matter for administration and government. This fatal scorn of nationality, which ruined him at last, partly owed its beginnings to the disgust with which he saw that demented mob returning in brutal and insolent triumph from the destruction of the Bastille.

Yet, in spite of his Coriolanus-like scorn of the mob,—in spite of his inflexible despotic will;—in spite of his passion for race, which would have invented a pedigree, if he had possessed none of his own;—in spite of a feeling that would have made him, like the first Sforza, throw away his spade at the sight of a troop of horse, and clutch the sword that was to become a sceptre;—in spite of his contempt for triviality of thought or lowness of origin;—in spite of all this, Napoleon, the born anti-revolutionist, became a Jacobin, and to all appearance a sincere one.

He was no leveller by nature; but he soon discovered that the Girondins, with all their big words, did nothing; and of all contemptible things, next to the incoherence of an insurrectionary mob, mere talk was the worst. But among the Jacobins there were some who could act, and did act; action, however absurd, was something; it had some consequences, it was the road of ambition, the way to be great. Therefore he became a Jacobin provisionally, to set himself a-going. The phase was brief, and not very smooth. He attended some clubs, but always in his uniform, and he conducted himself with moderation. He soon found out that the Jacobins thought like a mob, and were subject to its epidemic agitations; but he fixed his eyes on one who was an exception to the rest,—the only one who could act, or speak, or hold his tongue, according to the occasion; the only one that still powdered his hair, dressed in the old fashion, refused

to exchange the language of the old court for that of the sans-culottes, and was systematically cold and inexorable. Maximilien Robespierre, one of the narrowest-minded of men, bilious rather than strong, was as far from being a mere declaimer as the times allowed, could pursue a definite object, could silence opponents, and could inspire a fanatical attachment. Napoleon acknowledged Robespierre to be *somebody*; a person and not a thing; and it was to his person and his policy,—not to his guillotine and his murders,—that he gave a temporary adhesion. Robespierre's brother made him governor of Toulon, and thus opened the door to his career.

Napoleon at Toulon was Jacobin; he appeared in the same character at Paris when the Directory employed him to sweep the counter-revolution from the streets; not that he loved the revolution, but he wished to use it. He had already determined to ruin the Directory when he was helping it to put down its enemies. Perhaps he was even then dreaming of yoking both the revolution and the counter-revolution to his chariot, knowing that there was no other hand to guide them, no one else that could make them run together. His Jacobinism was only a result of that fearless decision of character which afterwards conducted him to the empire.

We must now pass to another point, which concerns the great conqueror's personal genius, not the military or administrative genius which enabled him to regulate an empire or a camp with a view equally comprehensive. The moment he came upon the stage of the world, he began to discuss with Joseph, from whom he had no secrets, the question, whether he should be a Cæsar in the West, or an Alexander in the East? should he be Greek or Frank, Roman or Corsican? Oh, he could divide himself and go to buffets on the doubt! Would it be possible for him to discipline and unite revolutionary and counter-revolutionary France? Could he take the army of Italy as his starting-point? Could he change first Europe and then the world, and set it spinning on his fire-new French axle? or was it all a dream?

He was often in anxiety about his fortune; more than once he shifted his sails, and tried another tack. She had played him some dog-tricks; as yet he had grasped only the hem of her garment, he had not got hold of the hair of her head. He would quit France and go to Constantinople, discipline the Turkish army and raise the Ottoman hordes. Or he would throw himself on the East, set Islam in a blaze, and establish his power in the interior of Asia, or by the shores of the Red Sea. Such were the projects that flitted through his embittered brain. He would astonish the world,

or perish in the attempt. He had discovered, one might almost say created, the *dash* of the French soldier, only to see the army of Italy taken out of his hands by the suspicious Convention or the stupid Directory,—so he would throw himself into the arms of the Turk, whose pride might be inflamed by the magnificence of his destiny. It was a mere dream; but a dream that could only occur to a great mind, which can extract a practical view even from a chimera. An ambitious temperament like his can never, in modern Europe, be otherwise than chimerical; it is always abnormal, always in opposition to the reason of the age, always offensive to its civilisation, always injurious to its future. The revolution alone could make a Napoleon possible; not because he was a revolutionist, but because he could use the revolution as his instrument, and could make it contradict its own principles.

In the East all things are possible; the fatalism of the Coran invests every adventure with grandeur, and makes it practicable for the moment. Napoleon knew this. But what could he have done with the dull effete Turk? In spite of his fondness for them, how could he have united the Arabs, who have no more cohesion than the sands of their own deserts?

He solved these perplexities by dragging the unwilling Directory into the Egyptian expedition. Thanks to Josephine's influence over Barras, he was left to do as he liked. His designs were furthered by Talleyrand and Roederer, and the other ambitious men who had one foot in the revolution and the other in the counter-revolution, and were ready for any change save the return of the Bourbons, of whose forgiveness they despaired. The Egyptian expedition was an isthmus between two continents; it put, for the time, a two-edged sword into his hands. He might take his choice between Cæsar and the West, and Alexander and the East.

But even as general of the army of Egypt he was not yet ripe for his destiny. He was playing for the world, and the odds were still against him. He had an army, it is true; but the stroke of a red-tapist's pen at Paris might any day deprive him of it. He had no hold on the nation, no chance offered of seizing the supreme power. But when he had once conceived the idea of his return from Egypt, it was another affair. He soon penetrated the ins-and-outs of the situation; he made cat's-paws of those who wanted to trade on his glory; he took the measure of Talleyrand, Roederer, Thibaudeau, Fouché, and Sieyès; he counted on Joseph and Lucien, not without some doubt and hesitation; but he let them see that his personal greatness was the only soil in

which their ambition could take root and thrive ; that unless they were grafted on him, they would soon wither away.

Discounting a few oscillations, from this moment he may be said to have calculated all contingencies, and made all his combinations. Though not always master of his passions, it needed a sharp eye to pierce them ; his brothers alone could penetrate him. Henceforth his destiny was determined, and he kept it in his own hands. He would neither be driven nor led. He would be nobody's tool. He would take his own time, and would not hurry himself by a single minute for any one ; he took steps to secure his brothers' obedience, and pre-arranged the disgrace of Lucien. His brothers should be like members of his own body, but only on conditions. He would raise them to greatness, but they should be what he chose to make them and nothing else. How unnatural it was in them to rebel against him, how wrong of Lucien to understand him too well, of Joseph to understand him so ill ! He allowed them to see through his designs, but he required them to merge their personality in him. His brothers were the most essential feature of his political system, but they by no means answered his expectations. His complaints of them were bitter. Why could not Joseph and Lucien forget themselves, and remember nobody but Napoleon ? Were they not limbs of his body, parts of his very being ?

The fault that Napoleon always found with his brothers was, that they did not make themselves what he wished ; did not think as he thought, feel as he felt, nor devote themselves soul and body to his interests. He wanted them to anticipate his desires, and to obey before he had issued the order. He set Eugene Beauharnais before them as a model of filial attachment, and Hortense as a type of devotion. His policy was a family system, like the Arab sheick's, with his nucleus of sons and brothers in the midst of his circle of liegemen. He loved all his relations, but with a selfish love, as the limbs of his own body ; he suffered when they were hurt, and sympathised truly with their sorrows. But he sneered at their foolish amusements, when they seemed to forget their Bonaparte blood ; thus he made himself rather feared than sincerely beloved in his family. The forest-king was condemned to solitude, even while reposing majestically by the side of his lioness, or while gamboling with his cubs.

Italian as he was, he had not the harmony and completeness of the old Italian character. He could never attain to the clearness of vision, to the perspicacity and calmness which distinguished Cæsar. He was not as logical with himself as

he should have been. This defect, in a character of such energy, explains the worst instances of his rashness, his rage, and his indomitable rather than insatiable ambition. He belonged to the middle ages rather than to that classical antiquity whose life was simple, homogeneous; which aimed at unity of character, and harmony of the passions, ideas, and sentiments; which directed, but never thwarted nature,—unlike Christianity, which is a battle against the passions. Moreover, the social system of the Greeks and Romans was not complicated with the admixture of foreign nationalities. It was all changed after the Celts, Germans, and Slaves had established themselves in various parts of Greece and of the Empire. Strange languages, barbarous manners, new ideas, foreign feelings, leavened the old civilisation. Christianity came in, and set Greek and Roman, Celt, German, and Slave to combat the old man each in his own person. The roaring loom of time was weaving the web of a new world, and from this tangled coil the medieval nations of Europe had their birth. They were people of energetic passions energetically restrained; men ever militant, striving to model their life on the ideal of another world. Thus the simplicity and unity of the classical ideal stands in direct contrast with that of the middle ages, especially as developed among the Latin-speaking nations, where the contending civilisations were brought more closely together. If the Italians preserved the largest share of the classical spirit, they also inherited the greatest proportion of medieval passion. Napoleon was a living example of this well-nigh extinct species. His reason, his passion, and his imagination, were not in equilibrium.

Nor were the times apt to restore the balance. The eighteenth century presented a thick jungle of opinions, which, if they sent out vigorous suckers, also covered the ground with dead leaves. Aristocracy in decomposition; democracy developing; Christianity retreating; Deism advancing, but sapped by scepticism; materialism dogmatising atheism; the literature of Louis XIV. going out of date, that of Louis XV. setting the fashion; the school of D'Alembert giving birth to the Academy of Sciences, and the Academy changing into an *Institut of savants* leavened with Condorcet's double ambition of ruling the state, and of leading the intellect of mankind. All this was jumbled together in men's minds with reminiscences of classical antiquity and relics of Epicureanism, during Napoleon's youth and at his first start in life. Under such circumstances, we could not expect from his temperament either the harmony of a Cæsar or the unity of

an Alexander; much less could we reasonably look for those higher qualities which distinguished Charlemagne,—magnanimous and sublime simplicity and unswerving rectitude.

His education was equally at fault. Alexander, the scholar of Aristotle, had been formed by a great mind on great models. Cæsar, as an Epicurean, kept his philosophy to himself, without pretending to apply it to the world. Napoleon had made no solid studies except in mathematics, had formed no real judgment but for the exact sciences, and really liked nothing but natural history. The rest of his education was a dead letter; but he had not Cæsar's liberality; he could only regard literature as a political engine, or at best a decoration for his throne; he was beneath his times in all the essential elements of intellectual culture; hence he invariably failed in his attempts to found an Imperial University, and to impose it as a model upon the learning and education of Europe.

The secret of his ascendancy over men was, that his wonderful intellect could flash light on his whole horizon at a glance, could seize on all circumstances, all accidents, all changes, however unexpected; no variation of the political atmosphere found him unprepared. He was never off his guard, for a thousand ways and means opened before him on the instant, and in any emergency he soon regained his balance. His horizon may not have been as wide as Cæsar's or Alexander's, but it was wide enough. If he had not Alexander's encyclopedic knowledge of the world, or Cæsar's unprejudiced freedom of mind, he probably excelled them both in rapidity of view. An instantaneous inspiration flashed across him when the most unexpected events seemed to be conspiring against his star. His superiority was in the sphere of the *unexpected*, much more than in that of reflection and deliberation. If his genius sometimes played him false, it was only in his decline, and after he had grossly misused his fortune. The resources of his imagination and his judgment were most abundant when the situation seemed most desperate, even though he had become involved by his own fault. And yet, when danger thickened around him, when he tempted his fortune and risked his capital like a gambler, there was always a possibility that his resources might fail under the very encumbrance of their wealth.

Whenever he felt it necessary to clear his ideas, he spoke out to some of the hard heads that surrounded him,—not to ask their advice, but to disentangle his thoughts, and fix his conceptions; or else to transplant his seedling ideas into other men's minds, to be there cultivated and perfected.

Knowing nothing of legislation or of civil affairs, he got competent men to talk of them, appropriated their notions, stamped them in the mint of his own brain, and uttered them as his own coinage,—not always with complete success, for he was in too great a hurry; as soon as he had a glimpse of a thing, he fancied he had already mastered it, and thus his readiness and decision sometimes betrayed him.

But in spite of the encumbrances of his mental opulence, of his intemperate passion, and of his impatient rapidity, he was a born ruler of men. He did not persuade their reason or win their affections, but he knocked them down—he dumfounded them with wonder and amazement. His action was neither social nor intellectual, but imperial and administrative; and if he sowed a whole harvest of future difficulties, he reaped in his day the most absolute obedience without exciting outside his army the least true enthusiasm for his cause. What enthusiasm could there be for a man whose sole cause was his own person? His ascendancy was simply personal. Nothing could be more diametrically opposed to the aspirations and ideas of his epoch than were his principles; he subdued men, therefore, without converting them, he ruled them without gaining their affections. He would have given the world to be beloved; it was a bitter grief to him that he could not reach the hearts and minds of those of whose lives and fortunes he disposed. But how could a man who represented no principle, who was only the organ of his own cause, win the minds of mankind?

He revenged himself on mankind by despising them; and his contempt for them was fatal to him. Not but that he could appraise individuals at their true worth, as soldiers, men of science, or administrators; not but that he could flatter them, caress them, and exalt each of them in his own sphere. But the few men that resisted him he hated, and the rest he despised, perhaps for their unctuous obsequiousness. The Spanish war was the first thing that traversed the march of his designs. He bellowed for the truth, but detested those who told it; for he required the very stars in their courses to fight for his plans, and to favour his interests, and he loudly gave the lie to facts when they crossed his projects. Yet he complained bitterly of the truth being kept from him, of people not wanting him to know it, and of Joseph and Roederer, and the rest of his ministers, being too great fools to see it. He had done the same thing before the Spanish war, while Joseph was at Naples. At one time he wanted Corfu and Sicily; at another, when Marmont was in Illyria, he wanted to have a direct influence in Bosnia,

through an alliance with the Pasha, and a finger in the affairs of Albania and the Slavonic provinces of Turkey,—for he entertained ulterior views in regard to the Albanians and the Bosniaes, who now seemed to him of better blood than the muddle-headed Turks. All the time that he was master of the Adriatic he kept his eyes on Syria and Egypt. But how was he to manage England? No matter—Joseph and his admirals must be made responsible for the English fleet. He would not see what only a fool could have failed to see. Not that he was a fool, but this was his way of whipping the sea, like Xerxes, and of exhibiting his anger against the fatality which would not yield to his star. Joseph, or one of his naval officers, was almost always the unhappy whipping-post.

He heard a voice within him, which spoke louder than all the facts in the world. Though the West opened her arms to him, while the East was closing to him, yet it was for the East that his ambition yearned. There he might hit England a heavier blow than the continental blockade had proved to be,—if he could but enlist Russia without paying her with Constantinople; if he could secure Corfu and Sicily and the port of Cattaro, and establish his influence in Bosnia. It was with this idea that he employed so many agents like Badia throughout the East, especially in Arabia;—men who depended on him alone, over whose minds he had ensured a personal sway, and whose enthusiasm he had enlisted on his side. As emperor, he never lost sight of one of the projects that had flitted through his brain in Italy and in Egypt. Once master of the Mediterranean, he would infallibly become, as he thought, master of the world. His anger with Marmont and his resentment at Joseph's deplorable carelessness and stupidity, were but stalking-horses to cover his disappointment.

His impatience of fortune and his contempt for men were twin sentiments, which waxed as his chances of securing the Mediterranean waned. No good could come of them. A divine Nemesis dogs those who so scornfully slight the creatures of God. He in whose eyes the Calabrian patriots, the Spaniards, Portuguese, and Russians, were mere mobs, who could designate the great Baron Stein as *le nommé Stein*, and could officially treat men of the calibre of Fichte, Frederic Schlegel, and Görres, as so much mud, had small right to whine over the treachery of destiny and the fickleness of friends, when his own hour was come.

There was really but little reason why men should have been faithful to him; the armies that he had drawn from

revolutionised France, and the police which he had organised in the empire, were only the pedestal for his greatness, and had been systematically administered for his own purposes. It was mere policy to spare the finances of France as much as possible, to quarter his armies upon Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany, or Russia, and to consolidate French power in the conquered countries by rewarding his soldiers with grants of land. Yet he had a real love for the French; and in return the masses of the French people were devoted to him, though they understood him not. The leaders of the Revolution served him, because he seemed the only possible barrier to the return of the old *régime*. The *émigrés*, who had accepted places in his court, looked upon him as the most effectual barrier against revolution. The *Institut* was interested in his cause, because he had made some of its most celebrated members into senators; the great body of writers accepted pensions from him. It was a most mortifying fact that he could get no hold of their minds; his censorship of the press, and his *Bureau de l'Esprit publique*, a department of his state police, were a poor compensation. His army was interested in him, for he spared the blood of his own soldiers, and was only prodigal of the lives of his auxiliaries;* while, on the other hand, he always sent his guard into the battle at the decisive moment; greedy of honour for them, he grudged to share it with others, and thus kept them always at the boiling-point of glory.

He never spoke disrespectfully of the French; never respectfully of the Italians, the Spaniards, or the Portuguese. The Germans were ridiculously clumsy stick-in-the-muds, the Russians were slaves. The Poles, as allies of the French, were passable; the English Parliament was respectable, though odious, as the great obstacle to his designs. The Dalmatians, Croats, Albanians, Bosniacs, and Arabs, were hopeful young military races, with whom great things might be done in the East. The rest of mankind was only food for powder.

He loved the French peasants,—and with reason; it was of their sinew and muscle that his chariot of victory was compacted. He admired the French artisan for his ready wit, his good-will, and his handy versatility. He was proud

* Thiers tells us (*Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*, tom. xvi. p. 69), that Napoleon said to Metternich at Dresden, “‘J’ai perdu, cela est vrai, deux cent mille hommes en Russie; il y avait dans ce nombre cent mille soldats français des meilleurs; ceux-là je les regrette,—oui, je les regrette vivement. Quant aux autres, c’étaient des Italiens, des Polonais, et principalement des Allemands.’ A ces paroles Napoléon ajouta un geste qui signifiait que cette dernière perte le touchait peu.”

of his engineers, who made roads and constructed fortresses for him on the salient points of the conquered countries. It cannot be said that he was quite unfeeling; he loved his family and the French. But these two affections were only subordinate parts of his selfish ambition,—that dominant passion, which, like the rod of Moses, swallowed up every thing else.

His political system depended on the instruments he was obliged to employ. He succeeded in calling an army into existence. He had no success in creating a body of administrators inspired with his views and desires. The auditors of the Council of State, which he meant for a seminary of ministers, were men of the age, and could devote themselves to his service; but they could never identify themselves with his views, for the simple reason that they never knew what they were. The secret both of the strength and weakness of Napoleon's system lay in this. There was a subtle and perpetual antagonism between his personal views and the real destinies of Europe, as determined by the religious, moral, social, scientific, and intellectual antecedents of its civilisation. The only sympathy that Napoleon naturally had was with science; he was especially hostile to all movement of free thought, to every intellectual development which he could not guide and shape at his pleasure. The Revolution had put mighty instruments into his hands—the army, the *Institut*, and a centralised administration, conducted by men who had been aggrandised by the Revolution, and were personally interested in the maintenance of his power. But Christendom is not like Islam; fatalists submit soul and body to a conqueror, not so Christians. If Napoleon could have created a duplicate of himself, and made him Pope, he might have appropriated the faith of Southern Europe. But that was impossible; and his system remained irreconcilable with the free progress of philosophy, jurisprudence, and history.

This was the weakness of his career; he was condemned to be the phoenix of his race, the sole specimen of his species; and his system was but the function of his person; it had no independent vitality or value. It grew out of no past, embodied no present, and consequently could lead to no future. He represented neither the ideas of an age, nor the spirit of a nation; his ideas and his spirit were his own. He was a wonderfully great man, but his greatness was purely personal. But this was not enough for his ambition. Though he was neither the historical representative of a nationality, nor the intellectual representative of an age, but only the outward and visible sign of his own inward ambition and

terrible will, he yet wished to perpetuate himself to future generations, to annex Europe to his person, and to brand it with his name. He wished to survive in the structure of European society, like the Pharaohs in their pyramids. All its institutions were to receive the impress of his mind, and to be moulded by his personal character. This was his one gigantic mistake, and he was the first to awake from its brief illusions, and to experience its lasting disappointment.

But though others failed to comprehend his policy, it was clear enough to himself. When he reëstablished the style of Louis XIV., with its stiff etiquette and ceremonial; when he pretended to follow the direction of Talleyrand, and to adopt his forms of diplomacy; when he made a show of consulting Roederer because he had seen the old *régime*, took M. de Narbonne into his service, and employed Caulaincourt, his object was to impose, not upon the revolutionised French nation, but upon the *salons* of Paris, which were on one hand a relic of the old *régime*, and on the other the traditionary representatives of the philosophic *salons* of the eighteenth century, and upon the diplomatic and aristocratic world at Vienna and Berlin, and especially at St. Petersburg. Hence the extreme importance which he seemed to attach to the Parisian theatres; hence his ambition of having the best orchestra, the most fashionable opera, the most brilliant music, in Europe, and of amusing foreign society with the court-circular of the Tuileries, with the plays of the *Théâtre français*, and with the news of literature and art. He wished his brothers to echo this note at their capitals, Naples and Madrid; he wished the same *fêtes* and spectacles to be given at Milan, the Hague, and Cassel; so that men might every where see in the new empire the revival of the state maxims, the diplomacy, and the policy of Louis XIV.

Not that Louis and Napoleon had much in common. Louis XIV. had renounced the system of Philippe le Bel, so unfortunately revived by Francis I. He did not aspire to be Cæsar, or to restore to the throne of France the sovereignty of Germany and Italy. On the contrary, he explicitly recognised the rank of the emperor, and his priority even to the king of France; his pride respected the imperial dignity, even while his ambition was pulling down the emperor. His policy was that of Richelieu and Mazarin—to weaken the emperor in Germany and Italy by making the German and Italian princes dependent on his purse, as he had already subsidised the Stuarts and the great personages of Sweden, Hungary, and Poland. He wished to make the house of Bourbon practically the strongest in Europe; but, except in the case

of Spain, he never tried to graft the thrones of Europe on to the Bourbon stock. He limited his conquests to the interior of France; he got rid of the Austro-Spanish influence; he took possession of Alsace, and provided for the acquisition of Lorraine. But he never desired to seize the Austrian Low Countries; his aspirations were bounded by what was possible and reasonable for a king of France to desire. Though his pride united Europe against him, he had never thought of partitioning Europe.

Whatever he might say to the courts of Europe, clearly Louis XIV. was not Napoleon's model. All the times, during his long wars, that he was obliged to drain a fresh army from the generous soil of France, his manifestoes to the people never mentioned Louis XIV., whose memory had been eclipsed by the Revolution; but he talked of the *perfidie Albion*, that desired to ruin French ports and French commerce, and to deprive France of the Rhine, her natural frontier, which the Revolution had secured to her; he spoke of England, which had robbed France of her colonies, stifled her industry, raised coalitions, and armed Europe against her; which would never be still, never feel secure, till France was ruined, invaded, and dismembered. England had forced him to annex Holland, Westphalia, and the mouths of the Rhine, the Weser, and the Elbe; had obliged him to invade Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Russia, and to occupy Rome. For his own part, he would have given peace to the world, if England had not forced upon him the system of conquests. Moreover, he proclaimed that the French had a mission of civilisation to feudal, mediæval, barbarous Europe: the European nations wanted enlightenment; they longed for a liberator to bestow on them civil equality, and to give them codes and laws. They stretched out their fettered hands to France to deliver them from their oppressors. Such was his constant language to the French people.

Compare this with his letters to Joseph, where we may trace his real undisguised thoughts. There we do not find a word about the policy of Louis XIV., not a letter about *perfidie Albion*, not a line about civilisation and enlightenment; but much about the feudal system which he was founding in all the conquered countries for the benefit of the French army. Nothing can be more monotonous than his reflections upon his destiny: his policy was only a strategic game for the benefit of his ambition. The only question he ever asked was; "In this or that given circumstance, how am I to preserve my balance? how can I turn it to my own advantage? What sunken rocks are there in the way? What do my in-

terests require?" His science is that of a tactitian, of a chess-player. It may have been the system of Cæsar, Sforza, or Borgia; it was not the original inspiration of a Charlemagne, nor the political prudence of Henri IV, Richelieu, Mazarin, or Louis XIV., still less did it resemble the propagandism of the Revolution. It bore some slight resemblance to the system of Philippe le Bel and the successors of Louis XI. But it was a different game.

What he really said to himself, when he aspired to be the great man of the age, the one world-enthraling figure, was of this kind: "I have nothing in common with the Revolution; I am no ideologist like Condorcet, no cosmopolite like La Fayette, no democrat like the men of the Convention, neither am I a simple *parvenu* like the members of the Directory. It is not my ambition to realise an idea, a sentiment, or a constitution, religious, civil, or political. My object is the world, because I feel I have within me stuff enough to fill the world, to mould it to my will, and to stamp it with my ideas. There is nothing vulgar in my aim, for my genius raises me above the rest of men. By sovereignty of nature and by right of conquest, I am the constituent principle of the future; my successors will only have to follow my steps in order to remain masters of the world. All the monarchs, all the old aristocracies, of Europe are bitterly hostile to me; I have strangled the Revolution in my grip, and I must create a new aristocracy out of my army. The Bourbons have been ejected from France; I must clear them out of Europe. My family shall reign in Italy and Spain; all its members shall feel the reverberation of my fortune. Him that resists, I will crush, as I did Lucien; list or loth, they shall all enter into the combinations of my policy."

So, after establishing his sisters in Italy, Napoleon sought alliances for the Beauharnais family in Germany. At one stroke he called into being two confederations: the Helvetic, to assist him in his anti-Austrian policy; and the Confederation of the Rhine, to help him in his plans upon Prussia and Austria. His marriage with Marie-Louise was much more a social than a political affair. Politically, its only meaning could be to create a counterpoise to Russia by the gradual extension of Austria in Eastern Europe at her expense. But this was never seriously meant; for he was, at the same time, trying to direct Russia against the Persians, and thus to get her out of Central Europe, but without ceding to her either Wallachia or Constantinople. In fact, his unsleeping jealousy prevented his ever adopting any solution with hearty and entire honesty. For while he was scheming the dismember-

ment of Turkey in favour of Austria, and the extension of Russian preponderance over the Caucasus, Armenia, and Persia, he was frustrating both these plans by his missions to Teheran and Constantinople. Napoleon allowed Alexander to imagine that he was to share the world with him, and encouraged Francis in the illusion that, as his son-in-law, he would help him to Moldavia and Servia. But the strengthening of any great power external to his own would always have been intolerable to him.

If it had been possible, his real wish was to ruin the two houses of Hapsburg and Hohenzollern; but in the teeth of the popular excitement the labour was too herculean even for him. More than once he meditated the destruction of Prussia; but he never dared execute his design while Russia was powerful. Nor could he in prudence attempt to annihilate the Austrian empire while its incoherent parts retained such energetic vitality. He found the two confederations especially useful in helping him to erase the traditions of ancient Germany; for he soon found that victories will not accomplish every thing.

Napoleon's jealousy of every real power, however insignificant, was a morbid passion that betrayed him into the worst mistakes. A new kingdom of Poland, in the hands of one of his lieutenants, would have been an ample protection for Western Europe against Russia. But he chose to penetrate into the heart of Russia chiefly because he was jealous of Poland. If he had spared his army, instead of spending it on that Quixotic adventure, he might have continued to rule Europe for years. He might have satisfied the maw of one of his marshals with Northern Germany. The grand-duchy of Mecklenburg was clearly cut out for Davoust. Prussia, separated by Poland from Russia, would have been checkmated by his kingdom of Westphalia. Such an unstable equilibrium of antagonistic forces was too violent and unnatural to last long; but it might have lasted his time, if he had been content to organise what he had overcome. But his visions were boundless; and his hot-house policy could only abide the hasty growth of forced vegetation.

Though he created a kind of feudal France in the conquered countries, where he formed great fiefs for his marshals, and endowed whole corps of his army with estates, in France itself such a thing would not have been borne. The uttermost that he could have done would have been to decree the inalienability of the estate connected with the title, though even this was contrary to the principles of his code. But out of France there was no difficulty, but every facility; it flattered

the pride of his soldiers, and riveted the chains of a population which might be tempted to rebellion—for they were always foreigners in his eyes: he never identified Italy or the German provinces of his empire with France proper, though he had brought them within the sphere of his administration and his codes.

The introduction of senatorial titles into France was due to the greenness of the revolutionary levellers, who were lunatics enough to fill their mouths with the official titles of the Roman republic. After having senators, tribunes, and consuls, it was no great stretch to disguise some of them as dukes, marquises, and counts. At bottom the revolutionary classes of Frenchmen were crazy for titles—all except a few savages of Jacobins, a few ideologists, who nevertheless consented to be ennobled, and a few Americanising democratic radicals. He made wonderful play with these baubles, and limed with them the very men who had been most furious with the old *noblesse* for barring against them the avenue of the court, the army, the navy, and the diplomatic corps, and for making them put up with a hundred humiliations.

Unlike all the rest, the peasants and artisans asked for nothing, and had no other ambition than to serve him disinterestedly, devotedly, fanatically. He was their hero, their darling; they never abandoned him,—not even when he had bled them to death. In his eyes they were the real French people, the national power. He had always a kind word for them: never had they been so petted since the days of Henri IV. Different as Napoleon and Henri were, the one all French, the other all Italian, they were both true soldiers: Henri laughed and joked with his people; Napoleon slapped their faces, or pulled their ears, in genial horse-play. He told them that at the bottom of each of his brave soldiers' knapsacks there was the baton of a marshal of France. His generals all cooled as his wars lengthened; but for his lieutenants and captains his wars were never long enough, and his soldiers never murmured at any thing their emperor did.*

His passion for chemistry led him to take the greatest interest in the fabrics which owe so much to that science. He founded the manufacturing interest, which, with the profession of arms, was the only social development for which he really cared. He respected men of science and manufacturers because he esteemed their calling.

* In 1813 three marshals asked to be relieved of their command—Macedonald, Oudinot, and Ney. The latter wrote to Berthier: "Le moral des généraux, et en général des officiers, est singulièrement ébranlé: commander ainsi n'est commander qu'à demi, et j'aimerais mieux être grenadier."

He instituted the auditor's office in his council of state to be an apprenticeship for his prefects. They were chosen with his usual penetration, and in process of time France and her dependencies were filled with ambitious and devoted partisans of the imperial despotism. On the other hand, the pupils of the Polytechnic School, from which his corps of engineers were supplied, instructed as they were by ideologues, or men of Condorcet's school, always longed for a military and scientific republic. The engineers were so necessary to Napoleon, that he never dared either turn away or change the masters, so the school always remained a hotbed of republicanism.

History, theology, and jurisprudence, had no place in his system. History could only be tolerated when cut down to a panegyric of his absolutism; he would allow some few educated men to read Machiavelli and Montesquieu (not the *Spirit of Laws*, but the *Greatness and Decay of the Romans*), from which he said a breviary of princes might be compiled. Tacitus was only a calumnious liar. Napoleon knew nothing of the marrow of history. He was utterly indifferent to all pictures of manners, and to all that did not relate to ambition, power, command. He considered that theology only raised futile and insoluble questions, which in turn called up metaphysical questions, a hundred times more futile and insoluble, and dangerous to boot. Priests were useful to preach up the religious duty of submission to Cæsar; but if they were not watched, they would want to rule Cæsar themselves. All philosophy turned to ideology, and all ideology to republicanism. He patronised Bonald, who was then tutor to the present Emperor, not because he admired his talents, but because Bonald supported absolutism, and attacked the ideologists. But he would not allow a regular controversy between Bonald and Tracy; the combatants were ordered to confine themselves to allusions, to a skirmish of outposts, without venturing a battle.

Lawyers he detested as a swarm of small demagogues. They never played any part in his empire. Under him all the higher spheres of thought in France collapsed; but he evoked a passionate enthusiasm for conquest and dominion. He wanted to see her mistress of Europe.

When Napoleon, as first consul, had to give a constitution to his future empire, he was encumbered with the Directory, and all the antecedents of the Revolution, as well as with the carcasses of the still-born constitutions, honeycombed with a preposterous and impure clubbism. But there still survived two great tendencies; one, that of the constituent, represented by Siéyès, Talleyrand, and Roederer, and by Thibaudeau and

Merlin of Douai, who had both belonged to the Convention. These maintained the principles of the *droit coutumier*, or common law of the old *régime*. The other was the southern school of Roman or statute lawyers, systematic opponents of the common law. Among these were Cambacérès, Portalis, Siméon, and others, all monarchists, all friends of codification, and all men of much greater judicial than administrative ability. The atheistic *savants* of the *Institut*, with Cabanis at their head, wanted a scientific republic; the others wanted a throne with any body but a Bourbon to sit in it, supported by the middle classes that had been called into existence by the various revolutionary governments. Monarchical opinions found a home in the Council of Ancients, which afterwards developed into the Senate: while republicanism muttered in the *tribunat*, which the irony of fortune converted into the mute *corps législatif* of the empire.

Napoleon cared little for the name of things, or for their outside shell. He came to a perfect understanding with Talleyrand, Roederer, and Cambacérès, made advances to Merlin of Douai, and consulted Portalis and Siméon. To counteract the opposition of the *tribunat*, he found it necessary to make use of the shallow but solid-seeming doctrinalism of Siéyès. It was between this man and the first consul that the subtle and slow game of the evolution of the constitutions of the empire was played. It is curious to note Napoleon's address in trading upon the starched pedantry of his colleague, the impetuosity and hasty sallies of the one, and the snail's pace and suspicious drawing-in of horns of the other, and their reconciliation by the united efforts of Talleyrand and Roederer. The offspring of these labours of the two consuls was that embryo constitution, which the Emperor completed by giving it a senate, important but impotent, and a highly-paid *corps législatif*, taken from the highest classes of the landed proprietors, but never intended to say any thing. Yet it was this *corps* that first showed signs of impatience shortly before the fall of the empire. The senate never woke up till the empire was defunct, and then only to ensure its own safety by proclaiming a new *régime*.

The imperial crown was sanctioned by a strange combination of election and consecration. Napoleon wished to derive his rights from the people abdicating their sovereignty in his favour. His consecration was to detach him from the people that had elected him. Democracy or the republic, and theocracy or the priesthood, were to combine for a moment, and then resign all their rights to him, and become his very obedient slaves. After this was done, the *émigrés* came back

with all their old titles, and a new *noblesse* was selected from the ranks of the Revolution; among these new aristocrats figured some of the most blatant patriots—Carnot, Grégoire, Lajuinais, and Tracy. This attempt to reconcile old France with the new could only succeed by eliminating the most essential characteristics of each.

As a fatalist Napoleon sympathised more with the teaching of Mahomet than with that of the Gospel. He felt that he carried within him his own and the world's destiny. This brought him into contact with the Chaldaic superstition which had been current in Europe in connection with the fortune of the Roman Cæsars, and had reappeared in the Arabian astrology of the middle ages, and in Italy of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, under the sway of the Visconti, the Sforze, and the other brigand chiefs. Catherine de' Medici introduced astrology into France, but it soon died out. Wallenstein was a fatalist, but of a different stamp. The only dreamy part of Napoleon's mind was that which brooded on his destiny, and which felt so powerful an attraction towards the Arabs and the East. His fatalism prevented his being an atheist. He believed in two orders, that of nature and that of will; he believed in the power which inspired him, and in his own genius. With these ideas he could neither be ideologist nor atheist, could not form the world out of a fortuitous concourse of atoms, nor the human soul out of a fortuitous aggregation of impressions and feelings. He was no Protestant; for he did not admit the principle of private judgment, nor allow each man to have his own opinions or his own religion. He was no rationalist; the power of the forms of the understanding, and transcendental thought abstracted from phenomena, seemed to him the essence of sophistry. He was disgusted with the vulgar deism, and its universal philanthropy and vague sentimentality, and called it a childish folly. He respected Catholicity as a great social power, and a mighty union of hearts and minds; as an Italian, he habitually paid an external reverence to the Church and her ceremonies; but he was not a believer, and the Christian faith was always quite alien from his habits of thought.

Regarding the philosophy of the eighteenth century as republican, he determined to wean the people from its influence, and to make the peasant at once catholic and imperial—catholic because imperial, and imperial because catholic. This was the task which he set the clergy of France and Italy to perform. And he had himself consecrated emperor, because he thought he should influence the Catholic populations of Europe through the Pope.

By his concordat he proposed to assimilate the constitution of the French church to his administrative system. The Bishops were ecclesiastical prefects, the curés sub-prefects, the chapters were the councils of the prefecture, the Cardinals were the senate,—but all without *esprit de corps*, without ecclesiastical liberty, all depending upon him as a mere emanation of his power. There were to be no synods, no councils, but all church affairs were to pass through the office of his minister *des cultes*. If he did not favour the pretensions of lawyers to meddle with clerical matters, it was because he did not wish his tribunals to retain the spirit of the old *parlemens*. It was not his wish to tease the clergy, but to keep them in order.

He quarrelled with the Pope only when the Pontiff refused to be his tool against Catholic Austria and Protestant England. Like Philip the Fair, he had fancied that the Pope ought to be his decided partisan, his most faithful ally. He wanted him to be like one of his brothers,—devoted heart and soul to his wishes, his ideas, and his interests. At St. Helena Napoleon bitterly regretted his brutality to Pius VII., and recommended in his will that some members of his family should always be settled at Rome and intermarry with the great Roman families, so that there might always be Cardinals, and some day perhaps a Pope, of his blood. He wanted also the Pope's influence to counteract Russia in the East, and to exorcise the criticising spirit of the German theologians of the Protestant provinces of his empire. It was not religion that prompted this policy, but his idea of the natural aptitude of the Church to be an engine for his political designs, an opponent of the liberty of science, and a state machine for the performance of public functions, and for maintaining a spirit of religious submission in the ranks of the people.

Education fared no better than religion. There was the *Ecole Polytechnique*, with St. Cyr and the other military colleges, for his officers; the Office of Auditors of the Council of State was the seminary of his high functionaries; the University was destined to educate and mould the bar, the staff of professors for the lycées and colleges, and the gentry. Its organisation was such that he could direct education just as he directed his police or his custom-house. It became a mere branch of government. He allowed the University to teach the codes and their principles, and the Roman law, so far as it was consistent with his imperial constitutions. He did not permit it to teach the history or the philosophy of law, or comparative legislation, or canon law, or feudal or

communal law ;—nothing, in short, which might lead to a philosophical investigation of the history of domestic, social, civil, and political life. It offered only bare facts, and behind these facts the Byzantine doctrine of the absolute power of the state over the individualised atoms of the social body, who were supposed to be represented by his administration, as they were politically directed by the government.

This implied an official state-philosophy, a state-religion, and a state-history, made to fit the state-policy ; the Roman historians, especially Tacitus, were mutilated. The principles of Louis XIV. were officially inculcated ; the great authority of Bossuet was abused to support a system of pure monarchy in which the Church submits to the state, while the state pretends to guarantee her independence. Only books authorised by the University were permitted ; there were directories for the professors, and manuals for the scholars. The professor was allowed no choice either in the manner or the matter of his teaching ;—it was a uniform, rigid, absolute method, like a soldier's drill.

All the independent universities in every conquered province were abolished and broken into fragments, and their component parts distributed over the country as independent schools of law or medicine ; all the elements of education were isolated. Cuvier was employed to carry this into effect in Holland and Germany. The Emperor's only object was to give men a special professional training, to form persons whose trade should be medicine or science, and at the same time to kill theologians and philosophers in the bud, and to spill at once all germens of historians and jurists. The exact sciences alone were privileged. The *Institut*, a corporation of scientific mathematicians, naturalists, chemists, anatomists, geologists, mineralogists, astronomers, botanists, and zoologists, was in such high favour as to be exempted from the inspection of the University, and always to prove the high road to fortune.

With such views of education, we cannot expect much from the Emperor's patronage of literature. The classics of all nations belong to its great epochs, but they always have at their roots a real theology, a great philosophy, a grand historical and political spirit, or a deep study of the religious, social, and political laws of a period or nation. The age of Pericles was also that of Socrates ; Aristotle and Alexander flourished together. The age of Augustus takes in Virgil and Horace, Cicero, Livy, Sallust, Cæsar, and even Lucretius. Dante and St. Thomas were contemporaries ; so were Shakespeare and Bacon, Mariana and Cervantes ; Pascal and Des-

cartes, Bossuet and Fenelon, Corneille and Racine, illustrate one epoch. Miserable as was the French philosophy of the eighteenth century, there was something independent and manly about Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Voltaire. But an official rhetorical literature, servilely dependent on the patron's purse—a posthumous literature like that of Alexandria and Antioch, or that of Rome after Tacitus; a Byzantine literature, with its pert conceits and fulsome phrases;—what wretched stuff! Now of all this pretentious twaddle we do not hesitate to affirm that the whole paid and patronised literature of the reign of the great Napoleon was incomparably the most insignificant and the most paltry.

All the men of real talent were in opposition. Lemer cier was in irretrievable disgrace. Reynouard's *Templars* was an attack on Philip the Fair, and by implication on the Emperor. Ducis was an obstinate legitimist, or he would have been paid for his *Abufar*. Chateaubriand was often in disgrace. Montlosier's book *De la Monarchie Française*, though it suggested his foreign feudal schemes to the Emperor, never obtained his imprimatur. He would not permit Bonald to undertake any great work; and in spite of his pretended esteem for De Maistre, he would never, if he could have helped it, have suffered him to publish any one of his books.

Literature, like *fêtes*, was to his mind only useful in distracting the rich idle classes, and giving them something else than the government to criticise. The great nobles of Russia were mightily amused with the Abbé Geoffroy's criticisms of Voltaire, and Etienne's replies. All novels except those of Madame de Staël might wander at their own sweet will through the *salons* of Paris, Vienna, and St. Petersburg. The government would industriously blow up the embers of a literary quarrel at the very moment that it was engaging in the most perilous undertakings. It pretended to be thinking of nothing but Anacreon, Malec Adel, Taglioni, and prima donnas, while it was really preparing to deluge Europe with blood. The direction of all this belonged to the police functionary who was charged with the administration of the *esprit public*.

The newspaper department of literature fared the worst. Journalism had been an incendiary power in the Revolution, and the daily papers had acquired considerable ability. The emperor smothered them all. Fouché scraped together some old Jacobins and *émigrés*, and emptied them pell-mell into the bureau of the official press. The *Moniteur* was the result; but even this was too much for Napoleon's thin skin. He could not bear to be pointed at; a wasp drove the lion

mad. He detested any thing like liberty of thought or frank expression. He abominated Madame de Staël and Benjamin Constant; but the journal published by Peltier and the *émigrés* in London made him furious; the English government could not legally suppress it; and this "refusal of justice" on our part partly led to his premature rupture with this country.

Not all monarchs have been so narrow-minded; Charles II., Frederic II., and Joseph II. laughed at libels; Frederic even posted them up at his palace-gates. But then they had nothing to fear from lampoons. Napoleon, on the contrary, was a great parvenu; it was every thing to him to be respected and dreaded. The French is a sneering, ironical nation; it was of the last importance to him that their enthusiasm for the founder of their new dynasty should not be neutralised by jokes and epigrams. He had his ear at the keyholes of their salons, and knew how they railed at his parvenu court, and jeered at his struggles to restore the etiquette of Louis XIV. This was tolerated, because it was mere talk; it was not printed or read by foreigners: but he made all foreign governments responsible for harbouring his detractors; he shot Palm, the bookseller, at Erlangen; drove Gentz from Prussia; and pursued Arndt through all the states of Germany.

Such a lively, intelligent people as the French must have some mental occupation. Napoleon ordered the papers to amuse them with theatrical criticism. The officers of the army of Spain felt dull in their winter-quarters, and asked for news. This was a terrible difficulty for the emperor. He gave Joseph the strictest injunctions to let nothing come to their ears except as filtered through the *Moniteur*, and other Paris papers. More than once Joseph was scolded outrageously for not obeying this injunction. Napoleon considered all journalists to be wretched intriguers. After moving heaven and earth to crush men like Fichte and Schlegel, and failing, he would solace himself by applying such epithets to them. It was one of his weak points that his judgment followed no law or measure when he was angry.

But to return to his personal characteristics. He was certainly one of the most astonishing men that ever burst upon the world. Great men, like Wellington, Stein, Görres, or William Humboldt, however hostile to his person, have never spoken disparagingly of him. We may pardon his weaker foes if they exhaled their resentment in abuse. But at the same time his apologists are unreadable. Bignon, the least wanting of them in judgment, is a flattering, purblind

fop. Thiers understood him as general and administrator, but not as man. We must discount the ill-humour of the *Memorials of St. Helena*. The amanuensis, who wrote at his dictation, admired him as an archangel, but had no conception of his depth. The man's incapacity was a positive premium upon fanfaronade. Napoleon's screaming irony, his sardonic mockery, his angry convulsive laughter, his utter weariness of the empty-headed noodles who surrounded him,—who had no intellects that he could converse with, who understood neither men nor things, and who could echo his words, but could not answer him,—all this may sadden the historian, but can give him no real insight into the man. Those who want to know the real genius of the captive of St. Helena, must not look at the pages of Las Cases or Gourgaud, but at that political testament which he sent to his eldest brother, and which has been published in the memoirs of Joseph.

It is a voice from the tomb; Napoleon spreads his hands over the future, as if to claim it for his own; and traces out the line of conduct which he bids his family pursue. He speaks not like Napoleon the emperor, but like Bonaparte the general; he broods over the time when his career was all before him, and when he held in his hands the destinies of the world. He has lost an empire, but he will teach his family how to win it back, and how to avoid the most crying mistakes of his passionate ambition. The revolution of February and the 2d of December have abundantly justified his foresight, and have proved that a great man, though isolated in space, and in time stationed on the debatable ground that divides a past in ruins from a future as yet without consistence, can, by the mere force of his personal character and his indomitable will, always master the complications of events, even in spite of the current of ideas; provided only that manners are in a state of transition, and opinions unfixed. The experience of his life had taught him this lesson, and he repeats it to us from his tomb.

France first occupies his attention. Without absolutely predicting the revolution of July, he evidently foresaw it; for he provides against it, and calculates its chances. He had not driven the French so long without learning all their paces, their passions, and their prejudices. He had felt the pulse of the people, and knew how high the Bonaparte blood would rise in their veins. He was sure that he had not engraved his name in vain on the brazen tablets of history. He knew that deeds and not words, victories and not harangues,

keep the imagination of the masses vibrating. It is a truth as old as history.

He knew, then, that for two or three generations Bonapartism would always have a chance. This was the cornerstone of his calculations. And he knew where there was no chance; he knew how completely his memory had vanished from the minds of his own servants, who had now become legitimists or liberals, or were ready to turn Orleanists. But he knew also the arrogance of the *émigrés*; the aggressive spirit of the clergy; the surliness of the peasantry, who had purchased the national property; the envy and hatred of the lawyers; the discontent of the small *bourgeoisie*; the leaning of the higher *bourgeoisie* towards the house of Orleans, and the facilities of attaching all the middle classes to the same family. He knew Talleyrand's intrigues; the hostility of Foy, and the generals of Moreau's army; the chicanery of Dupin and the bar; the vanity and ambition of Laffitte; the conspiracies of Lafayette; the republicanism of the Polytechnic School; the youthful ardour of the colleges; the burrowing of the secret societies; the relations of the *sous-officiers* with the Carbonari. The sum of all these elements of his calculation was, the probable fall of the elder branch of the Bourbons.

Then he counted on his fingers the chances against the Orleans family,—its bad odour in the nostrils of the European monarchies; the rivalry and jealousy of the winners; the hostility of Lafayette's party, and internal divisions; the discontent of the masses, and the perpetual possibility, not to say probability, of a revolution.

In the steps which he recommended in case of the failure of these calculations, he showed the same wonderful sagacity which characterised his prediction of the fall of the two branches of the Bourbon family. The provisional residence of the Bonapartes, while out of France, was to be either in Switzerland or in Italy; if in Italy, then either in Florence, or, still better, in Rome. He did not foresee the Swiss revolution of 1830, and so supposed that the aristocracy of Berne would remain in power. Some of the Bonapartes were to intermarry with these old families, and thus acquire a domicile in Berne; riding securely in their Swiss anchorage, they might watch for any opening to influence the French army and people, either from the frontiers of Switzerland, or from Baden, where the grand-duchess, Stephanie Beauharnais, would be their friend. Queen Hortense followed this programme literally in the youth of Louis Napoleon, till the Swiss revolution made the part relating to Berne waste-paper.

Napoleon expected nothing from Germany, where he thought his family would find no sympathy. He had no hopes that Austria would play off his son against the Bourbons; for she would never adopt revolutionary measures to disturb her population, and to jeopardise her rule in Italy.

If, contrary to his expectations, France afforded no opening, he advised his family by all means to establish themselves at Rome, to intermarry with the great families of Rome, Naples, and Tuscany (as they have done), to acquire partisans in the cardinalitial houses, to consecrate some of the Bonapartes to the ecclesiastical state, to get some of them made cardinals, and to keep their eyes open to the chances of electing a Pope bearing the name of Napoleon. If there cannot be an Emperor Napoleon, let there be a Pope Napoleon. If it is ever possible to have both together, then Southern Europe will once more become the arbitress of the world—the true counterpoise to Russia and Germany. Such is his brief but energetic programme of the future of his race.

However incomprehensible Louis Napoleon's game, from 1830 to 1848, may appear by itself, it becomes quite clear when confronted with the political testament of his uncle. In his revolutionary attempt on the Papal States, when his elder brother perished at Rimini, he forgot two most important clauses of this testament; that which advised the Bonapartes to keep on good terms with Rome, and make it the basis of their power; and that which told them to make Switzerland and Baden the basis of their operations. They could not march to France through Italy. The Austrians, the English fleet, and Piedmont blocked up every pass. But Louis Napoleon was then young and inexperienced, headstrong and obstinate, and besides, under the influence of revolutionary opinions. Repulsed from Italy, he withdrew to Switzerland, where he at once commenced the intrigues which led to the Strasbourg exhibition. The true links of this plot, designed with much ability, but executed with youthful indiscretion, have never been satisfactorily explained. But it is certain that the understanding between the French Bonapartists and the Socialist and Communist clubs dates from that time. Some of the managers of those societies, as well as the agitating journalists like St. Edme, were engaged in the Strasbourg conspiracy. Gabriel Delessert, the prefect of police, was quite aware of all these movements; but Guizot, the prime minister, treated them as trifles. And trifles they would have remained, had it not been for the revolution of February.

Louis Napoleon promptly seized the opportunity offered by that event. He comprehended the situation of the country at a glance, and extemporised his policy with unexpected ability. He forced events to conspire to his objects. Cavaignac often expressed his conviction that a Bonapartist organisation existed in the midst of the insurgents of June. If so, the Red Republicans were the unconscious tools of Louis Napoleon. Some day, perhaps, the archives of the police will throw a light on this subject; unless, as generally happens, it is the victor's interest to efface such memorials. It is enough for him that his object is attained; the means by which he reached it are as well forgotten.

It is curious that Napoleon III. should make such a show of carrying out the Constitutions of the Empire to the letter, while he makes profession of having changed its whole European policy. What can be the use of his senate and his *corps législatif*? Why did he again set up the sovereignty of the people for his election, only to make it abolish itself once more by abdicating its rights in his favour?

It was clearly impossible for the imperial government to co-exist with a parliament that discussed its policy, and from which the emperor was obliged to choose his cabinet. There were two truths which the government of Louis XVIII. had failed to understand; first, that the tendencies of the old monarchical system were inconsistent with the charter; and secondly, that the administrative system of the empire was equally in contradiction with it. The maintenance of the old monarchy was avowed to be impossible; but Napoleon's administrative system was retained, and its conflict with the charter and the parliamentary system was inaugurated. To avoid revolution, which was the intention, a new foundation ought to have been given to constitutional government. The foolish chamber of 1815 saw this; but the sensible De Cazes failed to perceive it. The only possible foundation for a constitution which should consolidate the throne without provoking revolution, would have been furnished by a new organisation of communes, the independence of corporations, and the maintenance of the principles of equality and legality. Of Louis Philippe's ministers, Thiers could not see this; and though Guizot saw it clearly, he was not the man to realise his speculations. Parliamentary government had become totally indifferent to the masses, and to all but the higher strata of the middle classes; in 1815 they had taken an interest in it, not through public spirit, but out of opposition to the Bourbons, the clergy, and the *émigrés*. Under Louis Philippe the masses left it to engage in Socialism and

Communism. The middle classes became indifferent to the strife of parties, when they had no more great passions to satisfy. The great mass of Bonapartists, who had been liberals under the Restoration, became Orleanists under Louis Philippe, and distributed themselves among the three parties that divided the Chambers—those of Odillon Barrot, Thiers, and Guizot. The leaders trusted them, and they fancied themselves real partisans of their respective leaders. They were both misunderstanding and misunderstood. But Louis Napoleon had an instinctive insight into the tangle; and this gave him his enormous and almost religious confidence in the success of the Bonapartist cause.

Then came the Revolution of February, with the fright of the landlords at the spread of Communism in the provinces, and the terror of the manufacturers, merchants, and traders at the communist associations of the towns. Though only negative elements of Bonapartism, these panics were powerful enough to nullify the canvass of Cavaignac, and to elevate Louis Napoleon to the president's chair.

Probably Louis Napoleon has a superstitious faith in the magical power of the constitutions of the empire. If he changes his plans, and follows the European policy of his uncle, these constitutions will have no part in deciding his destiny. If he still remains faithful to his profession of peace after he has organised the affairs of Italy, he will find himself confronted with a new France, for which these constitutions will not be suitable. Napoleon I. found the country tired to death with the excesses of a frivolous and sterile ideology, and therefore requiring action and not ideas, literary amusement, and not historical or political discussions. The *Génie du Christianisme* or *Delphine* was then sufficient to divide France into factions. But she has since those days been spurred into healthy action by Bonald, De Maistre, Lamennais, Benjamin Constant, Royer-Collard, Guizot, Cousin, Montlosier, Augustin Thierry, Lamartine, Villemain, and Montalembert, who have led her to take interest in parliamentary and political discussions, and in all departments of history and philosophy. Moreover, under Napoleon I., Europe was hermetically sealed to France. Now she has intellectual communication with Germany and England, and discusses the affairs of Russia, the East, and the whole world. The constitutions of the empire are inconsistent with these movements, and yet have no efficient means of preventing them. Geoffroy, Jay, and Etienne, the official scribes of Napoleon I., were tolerated when nothing better was forthcoming. None but idle or empty heads can now find amusement in

About and the other fluent pens of the Napoleonic press. We may, then, boldly predict, that if the emperor turns out to be the "Napoleon of peace," he will be forced to modify these two mute assemblies, one springing from a sham universal suffrage regulated by the prefects in the provinces, the other meriting his rebuke for its entire want of initiative action. Once more,—under Napoleon I. all the men of talent, except Cabanis and Tracy, ranged themselves outwardly on the emperor's side, and it was only the *salons* that snarled at him. Now the opposition is not in the *salons*, but in the *Institut*, in the Academy, and in all the great men of the restoration and the monarchy of July. They are not actuated merely by disgust at the fall of a government which offered a field to their talents and opened to them the road of distinction; but they dread the establishment of a system which deadens the intellect, and brands it with the official stamp of the new empire. Men had not to endure this either under the ancient *régime* or under the charter; it was reserved for the revolution and the empire to bestow this grace upon mankind. Let us hope that it will prove impossible in the present stage of European civilisation.

Except in the posthumous papers of Napoleon I. we do not find a word about nationalities. He had never recognised their existence, had ruthlessly crushed them in Spain, Portugal, Russia, Germany, and Holland, to be himself crushed by their rebound. He ignored every nationality but the French; the Italians, Spaniards, and Portuguese were but mobs in his eyes; the German was a good soul,—a quiet, peaceable, tender-hearted paterfamilias, somewhat sleepy, and very dreamy; the Russians were a set of serfs. How he gnashed his teeth to find himself suddenly enfolded in the meshes of the nationalities that he had insulted! The eighteenth century and the Revolution preached universal brotherhood. The sword of Napoleon was the involuntary agent that roused the national spirit into consciousness. It was only at St. Helena that he began to open his eyes, and to perceive that it was possible to restore Italian nationality at the expense of Austria, and perhaps also to construct a compact German empire at the expense of Prussia and Austria, by playing them off one against the other. All this was but slightly sketched in the mind of the dying emperor, but the outline has been deepened and filled up in the mind of his living representative.

In England Napoleon I. recognised a national and a constitutional greatness, a political genius that led it to seek dominion and power, and a public spirit on which its policy

was founded. In the French he could find neither public spirit nor any turn for politics; but he considered that they had a true military genius, and a real passion for glory, chivalry, and heroism, which made them the best political engine in the world, in the hands of a man who knew how to manage them. They inherited, he said, the old spirit of the Gauls, the enthusiasm of the Crusaders, the energy of Jeanne d'Arc, Francis I., Henri IV., and Louis XIV. They proved it in the wars of the revolution and of the empire. After the French army, he thought the English navy the finest thing in the world.

Louis Napoleon passed some years of his exile in Great Britain; he had seen how his uncle's designs upon Europe had miscarried through pushing the war with England to extremities. Hence, though the army and peasantry grumbled at the English alliance, he remained faithful to it, for he knew well that England might any day become the life and soul of a new European coalition against him.

It was chiefly to secure the good-will of England that he embarked in the Russian war; not that he was careless of the Russian preponderance in Turkey,—but still his policy did not point to Constantinople but to Italy. He took the English side in European politics on the Russian question, in order to ensure the support of England on the Italian question. This was evidently his plan, and it is the only explanation of the abrupt manner of his dragging Piedmont into the Crimean war, with which she had nothing whatever to do. He threw off all disguise at the congress of Paris, when in concert with Piedmont he introduced the Italian question; the way in which he interested the English in his policy was most artful.

Austria, it must be owned, has played into his hands. Always distasteful to the Italians, her government has grown more and more unpopular ever since Prince Schwartzemberg attempted to amalgamate into one the heterogeneous races of the empire. She was too clever by half in trying to make capital out of the Crimean war without sharing the risk, and in her sly attempts to annex Moldavia and Wallachia. Her conduct to Servia and Montenegro, and her efforts to strengthen Turkey against the Bosniac rebellion, were of the same kind, and their real issue has been to sacrifice Austria to the French policy. Napoleon III., following the political testament of his uncle to the letter, saw his way to wrest Italy from the Austrian yoke.

But, it may be asked, what had he to do with the Italian question at all? When he proclaimed himself the Emperor

of Peace, he spoke to the hearts and pockets of all the commercial and industrial classes of France, who only forsook the house of Orleans to side with him on the conditions of his maintaining tranquillity, and guaranteeing them from the Socialists and Communists. They considered him to be stronger in France than the Orleans dynasty, because of his credit with the masses, and stronger in Europe, whose sovereigns had been on very cool terms with Louis Philippe; while Austria, Prussia, Russia, and England have in turn paid court to Louis Napoleon, because they thought that the man who was master of the revolutionary forces of France was master of the destinies of Europe. France herself also has seemed more peaceable. Under the Bourbons of the elder branch she was always uttering dark hints about the banks of the Rhine, and Belgium, and what she called her natural frontiers. This was the cry of the revolutionary party under Louis XVIII. and Charles X.; and it was taken up by Chateaubriand and Bonald and the counter-revolutionists under Louis Philippe, in order to degrade the house of Orleans in the face of Europe by the imputation of cowardice. But the claims are silenced now, and France professes herself vastly content with her present frontiers, and tells Germany that it will not be her fault if the clamour is revived.

From the first his policy has been directed towards Italy, not towards the banks of the Rhine. This is why the president of the republic was closeted with Gioberti when Charles Albert sent him to Paris; this is why he engaged Piedmont in the Crimean war, broached the Italian question in the congress of Paris, published Orsini's letter, united with England in remonstrating with Naples, invited Cavour to Plombières, approved of the King of Sardinia's opening speech to his chambers, and married his cousin to the Princess Clotilde. He has been always on the watch for an opportunity to advance Piedmont, from 1849, when he tried to get her to restore the Pope to Rome; and ever since he has used her as his lever for the regeneration of Italy and the destruction of the Austrian rule. Either his policy has been aimless, or else this has been his aim. But, then, how shall we account for the wonderful disinterestedness of France? Allowing for the fact, that the presence of Austria in Italy does not square with French policy, will France be contented with acts of generosity to Italy? Will she really and unconditionally give Lombardy to Piedmont? Why does she want an Italian confederation, and what place in it will she give to the Pope?

However hard it may be to answer these questions, the publication of the imperial pamphlet, to which M. de la Guéronnière signed his name, forbids us to ignore them. It spoke of a purely Italian confederation under the protection of the French army, in opposition to the dynastic Italian confederation which Austria attempted to form against Piedmont; but it threw no light on the position which Napoleon III. would give to Piedmont in Lombardy and Venice; or whether they were to be erected into a kingdom for the Duc de Leuchtenberg's son and Eugene's grandson, whose mother is a sister of the Czar; and whether, in that case, Piedmont would be enlarged at the expense of Parma and Modena, or in some other manner. All suppositions became possible as soon as the pamphlet raised them tentatively, without determining them.

The relations of Napoleon III. and the Pope are left in still greater uncertainty. We know what his uncle, in the hey-day of his power, thought of the Papacy,—how he tried to use its influence in Southern Europe, to oppose it to the Greco-Russian influence in the East, and to the Protestant feeling of his German provinces. We know, too, what he thought of it in St. Helena; how bitterly he regretted his brutality to Pius VII.; and how he advised his family to settle at Rome, and aim at ecclesiastical and ministerial offices there, so that some day they might give birth to a Pope, who should revive Napoleon's glory in another form, if the Bonapartes could not regain the throne of France; and, if they could, should double the Emperor's power, by giving him an *alter ego* in the Chair of St. Peter. Though, in spite of his respect for the religion of his childhood, Napoleon I. was rather a Mahometan than a Christian, and was an entire stranger to the liberty of the children of God, yet his comprehensive mind could take in the political and social significance of the Papacy. To appreciate the breadth of view which this displayed, we must remember the character of his age,—its paltry deism, its mathematical atheism, its pedantic rationalism, and its practical materialism. Frenchmen were ashamed to be seen in church. The peasantry did not go there, for they were enriched with her spoils. Some devout *émigrés*, and a few of the middle classes, and the people of La Vendée, Alsace, and the Jura, were about the only men that ever heard Mass. Napoleon himself always seemed distracted there, and his attitude was any thing but devotional. His marshals, generals, senators, and prefects paraded about the aisles during the ecclesiastical state functions; and he patronised infidel cardinals like Maury. But he did not be-

lieve in the stability of irreligion, and he felt that a people without faith was lost. In spite of the historical conflicts between Popes and emperors, he considered Catholicity to be a school of Cæsarism. He fixed his eyes upon Philippe le Bel and the Papacy at Avignon, and proposed to correct and reconstruct the whole work of Charlemagne.

Such were the views of the uncle. The nephew began, in 1830, with an unsuccessful attempt to revolutionise the Papal States, and to make them the centre of a reaction against Austria. His letter to Edgar Ney in 1849 shows that he still wished to introduce into Rome and the Legations the whole *Code Napoléon* with its appurtenances, and with all the forms of French administration. His great object is evidently to surround the Pope with French influences, and to remove all Austrian elements from his councils. He wishes the existence of the Papacy to become impossible unless the Austrians are driven from Italy. If Louis Napoleon sent for M. Veuillot, the editor of the *Univers*, and praised his talents and his policy, it was because of his influence with a portion of the clergy, because of his bitter hostility to all parliamentary government, and his advocacy of the most intimate union of the cross with the sword, and because of his antagonism to the Academy, where the principal parliament men are to be found; but not because of his simple and artless proposition for the intimate alliance of France, de-josephinised Austria, and the Holy See, against Russia, Prussia, and England. Yet at the very time that the emperor was thus inspiring Veuillot with a passionate partisanship for his dynasty, he was receiving About, Fould's *protégé*, and inviting him to court, where he was presented as a little Voltaire out at grass. While the rest of the press, and especially the former parliamentary journals, were restrained within the narrowest bounds, the *Univers* was allowed much license. But at the same time the *Siècle*, and its henchman the *Charivari*, were permitted to wage a pitiless war against Catholicity, under the pretence of a certain respect for Gallicanism. The reason is plain. If the *Univers* upholds the emperor's cause with the clergy and the religious world, the *Siècle*, which, in spite of its republican appearance, is devoted to Prince Napoleon, and since the war has become quite converted to the imperial side, has an immense sale among the Bonapartists of the provinces, the artisans of the towns, and the strong-minded godless portion of the middle classes. Naturally enough Louis Napoleon is averse from alienating any one of his partisans; so he has struck out an independent line between the Ultramontanism of the *Univers* and the Pseudo-gallicanism

of the *Siècle*. However obstinately he adheres to his opinions and his interests, he has the faculty of concealing his plans. And we confess that we find it impossible to form a probable guess about the place which he really intends the Pope to occupy in his Italian confederation.

Louis Napoleon despises the anti-Roman feeling of English Protestantism. Though the Germans have not opened their mouths for a century about the "Whore of Babylon," some of the English and Scotch ministers of the gospel still talk about her as they did in the days of Knox and Cromwell. The most zealous Lutheran or Calvinist in Germany would never think of treating Italy as a pagan country, or of sending missionaries to convert her from her false gods. But Exeter Hall treats the Italians as if they were Caffres. In this they are abetted by the gentlemen of Geneva, who refused the Catholics liberty of worship, and drove them into the arms of the democracy, and now take advantage of their own relations with Cavour, of the hostility between the Ratazzi party and the Piedmontese clergy, and the antagonism between the Church and the constitution, to revenge themselves by assisting the English Protestant propaganda in Piedmont and Tuscany. Louis Napoleon has shown his opinion of them by discouraging their attempts at Lyons and other parts of France. He does not want controversy; he knows that minds grow hot with disputing, and that sooner or later politics are sure to bubble up. We may be certain, then, that he is not pleased at the prolongation of the quarrel between Piedmont and Rome, for fear it should lead to schism. It may be presumed that he is trying to patch it up; but, on the other hand, it is also certain that he wishes for a radical reform in the government of the Papal States. What the reforms may be, and how he proposes to reconcile the Pope's position sketched in the pamphlet, as head of the Italian confederation, with his position as common Father of the faithful, are questions which at present seem to float vaguely in the emperor's mind, the answers whereto will be shaped by the event, and not divulged till the settlement of the Austrian question in Italy enables him to proclaim a final peace to Europe.

But these combinations were made only in view of a short, local, and successful war. They did not contemplate its complication with the Turkish question, nor the loss of Russia's hold on Prussia, and the rising of Germany; nor England's being forced by her maritime interests to interfere: in such a case the war must be transferred to the Rhine. Louis Napoleon has long been trying to avoid this by saying to Prussia and Germany, "Carry out the principles of your Zollverein,

which Austria refuses to join; make yourselves into a compact nation of 30,000,000 men, and leave Austria to fight her own battles with the Bohemians and Magyars." If the war once reached the Rhine, France could not pretend to the same disinterestedness there as she pretends to in Italy, where, without any enlargement of territory, she gains all that she wants. Her triumph over Austria, her protection of Piedmont and the Italian confederation, will suffice to secure her preponderance in Europe, especially as regards Germany. But then, how long will she leave Russia to herself in the East? How long will she maintain her alliance with England? That is the question which chiefly concerns us.*

THE THEORY OF PARTY.

GOVERNMENT by parties in parliament has been for many years an institution of our country, which nearly all statesmen, however bitterly they may resent its occasional vagaries, recognise as necessary in some shape or other for the consolidation of our liberties, and even for the preservation of our national identity. And though apparently condemned by the hasty ejaculations of puzzled politicians,—“principles, not parties,” “measures, not men;” or by their aspirations for the speedy destruction of the old party morality with the old parties that formed it, for the final exaltation of the interests of the country over the interests of party, and for the first consideration of the public good in every public measure,—such phrases, we may be sure, in the mouth of a statesman, are directed only against the abuse, not against the use, of party.

Burke sneers at the cry, “not men, but measures,” as a piece of cant, “a sort of charm by which many people get loose from every honourable engagement.” It is also a formula by which men pretend to guard their independence, and justify their holding aloof from all engagements. The assertion of principles as excluding parties is equivalent to reducing politics from an art to a science, from a practical business to a theory. Principles by themselves have no action; they have neither arms nor legs: to be active, they must be embodied—they must have their militia, they must find expression in a party. To be theoretically right is not enough for a man intrusted with the political guidance of his country. He has not only to make the good known, but to make it prevail; not only to detect, but to defeat the evil.

* This article was in type before any proposals of peace had been made.

The sluggard's proverb, "They who do nothing do no harm," always detestable, is ruinous in politics. The statesman who refuses to enter into the combinations requisite to give effect to his views frustrates his object and betrays his trust. Great men are accountable to the public not only for what they do but for what they don't, not only for their works but for their no-works,—for their laziness as well as for their business, for their refusal to coöperate as well as for their coöperation with their associates. Those who condemn party, cannot intend to condemn coöperation; they can only mean to condemn the present confusion of parties, which must be remedied, not by parties ceasing to be, but by giving them a new life and a new form. For without party no deliberative body like the House of Commons can exist.

To all practical purposes the possible permutations and combinations of the 654 members of the House of Commons are infinite. There can be no organisation in a body of 654 independent atoms, all in a state of fluctuation. There must be unions, combinations, and parties, or business is impossible. The question is, (1) Are these unions to be permanent? and (2) How many such unions are there to be? Are the unions to be permanent, extending over a number of questions; or are they to be only temporary, formed in view of a definite question, and resolved into their original atoms on the decision of that question? In such a case, the constitution remaining what it is, we should want a new party and a new ministry for each new act of parliament. Parties, then, must have a certain generalisation and a certain permanence. As to the number of parties, clearly only two can fight at one time; it is no true trial of strength when the two combatants know that a third is watching on the heights, ready to pounce down on the exhausted victor and appropriate his spoils. Some compromise, some combination, is always necessary in such cases, in order to reduce the combatants to two. On each question, therefore, the ultimate decision is between two parties, which for business ought to be permanent, not temporary.

But how attain to this permanence of party demarcations? The distinction between Whigs and Tories was not factitious, but of natural growth; men did not divide themselves by lot, but they congregated through sympathy, and separated through hostility. This is a simple process in unsophisticated states, where only one or two classes are represented; but in a complex society like ours such broad and simple demarcations of party, representing popular passions, are demonstratively impossible. The proof is easy. When a whole country

is animated by one dominant passion, or is ruled by a single class so animated, there are no parties, though the government is one of passion. But if a change comes over the country, if its feelings cool, or the formerly inconsiderable minority emerges, or the governing class splits into two parts, then government by party is immediately established. There is a conflict between two combinations more or less balanced, one of which is in power, while the other keeps guard over it and watches to supplant it. This conflict necessitates compromise, or the voluntary dropping of certain class interests and passions out of the sphere of government. If there is but one party in the government, all its social passions and interests may colour its administration; if there are two parties, with rival interests and balanced powers, the particular objects in which their interests are contrary must neutralise each other on the political platform, however active they may continue to be in social life. Thus there begins to be a distinction between political and social life and thought; and it continually increases, to the detriment of those personal interests and passions on which party distinctions were at first founded. It is important to recognise the trenchant distinction between social and political life and thought, which arises in a society divided into many classes with different interests, and at the same time governed by common representative institutions. In any plan for the coöperation of such different elements, it stands to reason that many social principles and passions, important, but sure grounds of discord, must be discounted. There must be a previous settlement of what are to be party, what to be open questions; on what subjects to agree, on what to differ without breach of political unity. The points of agreement constitute the political creed and programme of parties; the residuum of differences goes to form the aggregate of social life. As civilisation advances and men multiply, society has a perpetual tendency to differentiation; and as classes multiply, each successively claiming a share in the political representation, they must either become new elements of discord, or they must consent to erase from their political creed the interests and passions which belong exclusively or most particularly to them, and which they have neither right nor strength to force the rest to accept. Hence with the differentiation of social life there is a continually-growing uniformity in politics; class-passions and class-interests drop one by one out of the political platform, and fall into the social arena. When Anglicans alone held office in England, the government was Anglican; when Dissenters were admitted, government remained Protestant, but the distinction between

Churchmen and Dissenters became a social instead of a political separation; the admission of Catholics and Jews has transformed successively the distinction between Catholic and Protestant, and that between Christian and Jew, from a politico-social to a merely social distinction. Hence we see that a continual narrowing and simplification of the province of representative government follows the continual enlargement and multiplication of the classes and interests represented; while its machinery, as distinguished from its objects and ideas, grows daily more complex from the mere multitude of its individual operations. Hence Bentham truly portrayed the tendency of a representative government as always approaching an ideal term, when material utility will be its sole remaining aim; when all passions, all interests of mind and soul, will be discounted; and political economy will enjoy an undivided sway. Not that such an abstract tendency can ever become an actuality; not that Bentham can, by his prosing, charm away the spell with which passion sways communities and ambition individuals, though he may shut his eyes to the existence of national frenzies, and affect to believe that mankind can be mastered by budgets and tariffs. Yet though his system is marrowless and his schemes skeletons, they indicate a true tendency of representative institutions on a great scale—the elimination of passion from politics.

The progress of events, then, tends to render more and more difficult the aggregation of parties on the basis that formerly gave them permanence—on social opinions passionately embraced. When these opinions have dropped from the political into the social order, they no longer serve as a basis for political party. They may be potent on the hustings; they are impotent in parliament, where the various hustings-pledges neutralise one another. Parliament, for its own peace, must be insensible to social passions; hence its treatment of religious questions. Most members of parliament certainly display in their families a real respect for the Bible; but this does not prevent them from laughing down the wight who in debate argues upon a text. Mr. Spooner's theology only bores the House, though probably the majority of members belong more or less decidedly to the religious party which he represents. The Papal-Aggression legislation registered the voice of national passions; but it collapsed when the social fire died out, and again left the march of politics to itself. The dominant passion drew for a moment the majority into its vortex; when it died, the old balance revived, and the political bequest of the social frenzy is waste-paper.

In the early history of party the impress of passion upon politics was not thus transient. The Roundheads and Cavaliers, the original Whigs and Tories, were divided and defined principally by their social passions :

“The Roundheads,” says Lord Brougham,* “were deeply tinged with fanaticism ; and they were the original of the Whigs both in England and in Scotland. The Cavaliers held cheap all such observances, regarding religious enthusiasm with mingled dislike and derision ; and from them came the Tories in both parts of the island. Nor was the connection merely genealogical or historical. As late as the times of Addison and Bolingbroke we find the friends of the Hanoverian succession distinguished by their respect for religion, and the Jacobites chiefly giving in to deism, or latitudinarian principles.”

Assuming this partial view to be correct, as far as it goes, it is evident that Whigs and Tories have changed sides. In Charles Fox the Whigs obtained a leader with the morals of a Cavalier ; while the republican clubs of 1790 reproduced the Cavalier’s dislike and derision of religious enthusiasm. From that time the Orange Protestantism has found its home in the Tory ranks, and the Whigs have substituted popular progress for their old moving power :

“Così vid’ io la settimana zavorra
Mutare e trasmutare.”†

It was no longer *Church and King* on one side, and *Religion and Redress of Grievances* on the other ; but it was, according to the one party, *King and Constitution* against *Revolution*, and according to the other, *Popular Liberties* against *Despotism*. This was looked upon as the universal and necessary *rationale* of party demarcations.

“In a parliamentary government there must be always two great and leading divisions, under which parties, however broken into more minute sections, must ultimately be enrolled. The one a party which, feeling confidence in the people, favours all propositions for the extension of public liberty, so far as is consistent with order and with security ; the other a party which, distrusting the judgment and virtue of the people, seeks to confine their rights and powers within the narrowest limits compatible with content and obedience.”‡

The adoption of popular reforms by the New Whigs, in compliance with the revolutionary agitation of 1790, has impressed its present character on that party. They have become the interpreters of the “rights of man,” and of

* Works, Glasgow, 1855, vol. ii. p. 184.

† Dante, *Inferno*, c. xxv. terz. 48.

‡ Edinburgh Review, April 1840, vol. lxxi. p. 275.

Bentham's theoretical "principles of morals and legislation." They are the English *doctrinaires*, the men of progress, the patrons of material utility, the passionless politicians of theory and science, the apostles of centralisation, the mechanicians of government. The Tories have been forced into the opposite scale; they represent all the social passions that can force their way into the region of politics. This seems to be now the principle of party division in England. The Liberal party (speaking broadly) represents the political mind, the Tory party the social mind. For instance, religion, the deepest element of the social mind, is now nearly monopolised by the Tories, in spite of the coquetting between Exeter Hall and Lord Palmerston. The Orangemen, of Whig origin, now belong to them. The clergy of the Establishment support them. They have lately trawled for Catholics, and have caught many fishes. Even when the question for which they fight has nothing to do with any religion, they have always tried, often with success, to throw a religious halo round it. *Church and King* was their motto; they could not fight for royal prerogative without calling it a *divine* right. From their stand-point corn-laws have seemed creeds, and rotten boroughs holy ground. Solid social prejudice, dimly distinguishing God from Mammon, takes up its stand, with a reverential feeling almost religious, in the Tory camp. The Tories represent religious and social passions; their strength is measured by the strength of the religious (not the anti-religious), and the social (not the socialistic or anti-social), passions reigning for the time being in the country. Hence, in general, social excitements strengthen the Tories; while, on the other hand, political excitements strengthen the Whigs.

This view may be illustrated by the cases in which the leaders of either side have tried to trade on their opponents' capital. The estate of *No-Popery*, with all its appurtenances, has for many years been vested in the Tories. Lord John Russell thought to reënter on the old Whig property by means of the famous Durham rescript. Mr. Disraeli, in a letter to the Lord-Lieutenant of Bucks, put in his demurrer to the Whig claims; he had "always understood" that the Papists were encouraged in Ireland by the Whigs, and he thought that the Pope had a right to assume that in establishing the English hierarchy "he was acting in strict conformity with the wishes of her Majesty's government;" he concluded, therefore, that the question to be decided at the Aylesbury anti-Papal-Aggression meeting was "of a graver, deeper, and more comprehensive character" than they supposed. The deeper question being, whether it did not belong by right divine to

the Tories to make political capital out of *No-Popery*. But if Lord John Russell has erred in pilfering from the Tories, Sir Robert Peel and Disraeli have damaged themselves still more by pilfering from the Whigs. The glory of Catholic Emancipation, Free Trade, and Reform, seemed to belong to Whigs, not only by squatter's title, but *de congruo*, by congruity. Sir Robert Peel borrowed the plumes, and was plucked for his pains. Equally damaging is the adoption of Reform by Derby and Disraeli. In none of their battle-fields had the Tories chosen their ground well. The maintenance of the penal laws was a social question; but it only interested a limited class, on which it conferred no solid benefits, but only the power to insult and oppress another class. The opposition to Reform and to the repeal of the Corn-laws was equally unfortunate; the Tories did vast damage to their cause by turning questions of political machinery, and of budgets which only concerned narrow classes as social questions, into social questions of national import. The Tory strength is in social passions, such as social obstinacy or conservatism, social fanaticism or religion, and social frenzy or war. But then these passions must be national, or they are sources of weakness, not of strength, to their representatives.

The politics of theory, as distinguished from those of social passions, belong to the Whigs. Hence the side which scientific men almost invariably take. Hence the radical nature of scepticism, irreligion, and atheism; hence, also, the attraction between peace-societies and the Whigs. War, the greatest of social excitements, is the triumph of Toryism. Mr. Bright, who identifies the Tories with the aristocracy, derives war from the interests of the aristocracy, though it is more commonly a popular frenzy, which rulers cannot moderate. But whatever its origin, war, like all social passions, is aristocratic in its results. In nothing does personal superiority crop out so clearly as in war; nowhere is it so easy to obey, nowhere does the attachment and confidence of the subaltern in his leader become so enthusiastic. War may destroy one aristocracy, but it establishes another. Military success enabled Napoleon to restore a court as exclusive as that of Louis XIV. from the ruins of the Revolution; and suggested to Montlosier the possibility of rebuilding the feudal system in favour of Napoleon's marshals, even after the general levelling of the Reign of Terror.

It appears, then, that the elements of permanent parties are now on one side social questions, and on the other political questions as opposed to social. On one side we have

war, religion, and attachment to old habits and customs ; on the other, peace, centralisation, generalisation, political economy, and commerce. Passion, poetry, and colour on one side ; theory, statistics, and form on the other. And these two opposite lines must come into collision. Even political economy must be encountered by protection. Every generalisation in commerce implies the destruction of some monopoly, and will therefore be hotly opposed by the monopolists. Much more when this generalisation extends to social and domestic interests, around which the national passions are grouped. It is a usurpation for the government to take care that all the children of British subjects should learn to read and write ; it is a further usurpation to establish common schools on Bentham's plan, where these acquirements should be taught on a uniform system ; yet if it is certain that nothing else will be taught on this plan, perhaps the national passions will not yet be roused. But when we suspect that religion is to be taught also,—that all religions are to be fused together, and their contradictions allowed to neutralise each other, and then a common essence extracted, and taught as the religion of the State,—such a suspicion would rouse our social passions into frenzy : Conservatism or Toryism would carry the day for a long time.

We have then, in general, the elements of two permanent parties in the State, each deriving its utility from the deficiencies of the other ; each keeping the other by its opposition within the limits of reason. The antagonisms of life must find expression with equal freedom and with equal energy, or the various elements of society will not obtain their due. But what guarantee is there that the same persons shall always adhere to the same profession of principles ? If a man thinks that sometimes circumstances require changes to be made in the political mechanism, at other times the social passions to be encouraged and enforced, must he not change his party with circumstances, and is he to be taunted for inconsistency in doing so ? And yet when this is once allowed, a principle is admitted which might logically lead to the organisation of a fresh party for every fresh measure. Of course nothing can prevent a statesman from changing his apparent position with the changing questions of the day. Burke, always completely consistent as a politician, could not be equally consistent as a partisan. At first he was the advocate of political economy and generalisation, against the prejudices and passions on which George III. thought to found an autocracy ; afterwards he was as eloquent a defender of our social institutions against the levelling tendencies of a revolutionary

generalisation. Sir Robert Peel was a still more notable example of change. People must be governed not on an abstract principle, nor after the dogma of any politician, but according to their circumstances and their feelings. The statesman, therefore, is the man who can keep his fingers on the national pulse, can watch and even anticipate its beatings, provide tonics and stimulants for its weaknesses, and alleviations for its fever heats. He must be ready to alternate between the two policies of abstract mechanics and of passion. How, then, can there be permanence of parties? How can the permanent principles of party division come to have permanent personal representatives?

Yet without such personal representatives principles are powerless; they can neither talk nor act. While, on the other hand, persons who represent no principles are equally unpractical. In private a man may act and think as independently as he pleases; in public, if he is to act with others, he must have some common rule of conduct. This rule embodies the principle which he represents; for the rule is one which must express the interests and sympathies of those who agree to follow him. Leaders, therefore, must personify ideas, and represent powerful interests and wide-spread sympathies. It is for this cause that, as Lord John Russell says, "it is the habit of party in England to ask the alliance of a man of genius, but to follow the guidance of a man of character." Character is more stable and solid than genius. Genius changes with arguments; character adheres to self-consistency. Genius, conscious of its resources, likes to do every thing itself; character gracefully relinquishes the task to others, when any thing must inevitably be done inconsistent with its former conduct. Parties can depend upon character; genius may betray them any day. And not only the party leaders, but their followers also, should partake in this solidity of character; they must range themselves with tolerable permanence into two fixed armies and no more, otherwise the House of Commons becomes a huge heap of independent cliques, crotchety coteries, and individual advocates of capricious abstractions, which have nothing in common with the deep passions and social sympathies of the world without. As a mere isolated spectator, or caustic critic, a member of parliament counts for nothing; by uniting with a party he obtains a representative value; without connection he represents nothing but himself and his property. His speeches have no interest beyond their literary value; there is nothing historical about them. He is not a political force; nor can he be reckoned an element of power, for it is always impos-

sible to tell how he will act in given circumstances. Without connection there is no sympathy to communicate alarm at evil designs, no counsel and no union to oppose them; among unorganised atoms communication is uncertain, counsel is difficult, resistance impracticable. Without party ties, resulting in personal confidence and the friendship of common views and common interests, there is no power of acting a public part with uniformity, perseverance, or efficacy.

But now the question occurs, Are the opinions which divide statesmen in England a sufficient basis for their permanent division into fixed parties? And if not, is it not a warning that the old plan of party government must be modified, if not relinquished? A large school of statesmen has arisen which seeks for the utter extinction of parties. By means of parties, says Lord Brougham,* at least one half of the great men of each age are excluded from the service of the country, and both sides are infinitely more devoted to maintaining a conflict with one another than to furthering the public good. The origin of parties, he says,† is not *idem sentire de republica*, but a common desire of power and plunder. They are not guided by principles, but they "take up principles in order to marshal themselves in alliances and hostilities for their own interests, instead of engaging in those contests because of their conflicting principles." The principles of one party are fixed by those of the other. Each party in place would bring forward the same measures which in opposition it would oppose. If Burke had been minister (it is Lord Brougham who speaks), he would have fought the Americans; if the Whigs had been in office, they would have opposed Emancipation. Lord Brougham owns that parties are necessary, as England is at present governed; but he thinks also that "it is a sorry account of any political machine, that it is so constructed as only to be kept in order by the loss of power and conflict of forces" which parties imply.

Hence formal or mechanical politicians, as distinguished from men who sympathise with the social life of England, are always opposed to party. Loss of power in a political machine is in their eyes as bad as loss of power in a steam-engine or spinning-jenny. They seem to regard the English parliament as an engine, whose function it is to turn out annually the greatest possible amount of legislation of superior quality. Every thing that diverts the House from this supreme object is a nuisance. England requires a continual supply of laws and regulations, and instead we only get debates! On the other hand, a person disposed to let well alone,

* Works, ed. Glasgow, 1855, vol. i. p. 371.

† Ib. p. 372.

and to keep things as they are, blesses the providential arrangement that keeps statesmen busy, without obliging them to be continually tinkering the constitution. A parliament we must have, for the continual control of the executive government. Inactive, it would be of no use; if its activity was directed to continual changes in the nation, it would soon ruin every thing. Parties give it an internal activity that sharpens its wits and clears its eyes, and gives it other occupation than gnawing at the nation's vitals. There is a homely old English saying of a busy father to a troublesome boy,—“Jack, if thou wu't be meddling, go shoe the goslings.” Put into more decorous language, this is the blessing given by the solid Englishman to the representative whom he sends to Westminster.

But the existence of parties is capable of more serious defence. The rule of economy of force is applicable only to mechanics, not to ethical subjects, nor to any practical method whose utility is to be measured by something else than solid material results. Morals are intended to produce results on the soul, which are not capable of being tested by number, or weight, or measure. So, politics are intended to produce the imponderable results of peace, contentment, justice, and patriotism, even more than those described in the statistical returns of the Registrar-General. As we live to form and rule our souls, so the statesman lives to form and direct the national spirit. The House of Commons is as much his palæstra for educating himself to the task, as his arena for performing it. Party politics is the school of imperial government. As men are trained for civil society by domestic society, so are statesmen trained for offices in the State by party combinations. As the man is a microcosm of society, so is party the microcosm of the commonwealth. Men become fit for governing the nation by the experience they acquire in the management of party, where the conflicting interests are similar, if less complicated, and where mistakes do not ruin a nation. Parties, then, are the schools of statesmen; there they learn to govern: the legislator who has had no teachers but books and meditation, wants practice before he can be trusted with the keeping of the nation. In parties he may learn self-command, and the power of directing the compromises necessary for the amalgamation of so many persons, mustered not by the ascendancy of genius, but by a general similarity in some prevalent interests or opinions. The caldron of Awen bubbled for nine days and nights before it could produce the three mystical drops which transformed a cripple into Taliesin the sage. Party contests seem a mighty coil to make

for such small results of legislation ; but legislation would be crude enough if it proceeded straight from the brains of philosophic statesmen, without being tormented in the crucible of party. Witness the constituent legislation of provisional governments, always impotent, because unaccustomed to the mimic constitutional wars of parties. Government and legislation are not manufactures, but arts. Parties are the statesman's practising grounds. A man does not learn to fiddle in a crowded concert-room, nor is a soldier first taught the goose-step in presence of the enemy. So neither (except in provisional governments) does the constitutional statesman try his 'prentice-hand on fundamental measures which might compromise the great interests of the State.

Parties, then, are necessary to educate the statesman ; they are also almost indispensable as an instrument of constitutional government. If there is to be no opposition in Parliament, not only must all social passions be refused audience, and parliamentary business reduced to the mechanics of legislation, but also Parliament must have nothing to do with the choice of ministers, or the dispensation of patronage. If the two inspiring spirits of party combination, social passion and personal ambition, could be got rid of, Parliament might perhaps be found a very economical legislative machine ; provided the right of speech was sufficiently abridged to reduce debate within decent limits. But the result would not be worth having : instead of Parliament being the organ of the popular control on the executive, it would be a mere tool of the executive to give a popular look to its acts, like the constitutional shams of despotic countries ; the dignity and freedom of Parliament would be gone. Freedom such as ours must always be accompanied by a certain restlessness. Political virtue can only escape chains on the condition of leaving a certain amount of liberty to political vice also. But even without any political vice, active and ambitious men will crowd into the road of power, and will form parties to help them. Such a government may be a noisy vulgar thing, annoying to sensitive people, sometimes full of corruption, sometimes swaying to and fro with popular tempests. But such motion is healthy to liberty. Without it the web of bureaucracy would soon be woven around us, and we should doze off into the leaden slumbers wherewith Despotism deadens her subjects' eyes, while she gags their mouths and picks their pockets.

If, therefore, our parliamentary system is worth having ; if, in spite of all drawbacks, it has proved itself the instrument of the most perfect political freedom which the world

has yet seen,—it must be the duty of the Englishman to make all sacrifices to preserve it. And if parties are necessary to its maintenance, they must sacrifice something to the claims of party. Not that it is a crime to form political societies in support of any of the different interests in the State, or to endeavour, by all honest means, to advance to superiority and power men who share our sentiments and opinions. But the destruction of all the traditions of parliamentary government is not among such honest means. Members are sent to Parliament, not to make Parliament useless, but to aid in carrying on the work of government either by the active participation of the ministerial benches, or by the watchful control of opposition. When they are elected, they are members of Parliament, not delegates of a selfish section of the population; they are representatives of the nation, not of the opinions of the bare majority whose votes have given them their seats. They have no right, therefore, to intrigue, to set the interests of a class above those of the nation, or to stop the national business till their indiscreet demands are complied with. Unanimity in a party must be exhibited to the world like unanimity in an ecclesiastical synod, whose decisions are said to be unanimous even though there might have been twelve on one side and thirteen on another; because the minority is bound by the majority, and has equally to sign the decrees. Parliamentary government requires the broad division into two parties—one of which administers the government, the other watches and controls; one of which sympathises with the social passions of the nation, while the other is continually making propositions for the alteration of our political mechanism. These two parties alternately bear sway; in peace the political improvers, in troubled times the exponents of the passions of the people. With one or other of them every subordinate political combination should unite itself. To effect this union some sort of generalisation must take place, some compromise must be effected. No member of the party can keep his programme exactly what it was before the combination; no faction can insist on all the five points of its own charter. It would be a species of political immorality to do so, with the alternative of the unattached faction assuming an independent position, where it could watch attentively the balance of the two great parties, and gain consideration by giving alternately an unexpected but not gratuitous aid to the rivals. It is, moreover, a political mistake which must in time do most damage to those who make it. A privateer may watch two frigates fighting, ready to pounce on the weakened victor and his shattered prize. The plan

may succeed once; but the second time the principal combatants will first unite to sink their common enemy, and will then dispose of their own quarrel. A small independent party that uses the dead-lock tactics too unscrupulously, will raise a feeling which will unite all parties against it, though they are united in nothing else. Or if it is not thus crushed, parliamentary government will have received a mortal blow.

Besides the difficulties pointed out above, there are two others to which our parliamentary representatives do not sufficiently attend. First, they do not seem adequately to comprehend the difference between social and political questions. No law can create or change sentiments and opinions; these grow socially, not politically; and can only be cured by social, not by political remedies. The belief in the omnipotence of laws and regulations is a revolutionary idea. Nothing is stronger in England than the sturdy determination not to allow the government to exercise a bureaucratic interference with social and domestic relationships. Most of the grievances of Catholics are of a social and domestic character. The points on which we have yet to attain an absolute political equality are not practicable bases of party union. Time and the spirit of the age will solve them in our favour, if we can afford to await the sure march of events. Meanwhile our active opposition would only give fresh strength to the objects of attack, by enlisting the social sympathies of the majority of Englishmen against us. Our interest clearly is to exclude as much as possible all religious questions from parliamentary discussion, or to invest our demands as far as we can with the appearance of mere administrative reforms. Our policy in Parliament is the same as in a court of justice. We deprecate the introduction of religion in addresses to juries, justly fearing that prejudices will always go against us. He who first represented the Shrewsbury Estates' cause as a Catholic question, contributed whatever lay in his power to the defeat of the Catholic parties in the trial. The ostentatious establishment of a self-styled Catholic independent opposition might, in our weak condition, be attended with similar results. Happily for our peculiar position as English Catholics, the distinction between Catholics and Protestants has fallen out of the political into the social order, and has become a social, not a political difference. The establishment of a Catholic political party looks like an attempt to reverse the course of events. It is a precarious experiment for Catholic members of Parliament to exhibit themselves professionally as mere Catholics, instead of English or Irish statesmen and gentlemen. If religion is separated from politics,

religious distinctions can be no longer political; they are only accidents in Parliament. To make them essential is to ignore the conditions of English parties. In the present tendency of England a "Catholic policy" is as difficult as a "Protestant policy" is felt to be hateful. Any policy which takes its denomination from a religion, professes to thrust forward into the teeth of statesmen questions which, by tacit agreement, they have banished from Parliament, and confined to churches, lecture-halls, or firesides. The suspicion that we wish generally to solve social questions by political intervention, indisposes politicians to listen to us in those cases where a slight alteration of the law might improve our social position. In an English point of view, tenant-right is simply a social question; it is a matter of agreement, and might be settled by lease. Englishmen call its advocates, who wish to settle it by legislation, socialists. They are suspected of the revolutionary tendency to make all customs subservient to official regulation. Much of this hostility would be disarmed, if the advocates of tenant-right argued their case as an exception to, not as an example of, general principles. All political economists own that there are cases where custom is incorrigible, if left to its own resources. Rent, for instance, cannot find its own level where the farmer has no power of transferring his capital to another locality or another business. The tenure of land, which is a social question in England, is still a political question in India. There the transfer of questions from the political to the social platform has not yet taken place. And as England differs from India, so it may possibly differ from Ireland. Ireland may be in a state in which it would be unsafe to leave the tenure of land to custom and common law, without the interference of a legislative adjustment. This may be true, even though the abstract principle of tenant-right led logically to Socialism; as is the case, according to French politicians, with the abstract principle of poor-rates.

With regard to the religious rights of Catholics in workhouses and prisons, a small alteration of the law is all that Parliament can effect for us. And if such alteration is made in a manner to arouse the religious frenzies of Protestants, it will do us no good till the excitement is tranquillised. The stolid opposition of Protestant guardians and magistrates, and the active arts of chaplains, workhouse masters, visiting ladies, and nurses, may always go far to neutralise any law, however well meant: in the existing state of things a priest with tact may generally do almost what he likes; with the most favourable alterations of the law, a priest with-

out tact would still find endless difficulties and hindrances in his way.

The duty of Catholics, therefore, in this respect seems to be,—to aid as much as possible in the elimination from the political sphere of all religious passions, which in England would be almost always anti-Catholic, and to guard carefully against furnishing them with any pretext to raise themselves afresh into political consequence. The Papal-Aggression tumult was a warning that they *might* be so raised. The most direct provocation we could give them would be the systematic attempt to raise into political importance our own social and religious questions. Let us show them to be questions of fairness and equity, and they may be solved with the common approbation of all parties, like the abolition of the slave-trade, the principles of free trade, and the amendment of the criminal law. If we enlist party passions against them, we adjourn their solution for years to come.

The separation of religion from politics can do no harm to the Catholic mission in England. As nearly all our difficulties are social, arising from the inveterate prejudices which our countrymen have inherited for three centuries, our real task is to overcome the stupid ignorance and dislike that encumber our path. Here every Catholic may labour in his sphere: the statesman by showing that his religion is no obstacle to his being a gentleman and a patriot; the literary man by showing that his religion frees rather than enslaves his mind; and Catholics generally by proving themselves at least equal to Protestants in all social relations, and in the ornaments and amenities of life. But chiefly is the social persecution, which is now almost the only persecution we have to complain of in England,* to be overcome by the apostolic war which every Christian is bound to wage against the mass of irreligion around him. This is the surest way of disarming prejudice, if not immediately, at least in the long-run, by increasing our numbers and strengthening our ranks. But we must not allow ourselves to lapse into a sermon on the duties of the Catholic laity in England.

Such appear to be the dictates of political prudence. But the still higher motives of patriotism and religion have something to say on the same side. We have among us politicians reckless in driving government on the rocks, provided they can attain their ends, religious or social; as we have also enthusiasts who hope some day to “hear Mass in St. Paul’s under the protection of French bayonets;” or to see “the humiliation of England,” which they consider the sole, but

* Political injury in some things is still done us, as in charitable bequests.

sure, means to her conversion. They are not Englishmen, not they; they have a wider and holier country, the Catholic Church; they make up for their hatred of their brethren whom they have seen, by a more expansive, a more universal love, which excludes the vulgar attachments of kindred and country. Theirs is even a wider principle than Teucer's,—that a man's country is any place in which he is well off; a principle, says Lysias, which savours of a man anxious only for his own advantage, and unfit for political society. For he will not trouble himself much what becomes of his country, if his patriotic love is only proportioned to the advantages he gets by it. A good patriot ought to love the soil that nourished him, and to feel that it can never be well with him, unless it is well with his country also.* Now, without entering into the question whether patriotism is absolutely a religious duty, it certainly becomes such to the member of Parliament. Putting aside the obligations of his oath, it is clear that he undertakes a trust which he is bound to fulfil; the same principles of morality bind him as trustee for the nation which would bind him as trustee for his friend's children. Practices which are dishonest and dishonourable in society or in trade, are dishonest and dishonourable in politics. Men speak of the factious opposition of a small party for its own ends in Parliament (so far as its end is any thing else than the securing of the most evident rights, pertinaciously and factiously refused by the great parties), in the same terms as they would speak of a man who entered into the direction of a railway in order to secure an advantage to his own property at the expense of a heavy loss to the rest of the shareholders. There is such a thing as political as well as commercial dishonesty.

Next, as to the religious duties of Catholics in Parliament. Even when they suffered political oppression, which we do not, the ancient Christians used no factious means for preventing it. Towards an oppressive and persecuting State, those Christians considered that they had duties quite different from those usually practised by us towards a State that is only indifferent. Perhaps we may not be wrong in our practice; but we are certainly wrong in calling it a Catholic policy. The Jews in Babylon were commanded to “seek the peace of the city where they were captives, and to pray for it; for its peace was theirs.”† The Apostles prescribed the same rules to their persecuted converts, and their converts obeyed them. The Christians of a single province, Tertullian told the persecutors, were more numerous than the Roman army; they

* Muretus, *Variae Lectiones*, lib. ii. c. iii.

† Jerem. xxix. 6.

swarmed in the fields, in the forts, and the islands; their ranks were daily swelled by fresh proselytes of every sex, age, condition, and rank. Their mere passivity, their cessation from the active duties of citizens, would be a calamity to the empire; their secession from it would be its ruin. Yet, though insulted and murdered by the magistrates and the mob, they never intrigued against the State; but they were ever praying "for all kings, that they might have a long life, a secure dominion, a safe home, valiant armies, a faithful senate, a righteous people, a world at peace, and whatever the man or the king could desire." They proclaimed that they were commanded in their Scriptures to entreat God even for their enemies, and to pray for blessings on their persecutors, that quietness might prevail. "For," says Tertullian, "when the kingdom is shaken, we, though we stand aloof from tumults, have some part in the misfortune." If he declares that the Christians are cosmopolites, "acknowledging one commonwealth of all mankind," it is not to excuse their hostility to their own country, or their want of patriotism, but to account for their freedom from faction, and their insensibility to glory and greatness. But though of no political party, the Christians had all social interests, except those of religion, in common with the pagans that surrounded them. "We live with you, and have the same food, dress, furniture, and the same wants of daily life; we put not away from us any enjoyment of God's works; we live with you in this world, with the same forum, shambles, baths, taverns, shops, inns, and markets; we voyage with you, serve in your armies, labour with you in the fields, and trade with you. We join our crafts with yours; our acquirements, our services, we lend to the public for your profit." The idea of Catholic politics in Tertullian's time certainly did not justify the clogging the wheels of the republic in order to advance the Catholic interests. Their triumphs were social, not political. And it is almost a general rule, that religious changes must be prepared socially, or they can never be imposed politically. We are in the position of the early Christians, we have to conquer society; not in the position of the medieval Popes, who had to mould a society already christianised.

Not but that party interests are often different from those of the commonwealth. This is an abuse. But the essential character of the law of "independent opposition," as propounded by Lucas, and now adopted by Bright, is, that when parties are nearly balanced, an independent faction should conspire to render any ministry insecure that did not adopt the proposals of this faction for government measures.

It is not merely parties that are opposed, but the existence and stability of our government. Such an unpatriotic proceeding can only be justified on the rarest occasions, by the same exceptional arguments as are used to justify rebellion and revolution; it is, moreover, suicidal to the party, when adopted as a constant rule of action. For the honour of religion, we ought to protest against the name "Catholic" being appropriated to such a policy. Nor is it for our interests factiously to force weak governments to make political concessions to us, to the full use of which our social position is as yet unequal.

Catholicity, in a country like England, where parties are divided rather by forms than by principles, does not constitute a practicable base of party union, because she has very little choice in these forms. She has proved her power of creating a policy out of the rude materials of barbarous nations; she has a fund of principles which are the true basis of all liberty and of all tolerable government. But these are at the foundation; they are generally covered; the majority of political questions that arise may be solved one way or other without affecting the foundation; they relate to training and pruning the branches, not to transplanting the root. Hence, to make a parade of Catholic principles in our ordinary political assemblies is either beside the purpose, or mischievous: beside the purpose, if we only talk of them, without deducing any thing from them,—as a medieval chronicler would begin the history of New York from Adam, and would use so much paper about the præ-Noachic preliminaries, that he would never come to his subject at all;—mischievous, if he really tried to mix up navigation laws, suffrage qualifications, direct or indirect taxation, and the like questions of the day, with Catholicity, which is perfectly indifferent to them, except so far as they accidentally strengthen or weaken the hold of the fundamental principles. Our principles must necessarily be in the background in English policy; and it is well for us that it must be so; for if we pushed them forward, others stronger than ourselves would push forward the principles of a fanatical Protestantism, and would overwhelm not only us, but the principles of our liberty also,—that precious heir-loom which we inherit from Catholic England. Whatever metaphysical and deep principles of truth we may have are kept in shadow; the comparison between us and our antagonists must be made on the principles of formal politics, of law, finance, administration, and diplomacy, on which almost all measures turn. In such a comparison, it is obviously beside the mark to make a general appeal to the

public, to "look at the genius of the Catholic Church on the one side, high, generous, chivalrous, enthusiastic, refined; and then to compare it with that low, grovelling, vulgar nondescript thing called Whiggery, without one fixed principle, one clear-sighted aim, one generous aspiration." Men cannot compare what they cannot see; they cannot compare our hidden principles with the public principles of Whiggery; but they will compare our political principles, as manifested by the Catholic party in the House of Commons since 1829, with the principles acted upon by other parties in the House; and they will ask, Has all the chivalry, the clear-sightedness, the generosity, been on the Catholic side? Has that side been the only champion for fixed principles, the only high, enthusiastic, refined, gentlemanly party; and have those who have fought in the ranks of Palmerston and Russell, Melbourne and Grey, been always, in comparison to the Catholic paladins, low, grovelling, vulgar nondescripts?

If they challenge us to tell them *what* is the peculiar Catholic policy which is so generous, chivalrous, and refined, what shall we say? The Church has an inspired code of dogma and morality; she took the barbarous Germans, civilised them, taught them the principles of jurisprudence, and consecrated their love of liberty. All this is good, but it is distant, evanescent, unpractical; it is not in the sphere of formal politics. Here she no more makes a man a politician by inspiration than she teaches him to fiddle, to make steam-engines, to write an article, to draw a brief, to manœuvre an army, or to command the Channel fleet. Those who thrust themselves to the front of the modern political platform with no more ballast than Catholic principles, soon capsize, and drench themselves and their religion in a flood of ridicule. A Catholic does not know every thing else because he knows his catechism. It is not in this sense that theology is the mother of all sciences. Catholic principles have about as much to say to most of our technical legislative questions as they have to algebra, grammar, or geography. Budgets, tariffs, and reform, no more require Catholic principles for their solution than they require phrenology.

Such are the difficulties of a Catholic party in England. In the first place, there is no Catholic element in the questions of the day on which we can base a party, unless we wish also to provoke the resuscitation of the old fanatical Protestant parties. In the next place, the so-called Catholic party, if it exists at all, must distinguish itself from the other recognised parties; it must be neither Whig nor Tory, Conservative nor Radical. It must remain aloof from all other

sets; because we are told, "there are fundamental principles which every Catholic should hold, and which, either in theory or in practice, are denied" by all the rest of the world. The party, however feeble, must be distinct from all others, and hostile to them; and to this forlorn band all the hopes of the Church are to be committed. We have been wisely warned against putting all our eggs into one basket, and trusting ourselves entirely either to Whigs or Tories. But though both these great vessels are unsafe, the little cock-boat of the Catholic party, it appears, is secure, either through the impregnability of its principles, or through the ability of its leaders and the honesty of its members. It might, perhaps, be worth inquiring whether, if such a party existed, and was as wise and as well-conditioned as its best friend could wish, it could possibly have its own way in a representative government. Such a government must represent the sentiments and opinions of the people. Compromise may, every now and then, give an advantage to a small independent party; but such events must be exceptions to the rule. Representative government cannot be conducted by cabals, or compelled by dead-locks to unpopular measures. While such a policy is successful, representative government is really suspended. But the policy can only be successful while public interest is asleep. We cannot hope to force, through popular instruments, the triumph of unpopular measures. Society must be changed before our social condition can be improved. Sentiments and opinions may be gradually influenced from above; they cannot be compelled to change by act of Parliament. It is our part to persuade, not to compel, least of all to overreach, which is the most irritating mode of compulsion. A government must be composed out of the existing elements of society; and the distribution of power in the constitution cannot be permanently different from the distribution of power in society.

The Catholic politician must learn that *politician* is the substantive, *Catholic* the adjective. The consideration he enjoys will depend on the depth of his political powers; it is only after he is a useful member absolutely, that he can expect to be a useful Catholic member. Any man may deliver a continuous series of protests; no man who is not of substantive weight will have his protests listened to in the House.

Communicated Articles.

ROSMINI AND GIOBERTI.*

It is a discouraging reflection, that the only Italian names in speculative philosophy which have found an echo in the great world since the death of Galuppi, are names which, from well-known circumstances, are not regarded by Catholics themselves with unmixed enthusiasm. It is just possible that a lingering suspicion may still rest on the philosophical opinions of Rosmini; while the very mention of Gioberti is coupled with a natural distrust, and his system (spite of Dr. Brownson) has few admirers amongst us. But I must not be unjust. Rosmini was a saintly man; and if the shadow of an eclipse once passed over him, yet it passed, and left his reputation for holiness, learning, and Catholic loyalty, as glorious as ever. Remembering, to its author's detriment, an error which has been repaired, is as unjust as the most gratuitous suspicion. Besides, the writings of Rosmini, with the known exceptions, have been acquitted of unorthodoxy by the Sacred Congregation; which, in the important office of protecting the faith and morals of the people, can as ill afford to mistake on the side of leniency as on that of severity. With Gioberti, of course, the case is different; but although suspicion may be just, yet our suspicions ought not to make us unjust towards him, or blind to our own interests. As philosophers, both writers must stand on their own merits; for the philosophy of Rosmini is not approved because his writings are acquitted; nor is the philosophy of Gioberti disapproved because his writings are condemned. Both emphatically disclaimed the merit of invention; nor did they invent a philosophy, but revived different phases of the old realism,—made it their own, in impressing upon it the stamp of their individual minds, and clothed it in a modern garb. The object of this revival was a very practical one, viz. to furnish our Catholic youth with arms against the scepticism of the age; and the importance of such an object must be my apology for the present criticism, which, from the very nature of the case, can be of little interest to a large portion of the readers of the *Rambler*.

The philosophy of the present day is of German origin, and has two sides or phases of development,—a subjective side, which regards Necessary Truth as a mere psychological fact, a necessary manner of viewing things inherent in our

* *Opere inedite di Vincenzo Gioberti*. Publicate per cura di Giuseppe Massari, Torino. M. Chamerot, libraire, Paris.

mental constitution, or, better, our mental constitution itself; and an objective side, which considers Necessary Truth as a reality distinct from the faculty which contemplates it, and as an attribute of Necessary Being, which, under the aspect of the Absolute, is an immediate object of human cognition. The former view of the case would, I hold, if consistently carried out, resolve itself into speculative atheism, and, indeed, has already denied the speculative proofs for the existence of a Sovereign Being; while the latter, as upheld by its German supporters, does not save itself from the blasphemy of pantheism. Both these movements have been respectively represented,—in England by Hamilton, and in France by Cousin: the former accepting the subjective side, and reducing our necessary knowledges to so many mental impotencies; the latter taking up the objective side of the German philosophy, but admitting a pantheistic interpretation of the dogma of creation. Now the Italian school protests against the former, and corrects the latter of these doctrines,—proclaims, against Kant and Hamilton, the essential objectivity of our knowledge; against Schelling and Cousin the doctrine of creation, in its genuine sense, as a fact of philosophy, nay, as a fact of consciousness. It is my object, in the following pages, to examine how far Rosmini and Gioberti have succeeded, by the revival of solid and venerable principles, in their warfare against a false philosophy; and how far also they have impaired their cause by admitting extravagancies which the general voice of philosophers has condemned.

If any man should set himself to examine, and reduce into their last attainable elements, the arguments and assertions of a book, for the purpose of discovering what is the precise nature—so far as such nature is cognisable—of the intellectual process which we call thinking, he will find that to think is to make a judgment; and that reasoning is a series, more or less complicated, of judgments; then, if he examine what is the nature of a judgment, he will find that a judgment is composed of several ideas; and lastly, if he inquire into the origin of these ideas, he will discover that they are themselves the result of judgments. Judgments are composed of ideas; but ideas, in their turn, paradoxical though it may seem, are generated by judgments, as becomes clear on examining any single cognition. For suppose I think of an apple—it is certain that I cannot think of it *without thinking something about it*, or, in the phraseology of the schools, without predicating something of it. I may think of its shape, size, colour, kind, taste; perhaps I think of all these, or perhaps I only think of some of the properties of an apple, abstracting

the others: or, again, by an effort of abstraction, which, however unusual, is perfectly possible, I may think of the apple neither as sweet nor sour, large nor small, pleasant nor agreeable,—nay, I need not think of it as an apple at all, but, after the manner of a child, whose mind is just opening, I may think of it as a *vague indefinite somewhat*. Now, in either of these cases, I have made a judgment, explicit or implicit; and by each judgment my idea of an apple has gained either existence or definiteness. Thus—I have judged that the apple is large, that I may think of it as a large apple; I have judged it sweet, that I may think of it as a sweet apple: at least I have judged that *it is*, for I must think it a *something*, else I do not think at all; since the mind cannot think of nothing, in strict terms, because to think of nothing, in strict terms, is not to think at all. However, although, in the actual state of our knowledge, ideas are generated by judgments, which become in their turn the generators of fresh ideas, yet it would be a gross paradox to assert that this is an ultimate truth: for just “as, in the present state of things, it is true that every bird comes from an egg, and every egg from a bird, and each may be said to be previous to the other; yet, if we go back to the origin of things, there must have been some bird that did not come from any egg, or some egg that did not come from any bird;”* so it must be said of ideas and judgments; for although, in the actual state of our intellectual being, they are mutually generative of each other, yet there must have been at first some idea which did not originate from any judgment, or some judgment which did not originate from any idea. Which was first, the idea or the judgment? Locke taught that judgments resulted from the combination of the simple ideas got by experience: but Reid showed that a primitive judgment was necessary as the very condition of such experience, and that such a judgment was involved in the very act of perception itself; though how such a judgment could be possible, since, in the actual state of our faculties, a judgment always supposes preëxisting notions, he did not presume to inquire, but referred it to a *natural suggestion*.

Now this brief exposition of the mutual relation of ideas and judgments will enable us to comprehend the respective positions of Rosmini and Gioberti: for the former starts with an idea—*Being in general*; and the latter with a judgment—*Ens creat existentias*. However, we shall see that both these starting-points are ultimately reconcilable, and only seem opposed inasmuch as their respective authors regarded human thought from contrary points of view; for while both writers

* Reid.

contemplated the origin of thinking, and sought some fundamental fact explanatory of its origin, yet Rosmini inquired what constituted the potentiality, Gioberti what constituted the actuality, of cognition; whereas both are agreed that it is the idea of being which makes the potentiality of thought,* and that its actuation commences with a judgment:† while, however, they are divided as to the characteristics of the idea of Being on the one hand, and as to the nature of the first judgment on the other. Let us see what are the arguments adduced to support the former position, that the idea of Being is what constitutes the potentiality of human thought: they will be chiefly sought from Rosmini's great work on *The Origin of Ideas*.

To think is to form judgments; but to form judgments is nothing else than to make a certain classification of the objects of thought: as in saying, "the sky is blue," "the orange is round," "the ball is heavy," we thereby place certain objects, the sky, the orange, the ball, within the class-ideas of *blue*, *round*, *heavy*—the particular within the general. From this it will follow that generals must come before particulars in the order of knowledge, as the condition of the possibility of such an act of classification: and how were these generals possible in their turn? Obviously we must carry on the analogy, and suppose them acquired by the same process as the particulars themselves; and if thought be a system of classification, we must presuppose a primitive class as the condition of all classification,—a universal genus, an all-embracing predicate, the source and possibility of all judgment, and consequently of all thought and reasoning. But such a class, genus, and predicate, is the idea of Being in general; for it alone can be a universal predicate, because it is the only attribute predicable of all things in existence,—since, whatsoever differences there be amongst existing things, they all agree in this at least, that they do exist. The idea of Being, then, stands first in the genesis of human cognitions, although it is the most general of all notions; other classes are involved within each other,—the lesser within the wider in extension, and all together within the universal predicate. But is it not a subversion of the natural order to place the general before the particular? In a certain sense, no; for the genera are

* Gioberti (tom. ii. p. 126): "Se l'intuito fosse solo, l'uomo assorbito dall'idea, non potrebbe conoscerla." Rosmini (vol. iii. p. 208): "L'idea del ente adunque non racchiude un giudizio, ma costituisce la possibilità di tutti i giudizj."

† Rosmini (ib. p. 37): "Primo, dee essere l'idea del ente; poi dee venire la sensazione; in terzo luogo il giudizio che le congiunge:" and Gioberti (ib. p. 137): "Siccome l'uomo non puo pensare senza giudicare, non gli è dato di pensare l'idea senza fare un giudizio, la cui significazione è la formola ideale."

founded upon points of resemblance, and the species upon points of difference: but resemblances are observed before differences, as Aristotle teaches, “*Pueri a principio appellant omnes viros patres, posterius determinant unumquemque.*”^{*} The same author defends the position that universals are prior to particulars in the order of knowledge, if it be a question of the feeble beginnings of intelligence (for certainly in the order of distinct and perfected knowledge we ascend from the particular to the universal): “*Sunt [universalia] primo nobis manifesta et certa confusa magis: posterius autem cognoscimus distinguendo principia et elementa.*”[†] I may illustrate this view by an analogy. Suppose you observe a man coming towards you, when it is too dark to distinguish objects rightly at any great distance. You would not at once recognise a man, much less would you recognise your friend: you would first distinguish *a somewhat*; then you would distinguish a living being; then you would acknowledge him a man; lastly, you would recognise your friend. Thus it must be with the beginnings of knowledge, which will be naturally confused and indistinct; but, as St. Thomas observes, “*Cognoscere animal indistincte est cognoscere animal inquantum est animal; cognoscere autem animal distincte est cognoscere animal inquantum est animal rationale vel irrationale, quod est cognoscere hominem vel leonem. Prius igitur occurrit intellectui nostro cognoscere animal quam cognoscere hominem;*” or, in other words, universals are before particulars: and the reason is, that “*intellectus est universalium,*”—the intellectual element in every cognition (as every man may examine for himself) is always something universal.[‡] Finally, the Angelical Doctor recognises Being in general as first in the order of human cognitions, “*quod primo cadit in intellectu,*” and the condition of all others “*primo quo cognoscitur.*” From none of these statements can we reasonably differ. “*Objectum intellectus est ens vel verum commune*” is a common axiom amongst the scholastics. The mind cannot think of *nothing*. “*Non intelligitur nisi per id quod est;*” and even when we think of nonentities, phantasies, chimeras, it is clear we are only enabled to do so by a kind of mental deception, by which we feign their existence in our mind. “*Non ens non intelligitur nisi per ens.*” But these are truisms. Again, there are no less than sixteen ideas enumerated by Gioberti, each of which has, at some time or other, enjoyed the privilege of being

* 1 Phys. tex. 5, top. 2.

† Ap. Div. Thom. Summa. Prim. Sec. qu. lxxxv. 3.

‡ Ibid.

considered the "primum philosophicum," besides the idea of Being, viz. the One, the Necessary, the Intelligent, the Intelligible, the Incomprehensible, the Good, the Infinite, the Universal, the Immense, the Eternal, the Absolute Potentiality, the Pure Act and Force, the Cause, the Substance, the Absolute, and the Identical. But none of these are primitive, either in the order of thought or in the order of reality; for they are reducible to the common ratio of Being in general. Likewise the "Intellectual Principles," the "Laws of Thought," and the "Common Sense" of modern philosophers: was it that the scholastics were ignorant of the extent of application and paramount importance of such principles, that they did not make them starting-points of speculation, as Kant, Descartes, and Reid did? or was it because they were so well acquainted with them as to perceive their ultimate reason in some other intellectual fact which they did consider primitive? There can be no doubt. Take, for instance, the axiom of Descartes, "Cogito, ergo sum," which, taking M. Cousin's interpretation of it, is nothing else than a declaration of the law of substances, that every quality demands a subject, or, in other words, "quod nihili nulla sunt attributa;" which latter mode of stating it makes it apparently a mode or application of the principle of contradiction, that nothing can be and not be at the same time: but the principle of contradiction itself is not primitive, being carried back by the best logicians into the principle of identity, which latter looks awkward when put into the words *whatever is, is*, only because it is a twisted and clumsy way of stating what we shall call the principle of intellection, "objectum intellectus est ens." Or take, again, the principle of causation, that "whatsoever happens must have a cause," which is clearly a mode of the common axiom, "ex nihilo nihil fit:" but the axiom, "ex nihilo nihil fit," inasmuch as it is a mere declaration of the intrinsic incompatibility of being and nothing, is again *the principle of contradiction*, or better, the principle of intellection, *in disguise*; so, indeed, are all other laws of thought and principles of certainty, as is shown by Rosmini and Balmez after—St. Thomas!

Since, then, there is no conceivable form of cogitation which is not ultimately resolvable into the idea of Being, our authors (for I shall consider Rosmini and Gioberti together, so far as they are agreed) concluded that this very idea is in the human mind the *à-priori* constitutive of intelligence, the Light of Reason; which is subjective, indeed, inasmuch as the mind uses it as an organ of thought, but objective inasmuch as it is a reality distinct from the mind which uses it. Set

midway between the world of thought and the world of sense, it shines before the mind and renders it intelligent, upon the sensible object and renders it intelligible; and lastly, is, of itself and by itself, in the first instance, an object of intellectual intuition. However, they admitted that the form of knowledge thus presented in the first intuition was vague and undetermined, wanting the empirical element to particularise and concretise it,* since the idea of Being, while it is on the one hand the widest, is on the other the most empty of conceptions. To the data which I have just laid before the reader, and upon which it is attempted to raise this rather startling conclusion, I have no objections to offer: to the conclusion itself I cannot subscribe in unmodified terms;—I can neither accept it in itself, nor admit that it is rightly deduced from the premises; neither do I see that it is necessary to the support of the realistic position of which Rosmini and Gioberti have been the modern apostles. But before stating my own view upon the matter, let us see what results, even according to the concessions of the ablest supporters of what is called the Pure Intuition, when the intellectual light strives to emancipate itself from its natural conditions, and, divorced from all empirical alloy, to make itself its own object, “sine conversione ad phantasmata.” “Oculus mentis,” says St. Bonaventure, “assuefactus ad tenebras entium et phantasmata sensibilibum, cum ipsam lucem summi esse intuetur, videtur sibi nihil videre”†—*it seems to see nothing!* Rosmini declares that the idea of Being, considered purely, *i.e.* non-empirically, is vague, undetermined, general, a mere possibility, the last of abstractions, the negation of all actuality;‡ while Gioberti, who discarded Rosmini’s “Ens in genere” as an abstraction, substituting the real for the merely ideal Absolute of that author, affirms that, in the Pure Intuition, our cognition is vague, undetermined, confused, incomprehensible, scattered abroad, “without the mind’s being able to stay it, rightly to appropriate it, or have distinct consciousness of it.”§ But Schelling, to whom the doctrines of Gioberti bear in many points a striking affinity,||—saving always the German’s pantheism, of which Gioberti has given to the world the ablest modern refutation,—Schelling went farther; for while Gioberti af-

* Rosmini, tom. iii. passim; Gioberti, tom. ii. p. 126 et passim.

† S. Bonaventure, *Itinerarium*, ap. Gioberti, notes, vol. ii. p. 435.

‡ Rosmini, tom. iii. p. 17 et passim.

§ Gioberti, tom. ii. p. 17; ditto, p. 12.

|| Are not, for instance, the two *cycles* of the egress and regress of existences from and towards the Absolute a reminiscence of Schelling’s attractive and expansive forces?

firms that the intuition is of indistinct consciousness, the German places it as a distinct faculty *outside of consciousness altogether*, and looks down with philosophical contempt upon the vulgar, who still remain involved in the conditions of consciousness, unable to elevate themselves to his lofty standpoint, "where there exists no longer distinction of subject and object—no contrast of knowledge and existence; where all difference is lost in mere indifference—all plurality in simple unity; where the intuition itself—Reason and the Absolute—are identified."* This is what Sir William Hamilton calls "*pitching the Absolute too high*;" and I cannot but regard as suicidal to the cause of philosophy a system which builds up the ontological at the expense of the psychological element of human knowledge. While affirming, with St. Thomas, the Absolute in our cognitions, we should own that the Absolute only exists *to us* inasmuch as we are conscious of it; and that any blow aimed at consciousness is aimed also at the Absolute: they stand and fall together—at least as far as philosophy is concerned. But to return to our authors.

I have said that Gioberti objected against the Rosminian idea of Being in general, that it was an abstraction; and why? Because Rosmini had declared that his idea was not an idea of any actual existence, since all actual existence has its modes or determinations; for either it is matter or spirit, animate or inanimate, mineral or vegetable. In short, the idea ceases to be *Being in general*, and sinks into mere mode of being; becoming particularised by the very fact of its application to actual existences. Since, therefore, the idea of being could not be considered, according to Rosmini, as the idea of actual existence, there remained one only alternative (but a fatal one), that it was the idea of *possible existence*! But Gioberti saw that an idea of existence which was the idea of *nothing existing* would prove a stumbling-block to the minds of his countrymen, who are particularly clear-headed in these speculative matters; and that whereas the passage from the actual to the possible is easily explained, yet the *vice-versâ* process would render the contemplation of pure being akin to, if not identical with, the contemplation of nothing! He laid down, therefore, that the idea of Being in general, which he considered to be the object of the Pure Intuition, was not the abstraction of Being from existence, not the Possible, but the Real; nor yet the empirical real of the senses, but the Absolute,—God Himself under the character of Absolute Being. This was a return to the teaching of Plato, St. Bonaventure, and Malebranche, which had been

* Hamilton, Discuss. p. 20.

prepared by Rosmini himself; for if the idea of Being be the *à-priori* element in knowledge, that element is always something absolute, necessary, and universal, as was declared in the Rosminian philosophy;* but the Absolute, and all phases of the Absolute, may be summed up under the general ratio of Being, as we have seen. The absurdity was thus removed, but not the difficulty which the doctrine presents to the minds even of the majority of educated thinkers; for although the idea of Being was no longer the abstraction of Being from existence, but the Real Himself, yet when Gioberti comes to state, in human language, the stupendous fact of the first intuition, he relapses into the vague and unsatisfactory language of Rosmini. Now I venture to ask, Supposing that knowledge be possible abstracted from empirical conditions, and that apart from these conditions Being be offered in the first intuition, why should its contemplation be vague, dreamy, and indistinct? Certainly it is a principle of logic that the extension and intension of a conception are in the inverse ratio of each other; or the greater the extension, the narrower the intension, and *vice versâ*. Thus, while the conception 'animal' is wider than the conception 'lion,' yet it has less graphic power; for 'animal' only implies organised life, but 'lion' denominates a particular nature, and conveys an image to the mind. Yet although, when we say 'animal,' we mean less than when we say 'lion,' yet we know distinctly what we mean; so, when we say 'being,' we mean less (as far as descriptive power goes) than is meant by any other notion; but we know distinctly what we mean. True, St. Thomas calls the wider conceptions indistinct; but he means that they are indistinct, not in what they actually affirm, but in what they do not affirm; an important distinction. "Cognoscere animal indistincte est cognoscere animal in quantum est animal"—and in no other respect. But, in what they actually affirm, the wider conceptions are just as distinct as the narrower: 'plant' is a distinct idea, 'mineral' is a distinct idea, 'substance' is a distinct idea, and 'Being,' the widest of all, is a distinct idea. Why, then, is the Pure Intuition indistinct? Because it attempts the divorce of the noetic from the empirical element, which, in the actual state of our knowledge, are necessarily conjoined. St. Thomas himself, as I have said, asserted the Absolute in knowledge; yet not as the actuality, when taken by itself, but as the *potentiality* of cognition: "Necesse est dicere quod anima humana omnia cognoscat in rationibus æternis; per quarum participationem omnia cognoscimus. Ipsum enim lumen intellectuale quod

* Rosmini, tom. iii. p. 45.

est in nobis nihil aliud est quam quædam participata similitudo luminis increati, in quo continentur rationes æternæ.”*
 “We see with a light which is not ours,” as its chief opponent has correctly stated the doctrine; “and human reason itself is a revelation of God in man.” This consoling doctrine does not rest for proof on a mysterious intuition, outside of consciousness, as Schelling taught, but on the testimony of consciousness itself; and I would abjure both the intuition and the absolute of the German school,—the former as beyond consciousness, and consequently beyond philosophy; and the latter, inasmuch as it proclaims the supreme identification of thought and being, absolute and contingent,—as contradictory and blasphemous. But I accept instead (with the proviso of the “*conversio ad phantasmata*”) both the intuition and the absolute of St. Augustine, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, Fenelon, and Bossuet; in whose doctrine the absolute is an object of consciousness, and as such both a fact of consciousness and distinct from it, apprehended yet not comprehended by it. Hence

“this Intellectual Being,
 Those thoughts that wander through eternity;”†

and hence there is more in our conception of the infinite than is given in the indefinite, more in our conception of eternity than is given in that of time, more, in fine, always in the ideal than is given in experience. Give up the Absolute, and you must fall back at once upon Sir W. Hamilton’s position, which sinks philosophy into a mere methodical neuroscience. But this Light of the Absolute, I maintain, cannot of itself form an object of pure intuition: and while it is the organ, as it were, with which we see, it can only see itself reflected in the objects of thought. For it is with cognition as with bodily vision: that which is called the scene or object of vision is not the result of the visual organ alone, or of the object alone, but of both in conjunction; and that which is called the cognition is not the result of the cognitive faculty, or of the object alone, but of both in conjunction. This teaching of the reflected‡ in contradistinction to the pure intuition, not only puts philosophy in harmony with the common sense of mankind, but is actually the doctrine, I could almost say of the majority of the realistic, or, as it is now the fashion to speak, of the ontological school.

* Summ. Pr. Sc. q. lxxxv.

† Paradise Lost, book ii.

‡ Let not this word be understood in the sense of Locke’s “reflection,” as something representational and mediate. Necessary truth is immediately the object of cognition: not, however, in itself, though it is a reality in itself; but only as asserted, referred, or thought of things.

It is agreed upon by all philosophers of the present day that there is more in the principle, "the same thing cannot be and not be at the same time," than is given in experience—its necessity, for instance; yet put it to any man (philosophers excepted, who are bound to hold the contrary by their theory), and he will tell you that he cannot think it without referring it to things actual or possible, nor assert it without putting it into words or signs expressive of such things. There is a sense, therefore, in which we can agree with Aristotle's chief protest against Plato, that ideas apart from things are chimeras; yet Plato himself, the father of realism, never admitted the possibility of an unmixed intuition of the Noema itself,* such as was contemplated by certain German speculators; but he taught his disciples to look forward to death, which, loosing them from the prison of the body, should disperse the shadows of the phenomenal, and reveal before their gaze the Supreme Intellectual Fruition, the Pure Intuition—the Good, the Just, the Beautiful—the Being unsullied by all empirical clouds. Even the words of St. Bonaventure might, without great violence, admit of the same interpretation; while John Gerson, who loved, and constantly studied the "*Itinerarium*," has modified their import: "*Ens reale*," he says, "*non potest constituere scientiam aliquam, si non consideretur in suo esse objectali, relato ad ipsum Ens reale, sicut ad primarium et principale objectum.*"† Such was the teaching also of Cardinal Cusanus, from whom, through Giordano Bruno (if we may trust Sir W. Hamilton), came the whole German speculation on the Absolute; and it was also the distinct doctrine of Bruno himself.‡ Neither was the pure ideal contemplated by such writers as Descartes and Leibnitz (the latter of whom is expressly classed by Gioberti in the list of great ontological thinkers) in their doctrine of *innate ideas*; for these ideas, as explained by themselves, are identical with the *à-priori* conceptions of Kant, which, rid of their empirical conditions, resolve themselves into a bare potentiality in order to cognition. "*Sed cum adverterem quasdam in me esse cogitationes, quæ non ab objectis externis, nec a voluntatis meæ determinatione procedebant, sed a sola cogitandi facultate quæ in me est, . . . illas innatas vocavi, eodem sensu quo dicimus generositatem esse quibusdam familiis innatam.*"§ Leibnitz speaks to the same purpose: "*C'est ainsi que les idées et les vérités nous sont inées, comme des inclinations, des dispositions, et des habitudes, ou*

* Archer Butler.

† Ap. Hamilton, *Discuss.* Appendix 1 (B).

‡ Ibid.

§ Descartes, *Epist.* part. ep. 99.

des vérités naturelles.”* To conclude this portion of my task : I must admit an intellectual Divine Light in man, which is the potentiality of the first judgment ; but which cannot, for that very reason, make itself purely its own object, and can only see itself reflected in the objects of thought. Devoid of all cognisable characteristics in itself, it is characterised by union with its object, as Being in general, after the manner described by St. Thomas. With this modification, which is not a vital one, after all, I accept of the first term of Gioberti’s formula. According to this view, thought commences with the judgment, of which I will now treat.

The primitive judgment, or first actuation of human thought, results, according to both our authors, from the synthesis of the noetic and empirical elements, which are found united in all our *actual* cognitions.† The noetic element is nothing else than the intellectual Light, which may always be recognised by its characteristics of *necessity* and *universality* ; the empirical and sensational element is characterised, on the other hand, by *mutability*, *contingency*, *variety*. Both these elements, with St. Thomas, I have already reduced under the common ratio of Being ; but I must advertise my reader that Gioberti, like Plato, disdains to dignify with the appellation of Being the changeable elements of the empirical world : the Absolute Himself is the only Being ; while the phenomenal world of the senses offers only *existences*,—a suitable word, because its etymology (*ex-stare*) expresses very accurately the nature of the Contingent as having the reason of its reality in somewhat else ; thus distinguishing it from the Absolute, that which *is* by the necessity of its own nature. This proviso may be necessary, as it is natural that in propounding our author’s system I may sometimes find myself adopting his language. But to return from this short digression : since there is no possible phase of actual thought which is not resolvable into these two elements of the Absolute and Contingent, the Noetic and Empirical, it follows that the primitive judgment effective of their union is a complete scheme of cogitation, involving a process which is repeated, in divers forms, throughout the whole domain of thought. That judgment, according to Rosmini, will be “I am,” or “it is,” accordingly as Being were predicated respectively of the subject or object. Nor is there any radi-

* Leibnitz, *Nouveaux Essais*, Preface.

† Rosmini, iii. p. 78. Gioberti admits a non-empirical judgment, “*l’ente è*,” in the very intuition of the Absolute — *Giudizio primario Divino* ; but this is not the actual state of thought which begins with the formula, *ens creat existentias*. See tom. ii. pp. 164, 5.

cal defect in the judgment thus declared; but it wants analysis to bring out in strong relief the copula—for copula there must be in every judgment: moreover it wants what logicians call conversion, that is, the subject and predicate must change places; for the universal is before the particular, as St. Thomas has convinced me, in *the order of intuition*; and if the terms have become inverted, it is *the order of reflection* which has inverted them. Having been submitted to these two analytical processes, the primitive judgment forthwith displays itself in these terms: *Ens—Creat—Existentias*. We seem to find ourselves once more in the region of mists and darkness; but we must not be startled at the sound of words. The statement that we have an intuition of the Absolute was strange at first, until we knew its meaning, viz. that there is given in the human mind an immediate perception of necessary truth—a doctrine which any common clown might be made to understand with a little painstaking: so now the copula of creation, the assertion that we have an intuition of creation, will not be met with such repugnance on our part when we have mastered its meaning; at least we shall hesitate before we reject it, as declared by Gioberti himself: “Putting aside fancies, then” (he had been speaking of gross conceptions of creation, such as that existences were made out of nothing, as though out of some vague substance),—“putting aside fancies, then,—in what manner can one think creation? In one manner only; that is, by thinking of existence as having the preëssential reason of its reality, not *in itself*, but in Being (the Absolute) which quickens and fully penetrates it. Now we have shown, and each one may easily perceive for himself, that in the conception of existence are contained three elements: 1st, defect of intrinsic reason of its own reality; 2dly, the concomitant intuition of such reason in preëssential Being; 3dly, the nexus of Being as cause with the existent as effect. It is clear, then, that with the sole notion of existence man has the greatest information about creation which can be had.”* “Surely I have met with these doctrines before!” the reader will exclaim. The very conception of contingent existence is of somewhat which exists indeed, but by no intrinsical necessity; so that we can think its non-existence without repugnance: and whereas the definition of the Absolute is “that which must be,” that of the Contingent, on the other hand, is “what is equally indifferent towards existence or non-existence,”—*indifferens ad essendum vel non essendum*: wherefore, if it exist at all, it must exist by virtue of an extrinsic cause, and not a contingent cause

* Gioberti, tom. ii. pp. 202, 3.

(it is the Contingent I am accounting for) but an absolute cause—God: and, moreover, since the order of thought follows the order of reality, we can only *think* the Contingent to exist, inasmuch as it is caused, or in relation with, the Absolute. When, then, Gioberti asserts that the human mind is “a spectator of the creative act,” he does not mean that it sees the mysterious commencement of existences out of nothing. Absurd! His copula, *creat*, is nothing more than a conception of the correlation of Absolute and Contingent, as just stated; and which is given, not in a separate intuition, but in the intuition of the Absolute and Contingent themselves, in which such correlation is implied, as may be discovered by analysis. We shall see presently that there is nothing new in this doctrine. In the mean time, let me satisfy an objection which will readily occur to the thoughtful reader. “It is true,” some one will urge, “that in the actual state of our knowledge, refined as it is by reflex processes, the notion of the Contingent involves the notion of the Absolute as cause; and if Gioberti’s copula means nothing more than the correlation of these terms, we cannot hesitate in accepting it. But why regard it as intuitive? why not attribute it to the refinements of the reflective process itself?” Because it is a law which has almost an axiomatic evidence, when properly understood, that nothing is given in reflection which is not given substantially in intuition; or, in other words, reflection, as its name implies, is not a faculty *presentative*, but only *re-presentative* of truth, reflecting what has been substantially posited by the intuition. Gioberti was not the inventor or first propounder of this law; for we can trace it to Durandus at least, and it has been since recognised by others, and amongst them, *mirabile dictu*, by John Locke, whose whole theory of knowledge, both as to intellectuals and sensibles, was representational! To propound a truth is one thing; another to recognise its full import, and remain consistently faithful to it: and the latter is the merit of Gioberti.

Creation, then, is the nexus between the Absolute and Contingent: and here we see the answer to a celebrated problem in the realistic philosophy; for the scholastic realists, when asked by their adversaries the nominalists, “what was the connection between the sensible order of things and the transcendental world of ideas,” generally replied, after Plato, “*Participation*.” Sensible things partake of the nature of ideas; and what they borrow from them is the *form*, which qualifies a thing, or assigns to it its mode of being. But St. Augustine knew a better answer, of which the Giobertinian synthesis is the systematic exposition: “*Ecce sunt cœlum et*

terra: clamant quod facta sint: mutantur enim atque variantur. Quidquid autem factum non est et tamen est, non est in eo quidquam quod ante non erat, quod est mutari atque variari. Tu ergo, Domine, fecisti ea, qui pulcher es, pulchra sunt enim; qui bonus es, bona sunt enim; qui es, sunt enim. Nec ita pulchra sunt, nec ita bona sunt, nec ita sunt, sicut tu, conditor eorum; cui comparata, nec pulchra sunt, nec bona sunt, nec sunt. Scimus hæc, gratias tibi; et scientia nostra scientiæ tuæ comparata ignorantia est.”* The reader may smile to see a philosophical problem answered by a truism: but in philosophy, as in a still higher order, men say, “Behold here, behold there!” while the truth is within them, could they but recognise it. I repeat, the beautiful words of St. Augustine contain the elements which Gioberti merely exhibits in a systematic form. There is the invariable Absolute, the Good, the Beautiful, the Being, contrasted with the shifting phenomenal Contingent, which *is not* compared with the Absolute. Creation is the relation which connects them; and what better language to express the intuitiveness of creation than the words “clamant quod facta sint”? Nor does it avail to object that these remarks are applicable only to the order of reality; for although St. Augustine speaks of the real order, yet the order of thought follows the order of reality, as I just now observed: hence, if creation connects the Absolute with the Contingent in reality, it connects them in thought—in our judgments, which rehearse the reality; so that when we judge that a thing is good, wise, or beautiful, we mean that its existence is effectuated by the Absolute Goodness, Wisdom, and Beauty. But, it will be replied, why, then, am I unconscious of such a meaning in my judgments? You are not unconscious: that would be an insuperable objection, I admit; but you have not sufficiently analysed the facts of consciousness, or you would recognise that the idea of cause (and I have shown that there is an idea of the Absolute Cause) is implied in the notion of the Contingent itself; and hence it comes to be a necessary axiom that “whatsoever exists must have a cause,”—save the Cause of causes Himself, for to assert it of Him would be equivalent to a denial of causation altogether, as I have proved elsewhere.† Conceiving, then, the notion of the contingently wise, good, and beautiful, you imply the Absolute Wisdom, Goodness, and Beauty; for *nihil dat quod non habet*. Again, all this seems the work of reflection; but the human mind cannot create, and the representative faculty compounds or analyses the simple materials which come by the presentative faculty.

* Conf. xi. 4.

† “Philosophy of the Absolute.” *Rambler*, Sept. 1858.

Then comes the temptation to imagine that, whilst we are merely compounding or unfolding simple notions, we are actually creating objects of thought. We must dispel this illusion.

But Gioberti had a higher aim in exhibiting the analysis of cogitation than its mere analysis; and the object which he proposed was no other than the refutation of pantheism—the most specious error that ever warred with God's truth. He saw, that if it can be shown that creation is given in intuition, after the manner above described, the pantheistic position may be refuted by a more forcible argument than those heretofore in vogue amongst us, which, however good and just they be in themselves, unless recast and adapted to meet certain modern phases of the error, are almost useless. The venerable Aristotelian argument—that “*if we acknowledge only one substance, of which all other existences are simple modes, we shall be forced to reconcile contradictories*”—will not therefore become obsolete, and be thrown aside like an old-fashioned weapon unsuited to the purposes of modern warfare. No: truth never becomes obsolete or superannuated; but a principle sometimes lies idle against an error which it had once successfully combated, being thrown out by the mere vicissitudes of intellectual warfare, until some fresh principle comes to its aid, points its application, and renders it once more an efficient weapon. Such is the case with the Aristotelian argument against pantheism. All modern pantheists, Hegel alone excepted, have felt its force, and endeavoured to elude its application. You object that “if pantheism be asserted, contradictories must be reconciled; but the reconciliation of contradictories is absurd; and pantheism must consequently be rejected.” It is answered by an *argumentum ad hominem*, that “if the dogma of the Trinity in Unity be asserted, contradictories must be reconciled; and therefore, *pari ratione*, the dogma of the Trinity in Unity must be rejected.” But you persist, “The dogma of the Blessed Trinity does not involve the absurdity of a reconciliation of contradictories, since to be reconciled they must be predicated of the same thing in the same respect; but we do not say that the Divinity is Three in the same respect that He is one, but that He is Three in one respect, and One in another.” “Neither do I,” replies the pantheist, “assert that the Absolute is finite in the same sense that He is Infinite; that He is many in the same sense that He is One; nor, in fine, that He is evil [*indulge, pie lector*] in the same sense that He is Good: but whereas all existences are contained originally in the Deity in a state of pure potentiality (*natura naturans*), He does not

create out of nothing (which is simply unintelligible), but (which is at least intelligible) by that spontaneous activity which belongs to every being as being, He develops Himself, unfolds His own nature; and the result is the universe as we behold it (*natura naturata*). The contradictories, therefore, are predicated in the pantheistic system of two distinct states and aspects of the Absolute, and not of the same state or aspect." So that the absurdity seems avoided—but is not. And let us do our opponents the justice to acknowledge that such writers as Spinoza and Schelling sought to deliver themselves, so to speak, from their own pantheism; and by abstracting and distinguishing as much as possible between the Absolute in His developed and undeveloped state, to exhibit the Divinity as a pure supra-mundane Being, to save the moral order, and to mitigate the horrible blasphemy of their system: but in vain. There was only one means of effecting what they desired, and that philosophical pride forbade,—to bow down the reason, and accept the dogma of creation, however inscrutable. That dogma accepted, of course they would no longer be pantheists; for with creation, in the genuine sense of the word, pantheism cannot subsist. But what is creation in the genuine sense of the word? "It is identical with absolute causation," answers Gioberti.* True; and the notion of absolute causation, when properly developed, will prove a sufficient refutation of pantheism: but it wants development; for while the pantheist admits that in the very notion of causation is involved the idea of an absolute cause, yet the whole question turns on the manner of production,—whether this be by an effectuation of something *ab extra* previously non-existent, or by a mere process of development, such as is witnessed in secondary causes, *e. g.* light from the sun, a plant from its seed. What is it that forbids us to choose the latter and pantheistic process as the right one? Our *à-priori* conception of the Absolute as that which is necessarily contrasted with the Contingent, which is *nothing* of its own nature, and must therefore be brought into existence by the Absolute. This fundamental distinction posited between the two orders, the Aristotelian argument becomes once more effectual, and may be used as an aggressive weapon in demolishing our adversaries' position, while Gioberti's is used for the construction of our own. For, can then the Contingent exist in the Deity in a state of potentiality? It cannot; since the potentiality which creates things is the Absolute Himself. Where, then, is the Contingent? It is not: you have destroyed the Contingent in the endeavour to identify it with

* tom ii. p. 172.

the Absolute: or else, the potentiality which creates things is the Contingent itself in a state of potentiality; but where then is the Absolute? Choose your horn of this dilemma; or reconcile its contradictory terms, and commit the absurd.

Now there is nothing substantially new in Gioberti's argument against pantheism. The best, perhaps the only sufficient, arguments are those based upon our notions of the Absolute and Contingent, of which Gioberti's is one; but the importance of this kind of argument was seen by all the old writers. What, then, is his merit? It is his system which gives his argument its peculiar value; for, insisting that we immediately *conceive* the Absolute, *perceive* the Contingent, and that creation is immediately implied as their relation, his argument was now hardly to be called an argument, but a something stronger,—an appeal to the facts of consciousness itself; since that which is immediately the object of conception or perception is an immediate object of consciousness. But the boldest sceptic never denied, or rather never professedly denied, the facts of consciousness; but their scepticism consisted in their account of such facts being at variance with the instinctive persuasions of humanity. The reader, therefore, will perceive the importance of making creation a fact of consciousness; for if he can prove his point—and I think he can—the pantheistic system has received a mortal wound. Would it had come from a better hand! Let this, however, be our consolation, that the arrows with which he has slain our foe were plucked from the quivers of the great and glorious among the children of the Church. From St. Bonaventure, St. Augustine, and Gerson, he derived the intuition of the Absolute: the realistic doctors of the middle ages anticipated him, as they anticipated Reid and Hamilton in the important doctrine of the intuition of the Contingent; while St. Augustine taught in all but its systematic form the intuitiveness of creation. But I speak of the general character of his teaching; for I am aware that, in matters of detail, he borrowed from other sources.

And here I must draw my criticism to a conclusion. It has only touched the mere surface of the two systems it proposed to exhibit; but if it has disarmed any unfounded prejudices, it has fully satisfied the object I had in view. On the other hand, if I have been unsuccessful in reconciling my readers even to this modified acceptation of the Italian modern philosophy, I shall be quite satisfied if it provoke a more successful treatment, or even discussion, of subjects which are in these times of immense importance to Catholicism.

M.

THE CAPTIVE'S KEEPSAKE.

I CAN remember the time when visitors to prisons would seldom return without some little memorials of the ingenuity and kill-time industry of the languishing captives,—some rough wooden carving, some plaited straw, some picture, some specimen of curiously small handwriting; for from these depressed bodies and sorrowful souls we must not expect exhibitions of high art. I have tried to secure some such memorials from the prisons of Elizabeth's days, and the Catholics shut up there. The search has been tolerably successful; not that I have found any striking specimens of art, but time has preserved some few examples of poetry which at least came from the heart, and which was probably often elaborated for the purpose of seeming to employ the enforced idleness of the cell.

The Catholic prisoners of those days were generally men of education and of some standing in society; country gentlemen, squires of manors, who had been reported as crooked in religion to the Council by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, and had been sent up to London, and thrown into some of the many prisons that were then filled with Catholics. Out of prison, perhaps, their lives had not been much more free than in it; perpetually playing at hide-and-seek with the queen's officers; unable to settle down to any fixed employment; with time for nothing except their religion, and for matters which, in other circumstances, would have appeared to them the idleness and pastimes of life, they were forced to turn dancing-masters, and teachers of music, like the French *émigrés*, or to spend store of thought on verses which sound more laborious than natural. They are forced,

“in spite
Of nature and their stars, to write.”

They indited pieces of verse, and sent them as keepsakes to one another. Disraeli, in his *Curiosities of Literature*, has printed a very touching letter and copy of verses written by Chideock Titchbourne, one of the Babington conspirators, to his wife on the eve of his execution. There is a letter in the *Rambler* for August 1857, from *Stephanus Captivus* to Thomas Poundes, thanking him for his *golden cordial comfort*, and sending two pieces of Latin verse,—“a sweet delectable hymn of the Cross, and a doleful song of the nightingale touching Christ's passion,”—for him to clothe in a “new English livery.” Champion's friends rhymed about him. Henry

Walpole, Vallenger, and the ballad-writers, used their "paper, ink, and pen, and called their wits to counsel what to say" in his cause. His fellow-priests bewailed him in verse, and conveyed consolation to each other in hymns and spiritual songs, one of which has been published by Strype. They confess that it was not the inspiration of Helicon that drove them to write :

" Now I will conclude ;
And you, renowned confessors, do request
In humble sort, my homely metres rude
To take in gree, and construe to the best ;
For zeal, not skill, did make me take my pen,
To stir myself by stirring other men."

Father Southwell's poetry all bears the impression of this external necessity ; he writes poetry, not merely because he is a poet, not as if poetry was his highest function, but because he is cut off from all other recreations, and often from all other employments. Francis Tregean, who protected Cuthbert Mayne, the "protomartyr of the Seminaries," and who forfeited his liberty and his estates for his charity, was another of those who solaced the dreary years of captivity with music and song. A sonnet of his is preserved in Versteegan's *Restitution of decayed Intelligence*, Antwerp, 1605, and some of his music in the Cambridge Ms. called *Queen Elizabeth's Virginal Books*, where we find "Tregean's ground," his "Pavana dolorosa," a kind of mournful minuet, and a "Pavana chromatica" of his wife, Mrs. Catherine Tregean, Lord Stourton's daughter. Another Catholic, Richard Stanihurst, a pupil of Campion, wrote several pieces of poetry, and translated some of Virgil into English hexameters ; his verses are still worth reading for their rough English, *e. g.*

" But the Queen in mean while, with carks quandary deep anguished,
Her wound fed by Venus, with fire-bait smouldered, is hookèd ;
The wight's doughty manhood, leagued with gentility noble,
His words fitly placed, with his heavenly phisgnomy pleasing,
March through her heart," &c.

One of the most noteworthy of these memorials of imprisonment is contained in a Ms. in the State-Paper Office, which a few years ago was numbered Dom. Eliz. 1582, no. 58. It is a translation of F. Zara's account of the martyrdom of Peter Elcius, published at Cologne in 1582, followed by a long poem in two parts,—the first containing a review of "Fox the martyr-maker," the second an exhortation and comfort to the Catholics in prison. It is dedicated to "my loving brother Mr. F.," apparently Mr. Francis Tregean, who certainly "finds himself touched" in the poem. The epistle dedicatory con-

cludes in the following edifying strain: "Let us and our company bear the burden of all persecution courageously. If we consider how Saul in poor estate was most virtuous, and in prosperity most vicious; how David demeaned himself towards him in his misery, and how to Urias in his jollity; how friendly Pharaoh's butler was to Joseph in prison, and how unmindful in his liberty,—here is small cause why we should wish our case otherwise than it is."

I will not quote any of the criticisms contained in the challenge to Fox the martyr-monger, though the end contains some vigorous lines; as when the writer speaks of the Indies, and the other new spheres of missionary labour,

"Where cannibals of saints have eaten more
Than all the pack within thy pelting store;"

for Protestantism then had no Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, and no Anglican Bishop went out to New Zealand to be regaled at a native feast where there was cold missionary on the sideboard. The martyrdoms of the Indies were not such as Fox would have chosen to record, nor would our author produce them as testimonies to the Protestant martyrologist,

"Sith distance makes thee dainty of belief."

But I will quote the conclusion of the part addressed to the "Confessors" in prison, because it contains a summary of the sufferings of the English Catholics of the period (about 1582-85), so carefully executed, that a moderate amount of industry would enable a man to trace the allusions of every half line, and to appropriate them to the persons in the mind of the writer. I have done so only in a superficial manner, because to do it thoroughly would require more time than I can give, and more space than I can take.

"Though you be stayed and searched in every port,
Received of friends and kin with sorry cheer;
Though you be cited like the sinful sort,
And summonèd with terror to appear;
Though law and lawless men do reeve your wealth,
And stink of prisons do confound your health:

Though you be forced from place to place to fly,
By pursuivants pursued, by spies bewrayed;
In woods and caves though hungry, cold, you lie,
In doubt and dread, you shall be reste and stayed;
Though you be drawn (with death) from sickly beds,
Like perjured folks, bear papers on your heads:

Though to their churches you be borne by force,
And wondered at, and made the railing-stocks
Of pulpit parleres void of all remorse,
More proud than peacocks, learned less than blocks;

Though you be brought in presence to dispute,
All void of helps, yea, forcèd to be mute :

Of famine sharp although you feel the smart,
Be hanged for rogues, and burnèd through the ear,
And in the streets be whippèd at a cart ;
Though gyves and racks your limbs do gall and tear ;
Though bedlams bedless make you lie on ground ;
Though cold, though dead and rotten you be found :

Though you be forced to ransom life and land
For favouring facts and men you never knew,
When laws severe themselves, uprightly scanned,
Would have both quitted them and also you ;
Though you be penned in prisons close by might,
Whilst others wed the wife is yours by right :

Though you, my priests, for jubilees past date,
Receive the death which traitors ought to have,
And those which are of worshipful estate—
For that to you they entertainment gave—
Constrained now in deep distress do lie,
Through loss of goods, and lands, and liberty ;

And though their wives with child are forced to go
From house to house in ugly shade of night,
Their shurtless babes all helpless left in woe,
Refused of friends in such distressed plight ;
And though their nearest kin are in disgrace,
Who for their childbirth do allow them place :

Though underground such men be laid in gyves,
And fed with stinted fare of brown-bread crusts,
Which had been begged from door to door for thieves,
Debarred of water fresh to drink their lusts,
With guiltless friends and servants by their side,
For them in prison judged always to bide :

Although your husbands do procure your care,
And parents do renounce you to be theirs ;
Although your wives to bring your life in snare,
And brethren false, affright you full of fears ;
And though your children seek to see your end,
In hope your goods with thriftless mates to spend :

On pillories although you leese your ears,
Enjoined to seven years duress close besides ;
With dogs though you be bated like to beeves,
And made like fools coolestaffe steeds to ride ;
Though you be termèd mad, and bound in bands,
And whipped to death by preachers' bloody hands :

Though misreports with slander seek your shame,
And queans be brought within your beds to lie,
And bear of cursed coinerers the name,
Arraigned for rapes, in dread and doubt to die ;
Though witness false as traitors stop your breath,
As all the world may witness by your death :—

Though all these griefs, I say, and thousands more,
 You guiltless for your faith are forced to bear,
 Yet you of comfort sweet shall have such store,
 Through fervent prayer, as shall allay your fear.
 My arm is now as long as e'er it was,
 The fault is yours if it come not to pass."

The circumstances detailed in the first and second of the above stanzas were too common to need any particular instances to illustrate them. The fifth line of the second stanza seems to refer to William, the son of Sir Robert Tyrwhit,* who, for having heard Mass at his sister's wedding, was dragged to the Tower, though he was in such a high fever that the physicians declared he was a dead man if he was moved: he died within two days. The last line may refer to Campion, who was made to ride through London with a paper in his hat, inscribed, "Campion, the seditious Jesuit." Dragging the prisoners to church was a common proceeding; Challoner† gives an account of some of them being "dragged into the hall of York Castle, and there forcibly detained to hear Protestant sermons once a-week for the space of one year or thereabouts." The preachers were sometimes sufficiently contented with their performance to make them publish it. Bishop Kennett preserves us the title of a book, "The first part of a sermon wherein is confuted sundry gross heresies which the Jesuits, Seminaries, and other the Pope's scholars do hold. Preached at the Tower, *in their presence*, 7 Maii 1581, by John Keltridge; with a second sermon against the Jesuits in the Tower, 21 Maii 1581, and an epistle to the Jesuits, dat. Lond. June 10, 1581."‡ The two last lines of this stanza may refer to Campion's disputations in the Tower in August, September, and October 1581, when the four disputants were "sitting at a table and having their certain books about them;" and "right opposite, upon a stool, was set Mr. Campion, Jesuit, having nothing but his Bible;" and they only allowed him to answer, not to question, or to object; and they silenced him with brutal threats when he grew inconvenient. The fourth stanza may relate to Alexander Briant, "who was for some days kept without food till he was nearly dead, after which they brutally thrust sharp needles deep down under his nails;"§ to Mark Typer, whom Fleetwood, the Recorder, caused "to be whipped through the city, and to have his ears bored through with a red-hot iron;"|| and to John Cooper, who, while prisoner in the

* Challoner, vol. i. p. 60.

† Vol. i. p. 423.

‡ Kennett's Collections, vol. xlviii. ; Lansdowne Mss. 982, fol. 10.

§ Ms. Letter in State-Paper Office, Dom. 1590, no. 407, and in all Lives of Briant.

|| Challoner, i. 62.

Beauchamp Tower, "partly through hunger and cold, partly through the nastiness and stench of the place," became diseased and delirious; whereupon the lieutenant of the Tower had his bed taken away, and made him lie on the ground: he soon died; and "when they pulled off his slippers, in order to bury him, his flesh stuck to them, and came off by pieces from the bones."*

The fifth stanza recounts the ordinary incidents of a persecution: but the two last lines seem to refer to some fact which I do not know; while the three next stanzas refer to Cuthbert Maine, Francis Tregean, and their companions. Maine was hanged, drawn, and quartered at Launceston in November 1577, chiefly for having "obtained from Rome a bull, containing matter of absolution of the queen's subjects," and for "publishing" this bull at Tregean's house. But the bull was only "a printed copy of the grant of the jubilee of 1575, now of no force, noways procured from Rome by Mr. Maine, but bought at a bookseller's shop at Douai out of curiosity to see the form of it."† As soon as Tregean was condemned, the sheriff and his men "went with great haste in the night-time unto the house of the said Francis Tregean, seized upon all his goods, and barbarously turned his wife, being a baron's daughter, and then great with child, his children and family, out of doors, not suffering them to carry off their own clothes with them, so much as would conveniently cover their nakedness." Tregean himself, "laden with irons, was committed to the common gaol of the county, —a dark dungeon, three fathoms under the earth, not above fifteen feet across, where he remained in most miserable manner amongst at least twenty condemned persons by the space of thirty days, oppressed almost even to the last gasp of life with hunger and most horrible stench, not suffered sometimes to have the benefit of one drop of water to quench his thirst in a whole hot summer's day together; when, to add more afflictions to his miseries, some of the vilest and basest condemned persons were hired of purpose most opprobriously to abuse him, and to insult over him."‡

The tenth stanza contains references to Vallenger, a printer, who lost his ears, and was imprisoned for seven years, for writing and printing some verses about Campion, which might almost make the critic doubt whether he had any ears to lose;—to a certain priest, of whom Verstegan, in his *Theatrum Crudelitatis Calvinisticæ* gives us an engraving, where he is represented as sown up in a bear's skin, and

* Challoner, i. 61.

† Ibid. i. 40, 41.

‡ British Museum, Additional Mss. 21,203.

hunted by hounds. This is said to have happened at Dover; and a Ms. letter in the Gesù at Rome gives more details, changes the bear's skin into a bull's hide, and concludes with the preservation of the priest through the compassion of some bystanders. I suppose the "coolestaffe steeds" were wooden horses, a torture which was refined in the Netherlands to a tight rope, on which the victim was set a-straddle, naked, and dragged backwards and forwards till he was half-dead. Perhaps the misery of being "whipped to death by preachers" is a refinement even on this.

The eleventh stanza may be illustrated by the Ms. letter we have once before quoted. "Not many days ago a quean was shamelessly introduced by some knaves into the chamber of the Bishop of Lincoln" (Dr. Watson, then a prisoner at Wisbeach Castle); "and when the decrepit old man was struggling to push the shameless creature out of the door, the rascals who had let her in threatened to whip him." Another quean was introduced into the chamber of the venerable priest Mr. Wade, by a similar device of the turnkeys; and as soon as she was there, she began crying out to them, "Help, rape!" Such events were of frequent occurrence; and each time Topcliffe, or some other persecutor, would write a letter full of virtuous indignation to the Council, begging them to devise some means of reforming the abandoned wretches who were shut up for their religion. Amongst those against whom accusations of coining were trumped up, Richard Stanihurst, Campion's pupil, was evidently one. There is in the State-Paper Office a letter of Robert Beale to Leicester, dated August 28, 1580, recounting how he has searched Mr. Stanihurst's house, but found no letters or papers, as suspected: certain papers, however, were found proving him to have been connected with mineral matters, but *he denies ever meddling with coining or forgery.*

We see, then, that the poetical picture of the sufferings of the English Catholics is not over-coloured; on the contrary, the writer has kept within the strictest limits of veracity, and contented himself with merely generalising and versifying the facts which he either knew himself, or which had come to him by current report. He seems to have written in 1582, for I do not find any distinct reference to any event later than 1581. I am of opinion, though I cannot prove, that the writer was Thomas Pounes, of whom a biographical sketch was published in the *Rambler* of August 1857.

R. S.

Correspondence.

To the Editor of the Rambler.

NAPOLEONISM NOT IMPIOUS.

SIR,—I should not have discovered that your correspondent "Sigma" was aiming at me (for I could agree with almost all he says, excepting what I consider the bitterness of his tone), had he not quoted one clause from my letter. I said that the King of Sardinia was "fighting for fighting's sake" in the Crimea. I continue: "Perhaps, in consideration of the antiquity of his house, he was tolerated as a knight-errant of the nineteenth century." On this he remarks: "Few things had less to do than *chivalry* or *religion* with the presence of the Piedmontese troops in the Crimea. Count Cavour at least never doubted that the French alliance was sure of its consummation on the plains of Lombardy. There was no '*fighting for fighting's sake*.'" Strange that so able a writer should not have recollected when he wrote (for he must have observed it when he read), that my argument implied that Victor Emmanuel did *not* fight for fighting's sake; and that I was arguing against the blindness of Englishmen, who acted as if he *was*, and as if he had no thought of a *quid pro quo*; and who were angry with him now that he was fighting with a professed object, when they could allow him to fight when the best that could be said of him was, that he was fighting with no object at all.

However, I have not taken up my pen to answer an attack, which scarcely any one will have observed, and in which no one will have been able to concur. I write to protest against your correspondent's severe language on the subject of Louis Napoleon. Speaking of the Lombard war, he says: "France has gathered up her strength to wrestle with the Conservative force of Europe. This is not a mere contest about the boundary of empires, or the faith of treaties, or the mutual antipathy of long-estranged and hostile races. Once more the first-born of democracy has gone forth on her impious apostolate;" her impious apostles being Napoleons I. and III. There is no doubt that such is his meaning, for he proceeds to speak of "*Napoleonism*." Such language, almost fanatical, as *I* think, might still stand as a mere matter of opinion, even though it has been any thing but borne out by the event. Louis Napoleon has *not* been carried away by the Revolution; on the contrary, the apprehension of being involved in it has been one of his reasons, as he gives them, for closing the war. He has again and again disowned any purpose of touching the Pope's temporal power; and even in his Milan proclamation, which was more open to exception than any of his speeches or writings, he says that he came with no "pre-

arranged plan to dispossess sovereigns." We know, on the contrary, what Revolution or Red-republicanism means.

What I protest against, then, is not your correspondent's extravagant language, as I consider it, nor his running against facts, but his thinking it allowable to slander a remarkable man, merely because he does not understand him. I was far too cautious in my former letter, and am in this, to take Louis Napoleon's part; but it is another thing altogether to indulge in invectives, nay slanderous invectives, against him. Public men have characters, as other men; and their characters are as dear to them. We should do as we would be done by. We may fairly criticise what they have done; we cannot fairly impute what they have not done as yet, and what they disown.

J. O.

ON EXTERNAL DEVOTION TO HOLY MEN DEPARTED.

SIR,—In the May Number of the *Rambler* I find a letter, signed R. M., which raises the question, What honour may be given to the holy persons who in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries sealed their devotion to the Catholic Church with their blood? The best way to give a proper answer to this question is to go to the root of the principle of the *cultus* of saints.

Every one who may possibly share with us the happiness of heaven is a neighbour. Consequently the saints, who already enjoy this happiness, are our neighbours as much as, or more than, persons still living, or the souls in purgatory. We are bound to love our neighbour as ourselves *for God's sake*; i.e. not only because God commands it, but because our neighbour is *the child of God*. The more rightfully our neighbour owns this title, the greater is the love we owe to him. Thus we are bound to love a Christian, who is a child of God by creation and by grace, more than a Pagan, who is God's child by creation only. And in the same way we are bound to love a saint, living or dead, in whom God dwells more fully by grace, than a simple Christian, in whom He dwells less fully, and who is in his spiritual nonage. Hence to love our neighbour for God's sake is to love God Himself in our neighbour; and hence, again, the *love of our neighbour* is a theological or divine virtue which has God for its immediate object, just as the *love of God* has; in truth, the two virtues are but one.

In the *love of our neighbour* a distinction is made between (1) the love which is accompanied first by joy at his possessing such and such good things, and then by a certain honour, respect, and veneration that is paid to him (*Dilectio quam comitatur gaudium circa bona possessa, item honor, cultus, et reverentia*), and (2) the love which causes us to desire that he may possess those good things that as yet he has not, and which is accompanied with works of charity (*Dilectio quâ alteri optamus bonum nondum*

possessum, cum beneficentiâ). We owe both kinds of love to all our neighbours, living or dead. Thus, to speak only of the saints, we ought to exhibit our love of them by our joy at their having served God so well as to die in His grace, and now to be enjoying their eternal reward. At the same time we owe them the honour, veneration, and respect, which no one ought to refuse, even here on earth, to men whom he believes to be really holy ; we ought at the same time to hope for the general resurrection, in order that their happiness may be completed by their being restored to their glorified bodies. The *cultus of saints* is nothing more than this. It is simply a branch of the practical love of our neighbour. And I cannot imagine how educated Protestants can feel the smallest difficulty about it.

The invocation of saints is not properly their *cultus*, but it is an act of precisely the same kind as that of St. Paul, when he recommended himself to the prayers of the faithful upon earth. It is quite certain that the words of the man born blind are not literally true.* God *does* hear sinners. They are sinners whom our Lord teaches to say, "forgive us our trespasses." The Holy Ghost is the first mover of the prayers of sinners, as well as of the prayers of the just. But it is evident, if the Holy Ghost finds a better coöperation in the just and in saints, that their prayers will be more abundant, more fervent, and more confident. Besides this, the persons of the just are more acceptable to God. So when, after St. Paul's example, we would recommend ourselves to the prayers of our brethren, if we have the choice, we would rather ask for the prayers of those whose holiness we are assured of, than of those whom we consider to be sinners, or persons of less assured holiness. This would be our conduct in regard to the living. With regard to the departed there is no difference. To ask the saints in heaven or the saints on earth to pray for us, is one and the same thing. The whole point reduces itself to begging the assistance of our neighbour, living or dead.

When we ask our living neighbour to pray for us, since every thing which remotely or proximately affects our salvation must come from God, it follows (1) that we ourselves are moved to ask by the action of the Holy Ghost within us ; and (2) that our neighbour, to effect what we ask, must be moved in like manner. The same thing holds good when we invoke the saints in heaven. Not only must we be led by God's grace to invoke them, but the saints, to hear us efficaciously, must be assisted in like manner. They cannot hear us naturally, for they are not omnipresent ; God therefore, by the light of glory, must first let them know that we are imploring the help of their prayers, and must then give them a new grace to enable them to pray. This doctrine is openly taught

* John ix. 31. I believe their meaning to be—God heareth not sinners, that is to say, those false prophets who pray Him to work miracles in confirmation of the truth of the Divine mission which they sacrilegiously arrogate to themselves.

in several prayers of the *Missal*; but nowhere is it more clearly expressed than in a preface, 1200 years old, quoted by Bossuet in his *Explication de quelques Difficultés sur les Prières de la Messe, à un nouveau Catholique*, num. 39: "O Lord, this blessed confessor now sleeps in Thy peace; inspire him, therefore, O God of mercy, to intercede with Thee for us, and so, as Thou hast made him secure of his own happiness, now make him careful of ours; through Jesus Christ our Lord." But why should I cite an old prayer now disused, when I have a modern instance by me? To-day is the Feast of St. Rumbold or Rumold, patron of the diocese of Malines. Now what do we ask of God, or, in other words, what must God do if He listens to our prayers? The prayer of the day is explicit: "Lord, we beseech Thee to grant that the holy prayer of the Blessed Rumold, Bishop and Martyr, may make Thee gracious unto us; that we, who, because of our weakness, cease not from sin, may, through the ceaseless prayers of this saint, obtain pardon for our sins; through Jesus Christ our Lord." I may add, that we do nothing in the Mass in honour of the saints that we might not as well do in honour of our living neighbour. We praise and thank God for the good things, ghostly and bodily, which He has granted to our yet living brethren, and we beg Him that they may pray for us in an acceptable way. It is impossible to frame any argument against either the *cultus* or the invocation of saints, which would not be equally applicable against our conduct in regard to the members of the Church militant.

My explanation has assumed rather a controversial form; but it was necessary first to lay down the principles for the resolution of the question, What *cultus* is to be rendered to holy men not yet canonised? For brevity's sake I shall henceforth use the word *cultus* in a wider acceptation than its technical sense of the act of charity due to the saint; I take it to include invocation as well.

Such being the meaning of *cultus*, it is plain that it may be practised in two ways—either by the Church as a constituted authority, or by private members of the Church. When practised by the Church, it is either because she orders it by a general law (as in the case of the canonised saints), or permits it with a toleration that is equivalent to consent (as in the case of persons beatified either expressly or implicitly). Before the Church thus honours a saint, or authorises her children to honour him in her name, she examines whether he merits this honour; and if her examination of his virtues and miracles is completely favourable, she pronounces the sentence of canonisation or beatification. Now it is clear that the Church cannot permit *ecclesiastical* honours to be given to any chance person; therefore she cannot allow persons who have died in the reputation of sanctity to be honoured in her name before she has pronounced her sentence.

But for all this, she does not hinder the individual Catholic from venerating these persons in his own name, or from giving them special honour, either in private or in public. So far from opposing

this, she completely approves of it, because, as I have explained, it is only the rendering to these persons the consideration due to our neighbour. She only requires that it should be clearly understood that he acts in a private capacity, and not in the name of the Church. Now, to make this clear, she has ordered that a distinction be made between the honours given to the dead whom she has more or less expressly recognised as saints, and those given to the dead on whose holiness she has not given any decision.

These honours, so far as they are external, are generally indifferent in themselves. Statues are erected and pictures painted even of profane persons, living or dead, and exposed, not only in private houses, but even in churches; as the portraits of Cardinals in their titular churches, and those of Bishops in their cathedrals, images on tombs and cenotaphs, and the like. Processions with torches are made in honour of princes, or persons who have deserved well of their country, and wax candles are lighted round any body's coffin. In the Mass, not only the Blessed Sacrament is incensed, or the altar and relics, but also the celebrant and assistants, and the congregation. Similarly, bunches of flowers are offered to parents and friends; knees are bent before a king; a boy begs his parent's pardon on his knees; friends salute one another with an inclination of the body, and children kiss their hands to their mothers, as men used to do to the object of their worship.

All these marks of veneration, therefore, are in themselves indifferent. It is the intention, or the common acceptance of them, which gives them their significance. This significance may be indefinitely varied; but in the same external circumstances the signification will generally remain the same. Hence the Church orders that in the same circumstances we should not render the same external honours to holy men not canonised or beatified, and to saints who are. But when the circumstances are different, when it is openly declared that we do not pretend to act in her name or with her authority, she makes no opposition to our rendering the most special honours to persons who have died in the reputation of great holiness. Such are the principles which the Popes have followed, especially since the council of Trent, to cut short the abuses which had sprung up.

Benedict XIV., in his work on the Canonisation of Saints, explains at length the measures taken by his predecessors, and gives many examples of these measures. The rest of what I have to say will be drawn from him.*

1. In the case of persons departed in the odour of sanctity, but not canonised, we may make any panegyric on their conduct, their actions, or the reputation they have left behind them. We may say that they "died in the odour of sanctity;" "left a great reputation for sanctity," and the like: or that they were "put to death in hatred of the faith," or "died martyrs of fidelity to the Catholic Church." All this may be inscribed on their images or pictures, or

* See *De Servorum Dei Beatificatione et Canonisatione*, lib. ii. cap. 9-14.

on engravings representing their actions or their martyrdom; on the title-pages of their biographies, even under their portraits exposed in public places. But we must not say or write "Saint" or "Blessed Edmund Campion," "Blessed Arrowsmith, martyr;" for that is the formula of the titles solemnly conferred by the Church, and we cannot use them without introducing a confusion between canonised and non-canonised persons.

2. We may print, and the Church desires that we should print, and propagate the lives of those who have died in the odour of sanctity. We may write them upon the usual model of saints' lives, with separate chapters on their virtues and miracles. But we must print before and after the protestation enjoined by Urban VIII.

3. Though the question of burial solemnities has no practical connection with the particular question on hand, I may as well give the opinions of the best authors on the funeral honours permitted to those who die in the odour of sanctity. At the burial of these persons we may exhibit great pomp; kiss their hands and feet, put up inscriptions to recount their virtues, and the like: but we may not omit the Requiem Mass, for such omission, made by the ministers of the Church, would be a sign that the Church judges these persons to stand in no need of our prayers. But nothing prevents our dispensing with mourning, or wearing magnificent vestments, like the mother of Blessed John de Britto, when she heard of her son's martyrdom. These signs form no part of the Church's use, and therefore can only be signs of private *cultus*.

We know the kind of *cultus* which St. Leonidas paid to his son Origen, then in the cradle,—how he would uncover his breast, and respectfully kiss the temple of the Holy Ghost. What prevents our showing the same respect to infants who have died in baptismal purity? Those for whom baptism is a mere form could never comprehend it; but those who believe in baptismal regeneration, and who have read the magnificent testimonies of Scripture, Liturgies, and Fathers, collected by Dr. Pusey in his tract on Baptism, will easily comprehend the reasonableness of these marks of respect. They will not wonder at our covering their coffins with white cloth, crowning them with garlands, or decorating the cross over their graves with the gayest colours. We often call them *Innocents*—a name that connects them with Herod's little martyrs; or angels—a more usual, and certainly a more expressive, title. The old custom of saying a Mass *de Angelis* in presence of their bodies still lingers in many places. Lessou, in his *Voyage autour du Monde*, relates something still more touching. He tells us that he has more than once witnessed what he absurdly calls the *canonisation of infants* in Chili. The corpse, clad in its gayest frock, and with a rosary in its hands, which are crossed over its breast, is exposed under a veil upon a dais covered with flowers at the corners of the streets; it is surrounded with women playing the guitar, and singing hymns in honour of the child that has died in the grace of God; so that the death of the innocents is regarded as an occasion for festivities and

joy, instead of grief. In spite of all the Voltairian insinuations of Lessou, I only see in this a following of the apostolic precept: "My brethren, I would not that you mourned for the dead."

4. The bodies of those who die in the odour of sanctity should be buried apart, but in underground vaults; still it is not absolutely forbidden to keep them above ground, provided it is not under circumstances which indicate the commencement of an ecclesiastical *cultus*.

5. It is not forbidden to decorate the tombs of these persons with flowers, provided it is not done in obedience to a public decree, a perpetual legacy, or any circumstance that indicates the explicit or implicit sanction of the Church.

6. Individuals may fast on the vigil of their death, and feast on the day; but Bishops cannot prescribe such fasts or feasts. Civil festivals or public games celebrated in their honour are not forbidden.

7. On the day of their death we may pronounce their panegyric, or preach in their honour; but we must observe due moderation. At their anniversaries we may not substitute the Mass of All Saints, or the like, for the Requiem. This would be too like giving them an ecclesiastical *cultus*.

8. We may keep their relics in private, and burn candles and arrange flowers before them; this is only private *cultus*. But we may not expose these relics in church, nor do any thing there which implies that the Church invites the people to venerate them in a special manner. Individuals may carry portions of their relics suspended to the neck; carry them to the sick, kiss them, venerate them. All this being done privately, can only be a private *cultus*.

9. All pictures or images representing these holy persons with an aureole, or with rays, as if they were in glory, are forbidden in public or private. But without an aureole they are permitted: they may be distributed to the people, and put into prayer-books. We may even paint them with the instruments of their martyrdom, or represent their martyrdom itself, and the most memorable acts of their lives, with an inscription beneath to say what the picture means. Two things are forbidden—to give them the title of *Saint* or *Blessed*, and to paint them with the aureole or glory. Nor do I think that we ought to paint the palm-branch borne in their hands, or being brought down from heaven to them by an angel; but we may paint Jesus Christ and His angels in heaven supporting the martyr in his agony. When we once understand the principle, we can easily determine what is and what is not permitted.

Before Urban's decrees these pictures were exposed in churches. I will not venture to declare with certainty that they can still be so exposed, or that your correspondent R. M. can reproduce in his new church the pictures that were painted before those decrees in the English College at Rome. I will not say positively that you may exhibit in the churches and chapels of England the portraits of Father Campion, or the picture of his martyrdom, or representations

of the other illustrious confessors of the faith. I speak with this moderation, because though, on the one hand, it is perfectly clear that the decrees of Urban VIII. only forbid these pictures being placed in the chancel, or rather over the altar, but contain nothing against their being placed in the nave of the church, provided they have no glory or aureole,* yet, on the other hand, Benedict XIV.† is of opinion that no picture of any uncanonised person, who has died in the odour of sanctity, ought to be placed any where in the church, in chancel or nave, with or without aureole. Still Benedict, in the preface of his book *De Synodo*, allows the opinions which he advances in his books as a private doctor to be controverted; and his opinion about the extension to be given to Urban's decree is certainly controvertible. I have myself seen in the chapels of religious orders in Belgium pictures of persons recently declared venerable: afterwards I saw these pictures in the vestibules of the chapels; but I do not know whether they were removed in consequence of the opinion of Benedict XIV., or to make room for some pictures of canonised saints, which I found in their place. I will give the words of the decree of Urban VIII. "Imagines eorum, qui cum sanctitatis seu martyrii fama obierunt, non apponantur *in altari publico vel privato*, et multo minus cum diademate, laureolis, et radiis seu splendoribus, vel alio quocumque modo venerationem et cultum præ se ferente et indicante: hæ enim prohibentur apponi non solum in altaribus prædictis, sed etiam in oratoriis vel ecclesiis, aut locis publicis seu privatis quibuscumque, antequam a sede apostolica canonisentur vel beati declarentur." These words are clear enough; and Benedict XIV. himself, in two different places,‡ says that they forbid two things—(1) the placing over any altar the picture of a person not beatified; because a picture, with or without rays, by being placed there, always indicates an ecclesiastical *cultus*. They forbid (2) the making a picture of any such person with rays round his head, or the keeping it in any place whatever. But in this decree, which only speaks of the altar, there is not a word against painting in the nave of a church the acts or the martyrdom of a person who died in the odour of sanctity. On the contrary, on the principle *inclusio unius exclusio est alterius*, I think that we must conclude that the decree does permit the painting of these persons in the nave, provided no aureole is given them. In the passage where Benedict would extend Urban's decree,§ he quotes (1) a decree of the Congregation of Rites, dated August 7, 1609, enjoining some nuns to remove from their choir the portrait of Cardinal dei Monopoli. But no general law can be founded on this order; it is sixteen years earlier than Urban's decree, and therefore cannot explain it; and we do not know the circumstances under which it was given: probably the picture was among others of canonised saints.

* See the decrees in Benedict XIV. de Can. lib. ii. c. xi. num. 2 and 5.

† Ibid. c. xiv. num. 5.

‡ Lib. ii. c. xi. num. 5 and num. 12.

§ Lib. ii. c. xiv. num. 5.

Benedict alleges (2) that the Jesuits in Rome, in obedience to Urban's decree, removed from their church the pictures of B. Ignatius Azevedo and his companions. But this act has no value whatever; because, when the cause of the martyrs came on again, the Congregation of Rites and Pope Pius IX. declared that the Jesuits did wrongly to interrupt the *cultus* of those servants of God, which had been begun under the authority of the Pope. Hence I should never venture to blame those who have the martyrdom of the "Missionary Priests" painted up in the naves of their churches; and all the more because *lex dubia non obligat*.

Y. Z.

ON EXTERNAL DEVOTION TO HOLY MEN DEPARTED.

SIR,—On the subject of the honour due to our old martyrs I send you a translation of a Ms. from the archives of the Gesù at Rome. It is a paper drawn up by Father Andrea Budrioli, S.J., and is entitled, "On the Cultus of the English Martyrs under Gregory XIII., before the Institution of the Congregation of Sixtus V." It consists solely of extracts, without any comment whatever, and begins absolutely as follows :

1. "An old book in the archives of the society, entitled 'A true Account of the Profession, Life, and glorious Martyrdom of F. Ralph Acquaviva, S.J.,' p. 103. 'For a true martyrdom for the faith it is not requisite that the persecutors should have the express intention of killing one for that cause. Hence there was no reason for F. Campion and his companions not being considered true martyrs, though Queen Elizabeth did not say she killed them for being Catholics, but protested that she did not put them to death for the faith, for fear of an insurrection among the secret Catholics of her kingdom. And although she loudly declared that they were punished only as rebels and traitors, this did not prevent Gregory XIII. and all the Roman *curia* from esteeming them as happy martyrs; and as such, his Holiness caused the story of their martyrdom to be painted on the walls of the English College which he founded in Rome.'*

2. Mark Anthony Ciappi, in his *Life of Gregory XIII.*, dedicated to Gregory XIV., Rome, 1591, c. xiii. p. 19: 'The fifth year of his

* Engravings of these pictures were published at Rome in 1584, cum privilegio Gregorii XIII. P. M., with the title, "Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ trophæa; sive *sanctorum Martyrum*, qui pro Christo Catholicæque fidei veritate asserendâ antiquo recentiorique persecutionum tempore mortem in Angliâ subierunt, Passiones; Romæ in Coll. Ang. per Nic. Circinianum depictæ, nuper autem per Jo. Bapt. de Cavalleriis æneis typis repræsentatæ." There are three plates relating to Campion,—his racking, his dragging to Tyburn, and his martyrdom. The book is dedicated to the Pope, who gives the publisher a special guarantee against copyists. There is a copy in the library of Lambeth Palace.

pontificate he founded the English College in the Church of the Trinity near the Corte Savella, having turned the next houses into suitable rooms for the students, and *having caused the church to be painted with the stories of the holy martyrs of that nation.*

3. F. Philip Alegambe, *Mortes illustres*, &c., Rome, 1637, c. xxv. p. 100, speaking of Campion : 'This mass of authorities was clinched by the consent of Pope Gregory XIII., who, according to Rayssius, who quotes the Bishop of Tarrasona, gave leave to consecrate altars with the relics of the English martyrs of our times, just as if they had been canonised.'

4. Arnoldus Rayssius, Canon of Douai (*Thesaurus sac. reliqu. Belgii*, Douai, 1628), speaking of Campion and his companions : 'It is certain that Gregory XIII. went so far as to declare that the relics of these martyrs might be used in consecrating altars, instead of relics of canonised saints.'

5. Ypes, Bishop of Tarrasona and Confessor of Philip II. (*Historia particular de la Persecution de Inglatierra*, &c., 1599, lib. ii. c. v. p. 50) : 'The queen and council seeking to obscure their glory with the novel and false names of treasons and traitors, God honoured them by inspiring His Vicar, Gregory XIII., to declare in 1582 that the Catholics might use their relics for altars, when the relics of the ancient saints could not be had. And possessed people felt their force, the devils departing out of them, as shall be said in its place. And as the heretics could not hide this greatness, the just rejoiced in the Lord, and revered these holy martyrs, seeing the word of God fulfilled in them, who had promised glory and honour to those who suffered in His cause.'

6. Cardinal Baronius, in his additions to the Roman Martyrology, c. viii. : 'Let not the reader wonder to see omitted from this Martyrology those most glorious martyrs, who in our age have suffered at the hands of heretics the most painful deaths, equal to any other martyrs, for the defence of the faith, especially in England and France, so that we may well believe them to be in heaven among the other martyrs, equally triumphant and glorious. Nor, again, will he find any mention of those new *sons of thunder* who have evangelised the New World, and suffered martyrdom there. For, it appears, it was not the present intention of the Roman Church to write a new Martyrology, but to restore the old one from ancient documents.'

The same, in the notes to St. Thomas of Canterbury, 29 Dec. : 'Our age, in this respect most happy, has witnessed many a Thomas in the persons of those most blessed priests and most noble men of England, crowned, as we may say, with a larger martyrdom and with twofold honour, since they were martyred not only for the liberties of the Church, with Thomas, but also for the defence, restoration, and preservation of the Catholic faith : such as, amongst others, those whom the Society of Jesus has fed in its folds, like innocent lambs, with holy learning, for victims acceptable to God ; and those whom the colleges of Rome and Rheims have sent forth

to battle. Be brave, be strong, you glorious Englishmen who have enrolled in this noble service, and have promised your blood with an oath; I envy you with a holy envy, when I see you clothed in purple and white, like martyrs elect; and I am forced to say, Let my soul die the death of the just, and let my end be like theirs.'

7. F. Louis of Granada, in the fifth part of his *Introduction to the Creed*, c. xviii.: 'The history of the martyrdom of Campion and his companions is well worth knowing; we may say of them that they were twice martyrs—martyrs of faith and martyrs of charity,—the first in not consenting to heresy, the second in refusing to betray the Catholics in spite of the tortures used to force them to do so; loyal in the first to God, in the second to their neighbours and brethren. . . . It now remains for the Christian reader to consider with the eyes of faith the joy wherewith the holy angels accompanied these happy souls, faithful to God, for whose faith they died, and faithful to their neighbour, whom no torments could make them betray—martyrs in both. Now what high festival must be kept this day in heaven to celebrate the entry of these twice-crowned combatants!' &c.

8. F. Peter Ribadeneyra, S.J., in his appendix to Sanders' *History of the English Schism*, Cologne, 1610, c. clxi.: 'An image of a Father of the Society martyred in London, honoured by the Indians.'—'I have seen in India a beautiful portrait of blessed Father Campion, whom you so barbarously slew. I know that he, at the time you tortured him, was honoured as a martyr of Christ, while you were execrated as enemies of God and tyrants of His Church.'

9. F. Andrew Eudæmonjohannes, in his *Answer to Is. Casaubon's Letter*, Col. 1613, c. vi. p. 129: 'Lancelot Andrews, in his *Tortura*, as good as confesses that Campion might have saved his life by denying the Pope's power over princes. I accept your confession, and say that it was glorious for the holy martyr of God to be willing to throw away his life for the defence of the Church, on your own testimony.'

10. Bombinus wrote the *Vita et Martyrium Edmundi Campiani, Martyris Angli*, &c., Mantua, 1620: at p. 303 we find, 'At Rome also, in the English church, among the rest of the martyrs who shed their blood to plant the faith in England, several pictures of Campion are publicly exposed. Nor has any history of him appeared in any language without giving him the title of martyr.' The book closes, 'Praise to God, and to the Blessed Virgin, and to the blessed prince of our English martyrs, Edmund Campion.'

" Una sit merces operi, o Beate
Martyrum princeps mihi Campiane
Pectus intactum. Titulis id unum
Insere nostris." "

11. Don Bernardin de Mendoza, Spanish ambassador to Elizabeth, wrote to his sister Anne four days after Campion's martyrdom, Dec. 4, 1581: 'Since I cannot well write in my own name from this country any thing that relates to our martyrs, I have told

Serrano [the secretary] to write. Will you copy it, and send it in my name to the Jesuits, to be published in all their colleges? I only add that every body here, and I in particular, can attest, that considering the manner of Campion's suffering, he is to be accounted amongst the greatest martyrs of the Church of God.'

12. F. Robert Parsons, S.J., in a letter to F. Claudius Acquaviva, Dec. 28, 1581: 'The relics of F. Campion are sought with the greatest eagerness, and large sums of money are offered to the heretics to purchase them. One man was very lucky, for without any expense but his wits he succeeded in stealing a quarter, which he took to a house where several Catholics were assembled. Such was the joy at this unexpected happiness, that many shed tears, and a certain baron who was there fainted.'

13. F. John Gerard, in his Ms. relation: 'I one day went to Bridewell, where I had to visit a sick person who deserves mention. He had once been Blessed F. Campion's man, and had been long imprisoned with me in the Marshalsea; I now found him in chains for nothing but praising F. Campion.'

14. Some German copied out a tragedy of Campion's before 1620, and entitled it 'Ambrosiana Tragœdia, auctore Beato Edmondo Campiano, Græco, Latino, Poeta, Oratore, Philosopho, Theologo, Virgine et Martyre.'

15. A letter from the College at Gratz, 1606: 'One of the chief nobles of Gratz, once a pupil of Campion at Prague, who used to tell most memorable things of him, and who held him in peculiar veneration, and prayed to him every day as one of his chief patrons, was in great anxiety for his wife, then in labour and in great danger; so he prayed, "O blessed F. Edmund Campion, help my poor wife." She immediately gave birth to a son, whom the father in gratitude called Edmund.'

16. Gilbert Genebrard, in his *Chronographia*, Paris, 1585, ad ann. 1581: 'Edmund Campion and other saintly and learned men martyred at London.'

17. Aubertus Miræus, *Chronicle*, ad ann. 1581: 'Ed. Campion of London, Priest S. J., the most celebrated martyr of our age, put to death in London for the orthodox religion, and the supremacy of the Pope, Dec. 1.'

18. F. Matthias Tanner, S. J. (*Societas Jesu militans*, Prague, 1675, p. 13): 'Many have venerated him, and many still venerate him as a martyr. Among them some of the imperial princes;—the Archduke Leopold of Austria Bishop of Passau, and the Archduke Charles of Austria Bishop of Wratislav, sons of the Emperor Ferdinand II., in visiting the old Clementine College at Prague, first asked to be conducted to the cell which Campion had consecrated by a residence of some years. They entered it as if it had been a church or holy place, with bare heads, and falling on their knees, they declared the pavement which the feet of so noble a martyr of Christ had trodden (so they spoke out of private devotion) was worthy of all reverence. An English gentleman, Henry Orton, who

visited the cell with the ambassador of the Duke of Lorraine, went still further; he prostrated himself on his face, and over and over again kissed the ground happy in having been trampled by those blessed feet.'

19. Saurez (*Defensio Fid. Cath. et Apost. adv. Anglicanæ sectæ Errores*, Conimbricæ, 1613, lib. vi. c. 11): 'Are those who were put to death in England for their religion and their obedience to Rome to be numbered among the true martyrs? We say that not only under Henry VIII., but also under Elizabeth and James, many suffered death in the English persecution, who are numbered among the true martyrs of Christ with great glory and with constant truth. All the Catholic writers who treated the English affairs of those times thought so; Polidore Vergil, &c. Sanders proves it by many examples, and reasons concerning these, and those who suffered under Elizabeth (*de Schism. Ang.* libb. i. et iii.), and relates the glorious martyrdoms of Campion and the rest in 1581 and the following years. Genebrard holds the same opinion in *Chron. ann.* 1534, and quotes Paulus Jovius, George Lily, and Sleidan, lib. ix. So Surius, Bozius (*de Signis Eccl.* p. 1. lib. ii. c. i.), Ypes, Andreas Philopator, Baronius, Petrus Opmeerus in his last chronological book, 1585, and Lawrence Bayerlinck in the second volume of the same work, an. 1606. There is therefore no reason why Catholics should doubt about the martyrdom of those saints. For, according to Augustine's rule, since they are sure that they died in the unity of the Church for her unity and authority, they cannot doubt their being crowned as martyrs, or their murderers being judged as persecutors. Let no one then, as Cyprian says, lower the dignity of the martyrs; let no one destroy their glory and their crown.'"

Several other testimonies to the same effect might be added, which would, I think, prove that Bishop Challoner was the first who deprived our missionary priests of the title of martyrs. As he hoped that his book would be read by Protestants, he carefully abstained from any thing calculated to offend them.

C. W.

CONSULTING THE LAITY.

SIR,—By a coincidence which often occurs, the July Number of *Brownson's Review* contains an article, parts of which illustrate that in the July *Rambler*, "On consulting the Laity in Matters of Doctrine." I do not suppose that you would altogether adopt the traditionalist phraseology which Dr. Brownson uses, and I wonder how he, after so long fighting against the theory of development, could have adopted a system which requires that theory for its complement; but whatever reserves are to be made, it is always interesting to observe the concurrence of thought of men placed at a

distance, and fighting the same battle under different conditions. Dr. Brownson, it seems, has been likened to Lamennais, and feels it necessary to point out the differences in their respective careers. In the course of his able article, the whole of which is well worth reading, the following passage occurs, which perhaps you will think it worth your while to reprint :

“The gravest error of Lamennais was in identifying Christianity with the general or universal reason, and making the common consent of the race the authority for doctrine and faith. But even this has a side of truth. The tradition of the primitive revelation is, in some form, universal, and enters into the common reason of the race. With Christians this is still more true, and this internal tradition, if we may so call it, common to all men, and especially to all Christians, is, in some sense, authority for doctrine and faith, and, perhaps, an authority not always duly respected. The error is, not in recognising it, but in substituting it for the positive teaching authority of the Church. All the Church teaches is not, save in germ, in that common reason, and it is only her positive teaching that brings out what is in it, and supplies its deficiencies.”

I stop here, because if I only ceased transcribing with the cessation of interest, I should transcribe nearly the whole article.

P. S.

Literary Notices.

The Life of St. Malachy O'Morgair. By the Rev. John O'Hanlon. (Dublin, 1859.) This careful and valuable work has grown out of a sketch which the author inserted in an American periodical, and is one out of a projected series of above five hundred Irish saints. Of these the Life of St. Lawrence O'Toole has been already published, and the Life of St. Patrick is in preparation. In the case of a biographical or historical work, a reviewer looks, first, for new matter, contributed to the stock of facts already known, from sources hitherto unexplored ; or, secondly, for a skilful condensation of the scattered notices, the minute details, and the conclusions which are to be found in various, rare, and voluminous works ; or, for such original views of scenes and passages familiar to us as invest them with a new interpretation or a philosophical character ; or, lastly, for such skill in composition and grace of style as may recommend the subjects treated of to readers who otherwise would never be induced to enter upon them. Of these qualifications Mr. O'Hanlon professes the second. His publication shows not only an acquaintance with the classical works upon his subject, but much collateral reading ; while he has availed himself both of the writings and suggestions of contemporaries. His notes in particular show great diligence, and a most praiseworthy minuteness and accuracy. We do not pretend to criticise him in detail ; but we are safe in saying, that

he has written as a scholar ought to write, and as a biography ought to be written. In his preface he disclaims for his work the graces of composition without undervaluing them. We wish he had kept close to the intention thus implied ; at least his line of thought has struck us as sometimes somewhat ambitious. Of this character, too, are certain quotations in the notes from Spenser, Walter Scott, Cicero, &c. We should not make this remark, except that his volume is to be one of a series.

Legends and Lyrics. By A. A. Procter. (Bell and Daldy, 1859.) It is difficult to review a volume of poems, from the want of a standard by which to criticise fairly what is so individual in its origin, and so capricious in its manifestations. How shall we weigh and measure what is of so ethereal a nature, and in its very idea so antagonistic to science ? We judge of poetry according to our humour at the moment ; and what seems to us strained, or affected, or fanciful, or obscure to-day, will to-morrow touch us as natural and deep. Each of us, too, has his own tastes, and the favourite of one is barely endurable by another. For ourselves, we confess we are not very fond of the free-and-easy style of the present day ; we have been brought up in a severer and more classical school. How, then, shall we do justice to a volume which in point of composition too often savours of the age ? We are accustomed to think that verse should either be blank or in rhyme : we do not like a mixture of the two. In the ballad metre, where the first and third lines do not rhyme, the defect is only in appearance ; for they are but portions of the second and the fourth respectively, being merely broken in the printing for the convenience of the eye. And so of the anapaestic, when four long lines are chopped into eight. But a slovenly fashion has come in (partly in consequence of translations from the German, and the impossibility of imitating in English the double rhymes of that language) of letting the real endings of lines remain ragged and uncouth, with no musical response to sustain them, instead of being, as they should be, "married to immortal" rhyme. Thus the authoress before us has whole poems in which a line like "A little longer still and heaven *awaits thee*," is matched by "Then our pale joys will seem a dream *forgotten* ;" though the second and fourth lines rhyme.

However, we did not take up our pen with the intention of being cross with a volume in which critics of every taste must find a great deal to admire. The "Tomb in Ghent," and the "Sailor-Boy," are as compositions perfect,—perfect in simplicity, pathos, sweetness, and precision. The same characteristics attach, different as is the verse and subject, to "A Doubting Heart," "Linger, O gentle Time," "Changes," "A Lament for the Summer," "A First Sorrow," and others. There are compositions in the volume of a bolder, wilder sort, which others will prefer, and with as much right to do so, as we to attach ourselves to the beautiful and serene ; and there are others of a more thoughtful and deeper character, such as "A Woman's Question," and "A Parting."

We should not use so many words unless we considered the

volume to be one which no reader will be sorry to have read. The authoress seems to prefer the Past to the Future ; in doing so, she agrees with ourselves, who have ever thought Memory more poetical than Hope. Perhaps this is the reason why there have been so few great sacred poets ; nature looking back, grace looking forward.

Pictures of Missionary Life in the Nineteenth Century. Vol. I. *In the West.* Vol. II. *In the East.* (Burns and Lambert, 1858.) These interesting sketches are for the most part taken from the accounts sent home by French and Belgian missionaries, as contained in the *Annals of the Propagation of the Faith.* Of the two volumes which they form, we consider the second far the more interesting : we suppose the reason to be, that they relate to the East, the cradle of the human race ; whereas the West is either the abode of savages who have degenerated from their first estate, and have no history, or of those European races whose history is our own. It is natural to the human mind to look up the stream, not down it, “antiquam exquirere matrem ;” and the filial yearnings which we feel towards Asia are seconded in the philosophic intellect by the reminiscences which linger among its scattered populations of former Christian teaching, and by the fragments of a still earlier revelation which are embodied in its idolatrous superstitions. Other objects too are lodged there of a liberal curiosity ; the East has its own civilisation, and a settled immemorial social state, varying in its separate countries, yet, as it were, indigenous in each. Place and people belong to each other, as if the nations were, strictly speaking, children of the soil. Hence it is that persecution is possible in the East in a sense in which it is unknown in the Western hemisphere ; and this, again, invests those regions with a solemn and special interest. The contrast is striking between the vulgar sectarian violence of the Wesleyans in Oceanica, and the fitful fury of their converts against the Catholic missionaries, which the collector of these scenes dignifies with the name of a persecution, and the terrible systematic efforts made in China and the Corea to eliminate the Christian name from the face of the earth. In the latter country, the persecution began in 1791, and lasted for at least twenty years. During that time more than eight hundred Christians were martyred, and among them ladies of royal blood and dignified magistrates. The persecution was renewed in 1827, and again in 1839.

Persecution implies two parties ; and the superiority of the East is here again shown in the material which it supplies for the production of martyrs, as well as of martyr-makers. In spite of all that may be said about the degradation of human nature in those countries, there is in them, after all, a capability of self-action which surprises the self-sufficient European. Our author points out to our attention the paradox that the Corean mission “was founded without missionaries, and long supported without pastors.” Mr. Marshall has lately directed our minds to the same remarkable country. In this age of the European world, when torpidity, scepticism, and apostasy are the order of the day, it is a wonderful and most gra-

cious relief to the oppressed spirit to look off towards those distant regions, where the glories of primitive Christianity are renewed. They evidence both the power of the religion itself, and the unchangeable and unequivocal characteristics of that system of faith and worship which has ever been its instrument of operation. We hardly need add, that the initials at the end of the preface are a guarantee, before reading the volume, of the care and skill with which the materials supplied by the *Annals* are put together.

Bertrand du Guesclin, the Hero of Chivalry. (London : Burns and Lambert, 1859.) This is one of the prettiest stories which we have come across for a long time. It reads like a romance; and we can hardly believe that it is not one. If it all happened to the very letter, then truth certainly is more marvellous than fiction; and Sir Walter Scott wrote prose, not poetry; and his accounts of tournaments, and the knights and fair dames who figured in them, are but a poor copy of the heroic reality. In one point, indeed, Du Guesclin falls short; for he was ugly in feature, and clumsily built. But, having in candour made this admission, we maintain that his true story is a better romance than the most specious miracles of the minstrel or the story-teller. Du Guesclin was as brave and agile as Ivanhoe; as devout to his lady as Sir Kenneth; as shrewd and wary as Quentin Durward; as manly, liberal, and magnanimous as Cœur de Lion; as modest as Damian de Lacy; and as incorrigibly fond of fighting as Henry Gow. He was religious, loyal, open-handed, tender-hearted, and given to alms-deeds. In his first feat he comes forward, almost as a *Desdichado*, with his visor down; obstinate in his refusal to declare his name; and discovered only at length when, after unhorsing and unhelming fifteen knights, his own casque is torn off by his adversary's spear.

Of course there is a reverse to this fine picture, besides the hero's ugliness; and this is the best proof of the substantial fidelity, after all, of the history. We felt grateful, as we read on, that we were not born in the age to which it belongs. We have lately had occasion to insist upon the contrast which may exist between schools of learning and the general state of the population in which they are found. It answers to the contrast which exists in this day between railroads, together with the towns connecting them, and the expanse of country through which they run, with the parish roads and slow conveyances which are the legacy of the past. To think that Du Guesclin lived in, or after, the age of Joan of Navarre, Walter de Merton, Walter de Stapleton, and Adam de Brome! Civilisation was then making progress; the universities were the seats of the movement; but chivalry was hundreds of years behind the age. Rather the College Statutes of Oxford might have been written in the age of Theodosius or St. Gregory, on the one hand, or in the nineteenth century on the other; while the knights of chivalry were little better, morally, than Homer's heroes, or the sea-kings.

Their contempt and consequent cruelty towards all but their

own *élite* circle of *prud'hommes*, was nothing short of the tyrannical bearing of Greeks and Romans towards their slaves. Scott's Claverhouse, prating about Froissart, is their representative in the seventeenth century. Our clever authoress, in spite of her love of chivalry, is fully alive to the fact; though she would use gentler terms about it than our own. Alas, that the English should supply her with a special instance of it in the course of her narrative! Too weak to sit on horseback, the Black Prince contemplated from his litter the merciless slaughter of men, women, and children at Limoges, deaf to the entreaties of the unoffending people, who cast themselves on their knees before him praying for mercy. "Upwards of 3000 men, women, and children," says Froissart, "were put to death that day." "Such," says the authoress, "was too often the case in those days. The sympathies, courtesies, and charities of knights were for each other; while the sufferings of the common people were very generally despised or overlooked" (p. 148). The English are undoubtedly a humane tender-hearted people: yet how are we to account for their cruelty in war, whether under the Black Prince, or the Regent Bedford, in Ireland or in India?

Dissertatio de Syrorum Fide et Disciplinâ in Re Eucharisticâ. Scripsit M. J. Lamy. Lovanii, 1859. This volume will be found by theologians and by ritualists to contain much interesting matter, brought together from works for the most part too expensive to be accessible to many readers. The original texts are always accompanied with a Latin translation, and that of John of Tela has been edited now for the first time. The author is, we think, a little credulous in believing the work ascribed by Asseman, *Cod. Lit.* vol. v., to St. John Maro to be his; at all events, we have been told by one who had seen the manuscript, that Asseman *must* have known that it was not St. John Maro's work. Sometimes, too, M. Lamy is not as exact as might be in his translations, *e.g.* in p. 73, the words "Lo vole" are rendered "nefas omnino est;" whereas we think "non decet" would be nearer the mark. On the same page a word which we believe is nothing but "Belteshazzar" puzzles him. Belteshazzar is used for any profane person, and the Syrian author simply confuses this name with Belshazzar, as the Septuagint seems to have done also. We desiderate also a fuller treatment of the knotty question touching the Invocation of the Holy Spirit in Oriental rites, upon which Orie wrote a tract, with which our author is apparently unacquainted. It is a question which requires, for the fair and unflinching treatment of it, ample theological as well as Oriental acquirements. But the extent and orthodox use of Syriac learning which M. Lamy has displayed, will doubtless lead him as he grows older to further theological pursuits; and through these, in conjunction with a little severer criticism, we see reason, in the present very laudable essay, to expect a great deal from the zeal and learning of the author before us.

The Patrons of Erin; or, some Account of St. Patrick and St.

Brigid. By V. G. Todd, D.D. (London, Dolman.) Whatever Dr. Todd publishes on the subject of Irish antiquities comes to us with great weight from the circumstance that he has made them his study. It is reported, indeed, that his researches into that field of interesting learning had much to do in making him a Catholic. When, then, he tells us that he has drawn his narrative from those authors who represent the most ancient traditions, he speaks as one who ought to know what the value is of the various accounts which have come down to us of the great Saints whom he has made the subject of his memoir. Under these circumstances, we do not see who has a right to express an opinion on any points which he sets before us, but those who have such sufficient Irish scholarship as warrants their going by their own judgment. That the narrative is interesting and edifying there needs no learning to be qualified to pronounce; and these are the qualities for which readers look out. Moreover, it is written with the conciseness and reserve which befits a scholar. We are not sure, however, that he has always observed this self-restraint. If he has done so, and if the following passage in the speech of Nathi, king of Hy-Garchon, is really taken from any old document, it is a remarkable coincidence. "What right," said he of Palladius and his missionaries, "has this bishop and his priests to come into our country? He asked no permission from our monarch. He is come to overturn our ancient customs. He is attempting to introduce a religion which has not received the sanction of the state. He wants to bring us into subjection to a foreign power, and to make us subjects of the Bishop of Rome. We will not have this man to reign over us." Yet we must not hastily assume that this passage is not what it seems to profess to be. A coincidence of the same kind occurs in the history of the Vandalic persecution in Africa, which seems in good measure to have originated in a fear, not indeed of Ultramontane, but of Ultramarine influence.

Contemporary Events.

HOME AFFAIRS.

1. *Opinions on the War.*

The short Session of this summer has done little for legislation, and has been interesting chiefly in connection with foreign affairs. Every debate of importance turned more or less on the absorbing questions provoked by the Italian war.

Most of the new Ministers were re-elected on Monday June 27. Mr. Cobden having, on his return from America, declined to join the government of a Minister to whom he had been so frequently and so bitterly opposed as Lord Palmerston, Mr. Milner Gibson became President of the Board of Trade, and Mr. Charles Villiers was appointed President of the Poor-Law Board.

Of the speeches of Ministers at the hustings, the most remarkable were those of Lord John Russell in the City, and of Mr. Lowe, the Vice-President of the Council, at Calne. Lord John at once struck the chord which continued to resound on the Treasury bench during the whole of the Session:

"I have told you on former occasions what, as I conceived, was the deep-seated cause of the present war—that it was not the ambition of one man, or of two men, or of three men; but that it was the grievous misgovernment of Italy, which had lasted for forty years, and which the Italian people had at various times endeavoured to throw off. We may hope that the moderation of the successful party, and the wisdom of the defeated party, may lead in no long time to an honourable and satisfactory peace; but our duty is to continue in the path of neutrality, which the whole country has determined to adopt. If, however, that moderation and that wisdom should not be manifested, it is impossible to say how far this war may extend, and what powers may take part in it. It therefore behoves this country, for her own security, for the defence of her own honour

and her own interests, not to neglect her navy or her army, but to be prepared for any contingencies that may arise. Such being the state of foreign affairs, then, the first duty incumbent upon us is vigilance. We must watch every move that takes place, and consider what bearing it may have on the future. In the next place, whenever the time shall arrive—and I hope it may soon arrive—when the belligerents may be disposed to terminate this destructive contest, it will then be the business of this country to give such counsels as may lead to a termination of the war, honourable to all parties, and as may afford better hopes for the independence and liberties of Italy."

The language of Mr. Lowe was very different. He said:

"In foreign affairs I believe it is the wish of the Parliament, the Government, and the people of this country, to maintain a strict neutrality; but we must not deceive ourselves, it is quite possible that we may find such neutrality no longer in our power. To remain at peace does not depend on our will alone, but also on the will of those who are waging war. Whatever be our sympathy with Italy as between nation and nation, there never was, in modern times, a war so unprovoked as that which France is now waging against Austria. France has possessed herself of the western ports of Italy; she may be even now seizing Venice; she has sent Kossuth and Klapka to debauch the Hungarian regiments, by the hopes of a second Hungarian revolution; and the frightful carnage of the Mincio has brought her to the very threshold of the German Confederation. Prussia has armed, and proposes to place an army on the Upper Rhine. Unless that Being, in whose hand are the hearts of princes, shall will it otherwise, the war will quickly cross the Alps, and spread itself from the Adriatic to the German Ocean. The military spirit of

France is aroused; she has met with an enemy too weak to resist her arms, too strong to be conquered without glory. Her military power will be strengthened and developed; and there is danger lest the tide of success should flow on, as it flowed in the days of the first Napoleon, and lest we should find ourselves no longer able to exercise our free will in the preservation of neutrality. The treaties of 1815, on which Europe has rested for forty-five years, have been torn up; and who shall say on what basis, or after what sufferings, the balance of power shall be settled anew?"

This speech is remarkable, because we remember no other case of a public man who acknowledged that to speak of unconditional neutrality is absurd; whilst his severe condemnation of France plainly shows that if our neutrality was to be abandoned at all, it should be, in his opinion, for the defence of the Austrian power in Italy. With reference to the same question of neutrality, there are some sensible remarks in a letter from Mazzini, published August 10th.

"Morally, neutrality is the abandonment of every function, of every mission, of every duty which is to be fulfilled on earth; it is mere passive existence, forgetfulness of all that sanctifies a people—the negation of the common right of nations, egotism raised to a principle—it is political atheism. A people cannot limit its own free action without falling, without denying the progress which God calls it to advance.

"Politically, the neutrality of a State is its nullification. It does not lessen a single danger, but condemns a State to front it in isolation. History points to States that neutrality has drawn into ruin—Venice, for example; not one that neutrality has saved from war or invasion; *media via*, said Titus Livius, *quæ nec amicos parat, nec inimicos tollit*. By inscribing a negation upon its own flag, a nation does not avoid death, but adds dishonour to it."

Our neutrality was defended by Lord Palmerston, on the ground that neither our sympathies nor our interests were involved in the war. The fact is, that popular sympathy was so strongly engaged on one side,

as to make the country overlook that its interests were on the other.

Most of the eminent diplomatists of this country, Lord Stratford, Lord Normanby, and Lord Howden, expressed the same opinions as Mr. Lowe. So also the chief Conservative statesmen in the House of Lords, Lord Brougham, Lord Lyndhurst, Lord Derby, and Lord Ellenborough.

July 5. Lord Lyndhurst said, speaking of the defences of the country:

"I will not consent to live in dependence on the friendship or the forbearance of any country. I rely solely on my own vigour, my own exertion, and my own intelligence. Does any noble lord in this House dissent from the principle which I have laid down? I rejoice, my lords, to find that such is not the case. But while this is a matter for congratulation, I regret to be obliged to say that we do not stand well upon the continent of Europe. I do not think late events have improved our position in that respect. But I go further, my lords, and express my belief, as the result of my own careful observation, that if any plausible ground of difference should arise between this country and France, and that difference should lead to hostilities, the declaration of war with England, on the part of the government of that country, would be hailed with the utmost enthusiasm, not only by the army of France, but by the great mass of the French people. If I am asked, 'Will you not rely upon the assurances and the courtesy of the Emperor Napoleon?' I reply, that I have a great respect for that high person, and that I will not enter into any explanation on this subject, but will leave every noble lord to draw his own conclusions, and to form his own opinions. This, however, I will say, and I can say it without impropriety. If I am asked whether I cannot place reliance in the Emperor Napoleon, I reply with confidence that I cannot place reliance in him, because he is in a situation in which he cannot place reliance on himself. He is in a situation in which he must be governed by circumstances; and I will not consent that the safety of this country should depend on such contingencies. My lords, self-reliance is the best road to distinction in pri-

vate life. It is equally essential to the character and to the grandeur of a nation. It will be necessary for our defence, as I have already stated, that we should have a military force sufficient to cope with any Power or combination of Powers that may be brought against us."

The common reply to speeches such as this was: Forbear to rouse the sleeping lion! Do not irritate the French people, and justify their anger, by showing distrust and alarm. This was the language used to the great English nation at a time when the people of every petty state in Germany were clamorously and fearlessly demanding to march across the Rhine. In truth, the necessity of awakening the spirit of the nation is more pressing than the danger of exciting the anger of our neighbour. We have more reason to be afraid of English inaction than of the hostility of France. "Men under consternation," says Burke, "suppose, not that it is the danger, which, by a sure instinct, calls out the courage to resist it, but that it is the courage which produces the danger. They therefore seek for a refuge from their fears in the fears themselves, and consider a temporising meanness as the only source of safety. . . . But a great State is too much envied, too much dreaded, to find safety in humiliation" (Works, v. 258). On this occasion the House of Lords has more fitly represented the interests of the country, and has spoken with more weight in Europe, than the House of Commons. But there too, August 8th, Mr. Kinglake spoke with great spirit of the pusillanimous silence which has been recommended. "The House had been told by the hon. member for Birmingham that they ought not to indulge in any hostile criticism upon the Emperor of the French; and the hon. member went so far as to say, that if we did, even for a few months more, England would be embroiled in a war with France. Good heavens! what an alternative to propose to a free and spirited nation—enforced silence, or a war with France! A war with France would be dreadful; but so would be the enforced silence advocated by the hon. member. If England submitted to such a silence,

then, he would say, had commenced the subjugation of England. We would not endure considerations of foreign policy to interfere with the freedom of England at home. That was the principle upon which the late parliament acted when they overthrew a very popular minister for pressing the late conspiracy bill; and he had no doubt that the existing parliament would pursue a similar course if the ministry betrayed any semblance of subserviency to a foreign power."

July 15. Lord Brougham spoke as follows: "We have no kind of security, at any moment, for the continuance of peace, of treaties, or of any one arrangement, from day to day. All depends upon the arbitrary will of a single individual. It is so in Russia, France, Austria, and I suppose it is so in Sardinia also, unless they restore the constitution suspended at the beginning of this execrable war—for by no other name can I call it; a war commenced on false pretences, not one single pretence of which has been fulfilled by the success which has attended it. As we have had, happily, no hand in the war, so have we, happily, no hand in the peace."

July 16. Lord Derby attended at a banquet in Merchant-Taylors' Hall, and expressed himself thus on the war: "From the information we at present possess, I look to the state of affairs arising out of the peace as more critical and dangerous than any thing which existed before. In my opinion, as I have avowed on former occasions, that war was commenced on insufficient grounds and on false pretences; for of all those purposes which were put forward to justify the war, there is not one which has been supported or attained by the struggle which has taken place; there are several which are placed in positions of greater jeopardy than they stood in before the war. I, who honour constitutional governments; I, who, in common with the true friends of liberty, looked with the most earnest admiration upon the example of the kingdom of Sardinia struggling into a state of constitutional freedom, avoiding the excesses of despotism on the one hand, and of unlimited license on the other,—

saw with pain that its government were not content with the enjoyment of its own liberties and its own constitution,—were not satisfied with making that constitution by its effects upon their happiness and domestic comfort an example which the rest of Italy might copy;—I saw them, I say with regret, depart from that constitutional course, endeavouring to excite animosity, dark intrigues, and machinations among other states; and for that purpose maintaining armies ruinous to their own finances, and which have proved destructive to their own comfort. I foresaw that in inviting the coöperation of a powerful neighbour against the fancied apprehension of invasion on the part of Austria, they were in effect bringing down on themselves, as well as upon the rest of Italy, the most serious dangers and the most inevitable calamities. And what, I ask you, has been the result of this effusion of the blood of 100,000 men,—for not less than that number have been put *hors de combat* in the course of this campaign? What was the plea? The presence of the foreigner in Italy, the mal-government of the Papal States, the discontent and dissatisfaction of the inhabitants, and the necessity of liberating them from a foreign yoke, and leaving them free to choose their own form of government. At the expiration of this struggle what are the terms upon which, as far as we know, this peace has been made; and what are the advantages which have been gained to the freedom of Italy by all this carnage? The constitution of Sardinia itself has been suspended,—I hope only during the continuance of the struggle. The Milanese, the possession of which was recognised by the Emperor Napoleon as the just patrimony of Austria, as long as she confined herself within her own limits, and from which there was no pretence for driving her, Austria has renounced.”

From these remarks we are able to appreciate Lord Derby's claim to be considered a “true friend of liberty,” and his notions of constitutional government. By a strange inconsistency, he fails to perceive that the system which he condemns in the external policy of Sardinia, is the same which he so much applauds in

her home administration. The rights of subjects and the rights of neighbours have the same title to the respect of governments; and the same principles which lead to aggression in one case, lead to oppression in the other. The Piedmontese constitution was, in fact, maintained in a spirit of opposition to Austria, and for the purpose of ultimately attacking her. This design has been pursued for years. With this view the parliament has served to increase enormously the financial and military resources of the state; and wherever the preparations for external aggrandisement required it, every semblance of right and liberty was relentlessly trodden under foot. A people that enjoys a lawful freedom, respects law in dealing with its neighbours. The classic definition given by Mr. Fox, December 1st, 1783, that “Freedom consists in the safe and sacred possession of a man's property, governed by laws defined and certain,” forbids tyranny and aggression alike, and condemns at the same time the home and the foreign government of the Piedmontese ministers. In particular, that inclination to encroach on the rights of the Church, which has been shown by the Piedmontese at Bologna, had been already abundantly displayed at home. Lord Derby is not the first who has eulogised the Sardinian government as keeping a just mean between despotism and revolution, and setting limits to both. It must, however, be remembered of several of the continental constitutions, more especially those of Latin Europe, that they tend to destroy the royal power. Most of those countries had undergone, previously to the establishment of representative institutions, one or two centuries at least of despotism. It is as a curb on the exercise of the kingly power that they arose, not as a natural development and acknowledgment of popular liberties: their kings reign, but do not govern. Such governments are devoid of unity and consistency, and are impotent to check the growth and resist the assaults of revolutionary principles. The union of monarchical and popular power can alone effect this. Monarchy alone, unless it be supported

by a system of representation, unless it be "not more limited than fenced by the orders of the state;" and, on the other hand, representative governments which have sacrificed the power and consistency which is afforded by a real monarchical element,—are alike unable to resist the attacks of their common enemies. It is the office of a sound constitutional system, never more urgently needed than now, to stem the torrent both of revolution and of imperialism. The Sardinian government has proved the ally and confederate of both.

2. Foreign Policy of Ministers.

From the moment of their accession to power, the present government has pursued with great candour and consistency, and as now appears, on grounds both of principle and policy, the plan of diminishing the Austrian power, and modifying the whole system of government in Italy. Their policy coincided to a very great extent with that of Sardinia, and altogether agreed more with Sardinia than with France.

June 22. Lord John Russell wrote to Lord Bloomfield:

"Her Majesty's government observes with great concern a disposition in Germany to take part in the war which has broken out between France and Sardinia on the one side, and Austria on the other. . . .

"The Prince Regent will, in his wisdom, weigh the impolicy of exposing his country to be considered the champion of the maladministration of Italy. It cannot be necessary for the security of Berlin and Magdeburg that misgovernment should prevail at Milan and Bologna."

July 7, he writes as follows:

"It might, perhaps, be premature to discuss whether the King of Sardinia should reign over Lombardy, Parma, Modena, and Tuscany, or whether several independent states in northern Italy should be maintained or created. Be their divisions and boundaries arranged as they may, it is the firm persuasion of her Majesty's government, that an Italy in which the people should be 'free citizens of a great country' would strengthen and confirm the balance of power. The independence of states is never so secure as when the sove-

reign authority is supported by the attachment of the people. A sovereign maintained wholly by the force of arms over a disaffected people, is a perpetual object of attack to her ambitious neighbours; and a balance of power founded on such discordant elements gives only an unstable equilibrium. If Italy could be ruled over by sovereigns possessed of the affections of their people, that country, with its 25,000,000 of inhabitants, its natural wealth, and its ancient civilisation, would, in the opinion of her Majesty's government, be a valuable member of the European family.

"I must not omit to state that any settlement of Italy would, in the eyes of her Majesty's government, be incomplete, which did not effect a permanent reform in the administration of the States of the Church. Every one knows that Rome and the Legations have been much worse governed by the Pope's ministers than Lombardy by Austrian archdukes; and that would be a partial and unsatisfactory arrangement, which struck down the rule of the latter, and left the former in all its deformity. Our views upon this subject have not been withheld from the government of the Emperor of the French.

"Such being the opinions of her Majesty's government on the present state of affairs, they are averse to any interposition which might either prove fruitless in the first instance, or which might lead to a partial and insecure settlement. Her Majesty used her utmost efforts, consistent with peace, to maintain the faith of treaties. At the last moment Austria, by an act of supreme imprudence, began the war, and invaded Piedmont. From that time every thing has been changed. Austria overstepped the frontier laid down in the treaties of 1815. It could no longer be expected that those treaties would be regarded as binding by France and Sardinia. Italy has been roused to war, and is taking her part in the struggle. In these circumstances her Majesty's government are bound to take a larger view of the whole field of contest. They will be glad to consult Prussia on every occasion where either power is of opinion that a step towards peace can be made

with good effect. It gives them pleasure to find that the cabinet of Berlin does not partake of the violent excitement which has lately arisen in some parts of Germany; and that, in directing the efforts of the German Confederation, she is animated by an enlightened care for the best interests of European civilisation."

Finally, in the debate on Lord Elcho's motion, August 8, Lord John Russell gave the following exposition of what must be considered, from the acquiescence of Lord Palmerston and of Mr. Gladstone, as the political system of the present administration. It is a complete adoption of the revolutionary theory, which the party who made the revolution of 1688, and who called themselves by the same name as that which is now in power, so energetically and so positively repudiated:

"The hon. gentleman, the member for Horsham, says, that while I spoke of the rights of the peoples of Tuscany and Modena, I omitted to notice the rights of the sovereigns who reign over them. I am afraid that in the eyes of the hon. gentleman I am a great heretic in that respect, because, although I have a great respect for sovereigns who have for generations maintained themselves on their thrones, and received the loyal respect of their subjects, I have no belief in the doctrine, such as the University of Cambridge once affirmed, which gives to the sovereign an inherent right to reign that no fault can alter or diminish. I cannot subscribe to a doctrine of that kind; and if I look to the sovereigns of Europe, I see many of them who could never subscribe to the doctrine, that a people have no right, upon fault or upon offence, to declare that they will no longer give their obedience to a sovereign who has not afforded them protection, and who has rightly forfeited their allegiance. To take the latest instance first, the King of the Belgians owes his crown to a popular revolution. Such too, though at a more remote date, is the foundation of the right of the King of Holland, who owes his throne to a popular revolt against the crown of Spain. Such is the foundation of the right of the King of Sweden, to whose crown

there is even now a pretender. Such, in fact, is the right of the Emperor of the French to his throne. If the right of legitimacy were to prevail, who but the Duke of Bordeaux could claim the allegiance of the people of France? And yet they pay no allegiance to him; but yield their willing submission to the emperor who now rules over them. Such, likewise, is the foundation of the right of our own dynasty. Our sovereign can claim no right superior to that derived from the decision of the parliament and people of Great Britain, that the throne was forfeited by the House of Stuart, in consequence of their violation of the rights of the people, and their withdrawing from the country over which they reigned. If such is the case, is Italy to be the only country the people of which are not to exercise this power? Are the people of Italy—who, as I have said, have been so moderate and so just in their proceedings, who have committed no outrages, who have taken part in no violence—to be deprived of that right, of that power, which had been exercised in Belgium, in Holland, in Sweden, in France, and in Great Britain? I cannot be a party to denying them that right. On the contrary, I believe that if you allow the people of Italy to settle their own concerns,—and that is the doctrine which my noble friend and myself have always held in this House, especially during the whole course of the present session,—if you allow the people of Italy, whether they have hitherto lived under the rule of the King of Sardinia, or of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, or of the Duke of Modena, under the Pope, or under the King of the Two Sicilies, to settle with their sovereigns on what terms they shall pay their allegiance, there will no longer exist the irritation and discontent which has long prevailed, but they will proceed with peace and order to establish the foundations of good government."

In the same debate Mr. Gladstone also spoke. His speech on that occasion will live among the greatest achievements of parliamentary eloquence in our time. For this reason, and because he spoke as the chief of that section which is considered to

represent the Conservative element in the Cabinet, we may extract one or two passages.

"It may have been only an unhappy necessity of her position, but this, at any rate, is true, that for forty-five long years, wherever liberty reared its head in Italy, wherever there was the slightest attempt to procure even the hundredth part of those franchises which as Englishmen we hold so dear,—there the iron hand of Austria has interposed, and has reëstablished in all their rigour the abuses of the actually existing governments. . . . It was commonly, and perhaps not untruly, said, that the Austrian provinces were better governed than other parts of Italy. I say there was some truth in this. It was necessary for the credit of Austria, as a great empire, that her administrative system in Italy, among a people so intelligent as the inhabitants of Lombardy and Venice, should be raised to a state of considerable excellence. But while she maintained that administrative superiority in her own provinces, as compared with the States of the Church and with Naples, she at the same time enforced the iron yoke upon the States of the Church and upon Naples, without having the power to procure for them the partial compensation of those administrative improvements which she herself was so careful to adopt. . . . What does the declaration made at Villafranca, for instance, that certain sovereigns should return to their territories, mean? It has received no authoritative construction, and I do not understand what it necessarily conveys beyond this: that the parties subscribing the terms of peace are perfectly willing that those sovereigns should return to their territories, other circumstances permitting. If it means that they are to be restored by force,—which interpretation, be assured, the Emperor of the French does not mean to put upon it,—then is there another reason furnished why the hands of her Majesty's government should not be tied up, and why they should not be prevented from protesting, with all that energy which the government of a free state can command, against a doctrine that would treat the in-

habitants of the territories in question as the property of so many ducal houses, who might dispose of them, their families, their fortunes, and those of their posterity, as they pleased, without any regard to that independent will and judgment which, as human beings, they are entitled to exercise."

3. Finance.

The alarm which was created in England by the Italian war, and by the successes of the French, was increased by the sudden conclusion of peace. The announcement of the peace of Villafranca was received in silence by the House of Lords; and in the House of Commons Lord John Russell only obtained a cheer by adding that there was no design of annexing Savoy to France as a compensation for her efforts in favour of Sardinia. In the country, people considered that the war in Italy had never given promise of territorial aggrandisement to France, and that it was not one in which success would satisfy the most violent passions of the French people. It was clear from the first that the Emperor would have to seek elsewhere conquests which would be a balm for the reverses, or a reward for the successes, he might meet with in Italy. These could only be obtained over Prussia or over England. The vulgar animosity which the people of France entertain against us, and the extent of the naval armaments, justified the expectation that we should have the preference. When the late government offered a bounty to seamen, the French navy was at once increased by 10,000 men. We learn from the *Quarterly Review* that the French government is determined to have fifty-five or sixty line-of-battleships, and seventy-two steam transports, each capable of carrying on an average at least one thousand men, with their proportionate complement of horses and stores. This immense expenditure cannot be incurred without a purpose, at a time when the finances of France are in their present condition. "From 320,000,000*l.*, at which the French debt stood a few years ago, it now verges on 400,000,000*l.*, and the interest has crept up from 15,000,000*l.* a year to 21,000,000*l.* on the funded

and unfunded debt. Before the account for the Italian war is settled, it will not be so far behind the amount of interest we annually pay as is generally supposed; and this with a deficit in time of peace of from four to five millions a year."

To meet these vast armaments, the English government, both that of Lord Derby and that of Lord Palmerston, made very extensive preparations. The total of our regular army at present amounts to 86,000 men, besides 23,000 embodied militia. The 90 Rifle corps include about 25,000 men.

But it is at sea that England is menaced, and must be defended. In half a year we are promised 50 ships of the line, 37 frigates, and 140 corvettes, &c., besides block ships. We possess, moreover, an enormous reserve in our mercantile navy, employing above 160,000 seamen and 1854 steamers, of which 159 are above 1000 tons, and 231 could be armed and fitted for war. The army estimates were 13,299,000*l.*, being an excess of 1,288,000*l.* over those of last year; and the vote for the navy amounted to 12,782,000*l.*, being an increase of 3,891,000*l.* on the navy estimates of last year. The panic, therefore, will cost the country about 5,180,000*l.*

July 18th, the Chancellor of the Exchequer introduced the budget. The estimated expenditure of the year is 69,207,000*l.* The estimate of revenue is 64,340,000, leaving a deficiency of 4,867,000*l.* He proposed to supply this deficiency, caused entirely by the necessity of increasing the national defences, by diminishing the period of malt credits this year from eighteen to twelve weeks, by which the treasury would receive 780,000*l.* The remaining 4,000,000*l.* are to be met by an increase of 4*d.* on the Income Tax on incomes above 150*l.*, and 1½*d.* on incomes between 100*l.* and 150*l.* The whole increase is to be levied on the first half-year's payment.

4. *Catholic Affairs.*

The meeting in St. James's Hall in behalf of the free exercise of the Catholic religion in gaols and work-houses was followed by a deputation to Lord Palmerston, and by inter-

views with the Home Secretary and with the President of the Poor-Law Board. No minister appears to have disputed the justice of the demands which were made. It remains to be seen whether they will have the strength to overcome the bigotry of the country, and to render it powerless against Catholic prisoners and paupers.

Considerable excitement was created in the Protestant world, and a deputation waited on Lord Palmerston to protest against further concessions to Catholics. They did not succeed in obtaining any modification of the opinions he had already expressed.

A synod has been held at Oscott, the proceedings of which have not transpired; and, after a conference at Dublin, the Irish Bishops have issued a pastoral embodying very important resolutions respecting popular education. The system which they unanimously condemn has had a long trial, and can at least be judged by its fruits. The following extract contains the substance of the pastoral:

"1. That schools for Catholic youth should be such as to ensure for them the benefit of a safe secular education, and adequate religious instruction in the faith and practices of the Catholic Church. They should be, therefore, so subordinated to Bishops in their respective dioceses, as that no books may be used in them for secular instruction to which the ordinary shall object; and that the teachers, both as to appointment and removal, and the selection of all books for religious instruction, and the arrangements for it, be under the control of the same ordinary. That the principles enunciated can be adequately embodied and acted upon in this country only on a system of education exclusively for Catholics. That the Catholics of Ireland have a right to obtain such a proportion of the aid allocated by Parliament for education as, regard being had to their numbers and the condition of the Catholic population, will suffice for the establishment and maintenance of schools to be conducted on thoroughly Catholic principles. That the concession of grants for exclusively Catholic schools in Great Britain and in the British co-

lonies is conclusive evidence of the fairness of the claim to a grant being made for Catholic schools in Ireland; and that the Catholic people of Ireland should therefore insist, through their representatives in Parliament, and by direct application to the Government, on obtaining such a grant. That the national system of education, though tolerated on account of the particular circumstances of the country, must be from its very nature in several respects objectionable to Catholics; and that the changes made in its rules from time to time, having been adverse to Catholic interests, have increased the distrust of the Catholic episcopacy. That we signalise as especially objectionable the non-recognition of the control over education which the Catholic Church holds to have been conferred on Bishops by our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, when He said to His Apostles, 'Go, teach all nations' (*Matt. xxviii. 19*).

" 2. The practical substitution, in its stead, of the control of a Board consisting of members of different religious denominations, predominantly Protestant, and deriving its authority exclusively from the State, whilst its power extends to, and is exercised in, matters vitally affecting religion.

" 3. The education of Catholics—of teachers in the model or normal schools, even in history and philosophy, and of children in other schools, by Protestants.

" 4. The constitution generally of the model and training schools, and their establishment throughout the country in opposition, in many cases, to the declared opinions of the local Bishops.

" 5. The exclusion from the schools of the cross, and of all symbols of Catholic devotion.

" 6. The character of several of the books published by the commissioners, the use of which is enforced in the schools under their immediate management, and is practically unavoidable in schools deriving aid from the Board.

" 7. The rule adopted some years ago by the Board, according to which aid has been since its adoption refused for the erection or outfit of schools unless the school estate be vested in

the Board; a condition expressly at variance with the instructions of the Holy See, and the decision of the Catholic Bishops of Ireland in the National and Provincial Synods.

" 8. The inherent evil in the system that the schools are all liable to inspection by Protestant officers of the Board; and the fact that schools exclusively attended by Catholics are, to a vast extent, exclusively under Protestant inspection.

" 9. The fact that in schools deriving aid from the Board, Catholic children have received, and may receive, religious instruction from Protestant teachers, in opposition to the original constitution as laid down by Lord Stanley; the commissioners not recognising the rightful claims of Catholic pastors to be the guardians of the religion of Catholic youth in attendance at National schools.

" That we have been deeply alarmed by the attempts now making to induce the government to increase and aggravate the evils of the mixed system, by the establishment of intermediate schools on the principles of that system; and that we call upon the Catholic clergy and laity of Ireland to aid us in resisting, by meetings, petitions, and all other constitutional means, the establishment of such mixed intermediate schools for Catholics.

" That in the event of the establishment of a system of intermediate education, we claim a fair proportion of the public money for the support and establishment of separate schools to be conducted on Catholic principles, in which Catholic youth may receive a good and liberal education, without exposing their faith or morals to the dangers of the mixed system.

" That whereas numerous schools, colleges, and seminaries, erected at great expense, are already existing, under the direction of the proper Catholic ecclesiastical authorities, in which science and literature are diligently cultivated, and other similar institutions may be gradually erected, those schools, colleges, and seminaries afford the Government an easy means of giving us that aid for Catholic intermediate education to which we are fully entitled.

" That in accordance with the deci-

sion already pronounced by the Holy See, we reiterate our condemnation of the present system of education established in the Queen's Colleges; that we cannot but declare that the said system has signally failed, notwithstanding the enormous expense entailed by it on the country; and that we consider that the only means for the Government to free themselves from the responsibility of maintaining the present useless, expensive, and noxious system, would be to give over the Colleges of Cork and Galway, situate in Catholic provinces, to be conducted on Catholic principles, while the Presbyterians are provided for in the College of Belfast, and the members of the Established Church in the University of Dublin.

"That we shall embody the substance of the above resolutions in a memorial to the Chief Secretary of State for Ireland, calling on the Government to take our claims into consideration and to grant them."

In Parliament a bill was introduced by Sir William Somerville enabling Catholics to occupy the post of Lord Chancellor of Ireland. The debate, in which no Catholic members took part, was conducted as a party fight. It was not pressed to a division. It was chiefly interesting to know whether the leader of the opposition would stand by the Catholics, or would act in this case as the instrument of the Protestant party. Mr. Disraeli chose the former alternative, and was loudly denounced by the sturdy Protestants who sit behind him.

Ministers attempted to pass a bill for the settlement of Catholic Trusts, which the Catholic members compelled them to withdraw. The usual exemption was renewed until July 1, 1860. Mr. Bowyer undertook to introduce a bill on the subject, which will be considered next year.

To a Catholic the most interesting event perhaps of the late session occurred in the debate on Lord Elcho's motion, which amounted to a vote of want of confidence in the Foreign Secretary. Great caution and reserve have been displayed by ministers in speaking of the Emperor of the French; but they have been less diplomatic in their language regarding a sovereign who reigns over the

hearts of a larger portion of mankind, but whose power, not being represented by fleets and armies, offers no inducement to public men to curb the license of their tongues. The statesman who undertook to make up for the silence imposed upon his colleagues by the formidable vicinity of France, and to give the necessary relief to the compliments which they address to the Italian revolutionists by a corresponding vituperation of an Italian sovereign, was the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the sovereign whom he selected as the object of his passionate denunciation was Pius IX.

"But to speak seriously, I must say, in reference to the Pope—quite apart from all sectarian differences—as a personage occupying an eminent station and possessing distinguished authority, as the head of a great body of Christian believers, that my wish would be to look upon him with all the respect which is due to those united titles. I, however, lament, as cordially as I could lament if I had the nearest interest in all that concerns him, when I see a sovereign who makes pretensions to represent in a peculiar sense the majesty of Heaven reduced to become a mendicant at foreign courts,—a mendicant, too, not for the purpose merely of obtaining the means of subsistence, but with the object of procuring military armaments whereby to carry the ravages of fire and sword over the fair provinces which he governs, and to rivet chains on the necks of men, every one of whom it is his direct personal interest to defend."

Mr. Gladstone was never more loudly cheered than when, in delivering this passage, he committed the act which will do most to prejudice his fair fame. It was said of an ancient historian, that if he had found that he could round off a period better by making Pompey win the battle of Pharsalus, he would have made him win it. It can hardly have been from mere stress of rhetoric that Mr. Gladstone invented and uttered this stupid and impudent calumny. Nobody before him has ventured to represent Pius IX. as a bloodthirsty and misanthropic tyrant. Yet he knew full well that if the Pope is assisted by foreign troops,—and Mr.

Gladstone's expressions apply to the French, not the Swiss,—it is because it is impossible without the aid of conscription to raise a Roman army proportionate to the size of the country and the exigencies of the time. There is not one state on the Continent, not even of those whose neutrality is assured by treaties, that has not an army at least twice as large in proportion to its population as the Papal army. A minister in a country which is unable in times of great emergency to raise a sufficient force of volunteers, which in our time hired mercenaries in Germany, and formerly purchased them of German princes, which once called to its aid, against its own subjects, the savages of America, and in our own time trusted its cause to the barbarous races of northern India, ought not to have denounced the Pope because, for the very same reason, out of respect for the liberty of his subjects, he too has recourse to foreign aid. The peaceful presence of the French is enough to preserve order in Rome, and we have not heard that they had been sent out to carry fire and sword over the provinces which the Pope governs. They brought him back, as the allies brought the Bourbons to Paris after twenty years of war. But Mr. Gladstone forgets that in England foreign troops were brought in to accomplish the two revolutions, which, as a sound Protestant and a sound Whig, he doubtless regards as the happiest events in the modern history of the country,—

the Reformation under Edward VI., and the Revolution which was accomplished by the Dutch soldiers of the Great Deliverer, of pious and immortal memory.

Mr. Gladstone has long enjoyed, above all our statesmen, the admiration of the country for his talents, and the esteem of the best men for his character; and he has long suffered from the dislike of the powerful party whose good opinion most men would be sorry to possess. This position has become, it appears, intolerable to him. He has approached the state of mind described by Mr. Burke as “a disposition to hope something from the variety and inconstancy of villany, rather than from the tiresome uniformity of fixed principle.” He has been respectable too long, and it has not answered. He has resolved to turn over a new leaf, and to try whether he will not be more acceptable to the country by borrowing something of Lord Palmerston's contempt for right, some of the claptrap of Lord John, and some of the bitterness of Mr. Newdegate. But in sacrificing his old friends, he will not be sure of the new. It is easy to lose respectability; it is not easy to obtain popularity. His new allies will never forget his past career, they will never think him one of themselves. And they will be right; for in his assumed bigotry and his radical politics he has neither the merit of sincerity nor the excuse of blindness.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

1. *Battle of Solferino.*

After the defeat at Magenta and the fall of Milan, the Austrians resolved to abandon all their positions in Lombardy and on the right bank of the Po, in order to concentrate their forces for a battle on the Mincio. The evacuation of Piacenza, in particular, which had been fortified in extraordinary haste and at vast expense, and which was so strong that its garrison would have threatened Milan, and might have diverted a

very considerable force from the advancing army of the allies, operated greatly to increase the moral effect of the battle on the Ticino. In the eastern part of Lombardy the country-people exhibited great apathy, and little of that hostility to Austria which was shown in most of the large towns. They seemed to expect that the Austrians would soon return; and the allies found greater difficulty in obtaining assistance and information from them than the Austrians had found in Piedmont. Yet

for a fortnight their progress was unimpeded; and before the decisive action took place 8393 Austrian prisoners had been sent to France. Amongst these there were many deserters. Considerable disaffection prevailed in some of the Italian regiments, two of which were sent home to Germany; at the same time the Croats of the military frontier showed little inclination to fight, and readily laid down their arms.

For a time the Austrians seemed disposed to await the enemy on the left bank of the Chiese, but ultimately retired across the Mincio; and on the 23d June the whole space between the Chiese and the Mincio separated the two armies. On the morning of that day the Austrian army recrossed the Mincio at five points, and took up a very strong position, with the centre at Solferino, with the intention of giving battle on the morrow. Later in the day the allied army advanced also, leaving only the corps of Canrobert to the extreme right beyond the Chiese, where it took little part in the ensuing conflict. The French centre was at Montechiaro, and the Sardinians on the left extended to the Lake of Garda. The outposts were opposite each other on the evening of the 23d.

The battle began early in the morning, on the 24th June; and at half-past one in the afternoon the key of the Austrian position at Solferino was taken. At this time the contest on their left wing was undecided, and on the right Benedek had repulsed the Sardinians; but the Austrians were obliged to retire, and recrossed the Mincio in unbroken order. It was a defeat very similar in its character to that which the first Napoleon encountered at Aspern, and which he retrieved at Wagram. It is said that the firing was heard at Trieste.

The Austrians, according to their official report, had about 140,000 men engaged; and the allies, according to the *Patrie*, 157,000. Officers who were present on the ground computed the French force engaged at 110,000, the Sardinian at 40,000, and the Austrian at 133,000; but the bulk of the Austrian cavalry, under Zedwitz, 10,000 strong, was left at Goito all day. But the nu-

merical superiority of the allies was entirely on their left wing, where the Sardinians opposed Benedek's corps of 24,000 men with a greatly superior force, so that the Austrians met the French in the centre and on their left with nearly equal numbers. Their loss, according to the official *Wiener Zeitung*, was 630 officers and 12,367 men, killed and wounded (of whom 2,352 were killed) and 6,314 prisoners; in all 19,311, and 13 guns. The loss of the allies, besides prisoners, amounted, according to the *Moniteur*, to 944 officers and 17,305 men, killed and wounded.

The battle of Solferino, the most important for all Europe that has been fought since Waterloo, confirms what was said by a military writer last April: "At the present day, in consequence of the admirable qualities of armies, even a general of very moderate capacity will accomplish something, provided he has a sufficient force; without very considerable superiority of numbers, no brilliant victories. It is becoming more and more difficult to be a great general."

The causes which determined the result of the battle must undoubtedly be sought, first, in the superiority either of the commanders or of the men. Several characteristic facts have come to light. The Austrian system brings the youngest troops into action first. Those battalions of the regiments engaged which consist of veterans did not reach Italy until the beginning of July. "It is in case of reverses," says M. Thiers, "that old soldiers are excellent. Under fire young soldiers led by energetic officers are doubtless more impetuous, because they know less of danger; but at the first reverse they are bewildered—the first sufferings disgust them; and, especially if they have been only a short time under command, a check confounds them, and converts their rash bravery into profound discouragement." The French emperor, unlike his uncle, has pursued with great success the plan of using his best troops at once. Next, the variety of nations of which the Austrian army is composed is injurious not so much to its harmony as to its equality (there are 54,000 Protestants and 16,000 Jews in the Aus-

trian service). The Hungarian cavalry and the riflemen of the Alps are better troops than those of the rest of the empire. It is to the *Jägers* that the unexampled mortality among the officers in the allied armies is due. The French officers in particular take the lead, in order to encourage their men in moments of extreme peril. The cry of "*épaulettes en avant*," was often heard by the Austrians during the repeated assaults of the French on the tower at Solferino, which is called the "*Spia d'Italia*." On the other hand, the French artillery was less destructive than was anticipated. The Emperor Napoleon, who has written extremely well on artillery, devised a gun of his own, which, in 1852, he introduced into the French army, in spite of very general opposition among his officers. But his short twelve-pounders proved a failure, and were given up. The famous new rifled guns were invented and patented in France, in 1856, by Mr. Whitworth, who has since succeeded in making a gun of a much more formidable description. At Solferino it was observed that they fired high. An officer writes, "I saw more than 200 shells go over the third *Jäger* battalion, without doing any damage." It was found, indeed, that the safest place was in the van. The artillery-officer who was the *Times* correspondent at the Austrian headquarters writes: "Amongst the wounded, to the number of 4000 or 5000, who are now in Verona and the surrounding villages, it is remarkable how few are suffering from wounds inflicted by artillery." On the other hand, many were suffering from wounds in the neck and arms inflicted by the *teeth* of the Turcos. The reason of the proclamation, in which the Emperor of the French tells his soldiers not to be afraid of the *armes de précision*, was, that a very small portion of his own troops are furnished with them.

Among the instances of bad management on the part of the Austrians, to which the early part of the campaign has accustomed us, is the circumstance that one part of the army was attacked before breakfast, so that they fought fasting, while the remainder had nothing to eat after seven o'clock. At Verona no

wine was served out to them, but they received money to buy it; and there was none to be had. On the day of the battle there were beds prepared at Verona for only 1000 wounded, and the place was not provisioned. These faults were, however, quickly repaired. In particular, while the hospital-fever raged in the hospitals in Lombardy, where the heat was intense; whilst at Milan, a fortnight after the battle, there were 12,436 men in hospital, and about 5000 at Cremona,—the Austrians escaped disease in great measure by sending their wounded by rail to the interior of the empire.

The two Emperors were exposed to a heavy fire for many hours. It was said, with unnecessary exaggeration, that the Emperor of the French was so hotly engaged that he had his epaulet shot away. It was torn off while he was mounting his horse at Castelnedolo in the morning. He himself announced that he slept, on the night after the battle, in the room at Cavriana which the Emperor of Austria had occupied in the morning, though it is known that Francis Joseph was never off his horse when at Cavriana.

2. Concluding Events of the War.

The Austrians retired within their famous quadrangle of fortresses, one army withdrawing towards Mantua, the other to Verona. The population of Verona exhibited signs of discontent and hatred to the Austrians, and provoked from the Governor-General Urban a proclamation, June 26th, in which he says: "The public has to busy itself as little as possible with military movements; the educated civilian knows how to contain his curiosity; the malcontent, belonging to the mob, becomes insolent and presumptuous; he will have to thank himself for the consequences." And again, "No difference will be made in persons, as I shall simply punish the act or the intention. In order that the inhabitants of Verona may know what kind of person they have to deal with, I declare that every one of them may have confidence in me, as a loyal Austrian, but that I have confidence in none of them."

Meantime the French followed the Austrians across the Mincio on the

fourth day after the battle; and the Piedmontese, whose siege-train had not arrived, invested the fortress of Peschiera. At the same time, Prince Napoleon, who with 35,000 men had marched through Tuscany, Modena, and Parma, every where encouraging the movement in favour of the independence of Italy, but meeting with little encouragement for his own designs, arrived with his army. Gun-boats were being conveyed by land to the lake of Garda, in order to aid in the siege of Peschiera; and Garibaldi was sent with his volunteers, and a body of Piedmontese regulars, up the Valtellina, to force the Stelvio, and threaten the Austrian communications with Tyrol. A powerful fleet was collected in the Adriatic for the purpose of attacking Venice, by which their retreat would have been cut off.

And now the time seemed to have arrived when the strength of those fortresses, by which the Austrians were deemed to be invincible in Italy, was to be tested by the new instruments of attack of which the French army speak with so much hope. It is commonly said that the science of attack has advanced more rapidly than the science of defence in war. The enormous armies which were introduced in the revolutionary wars, by allowing a commander to pass by fortresses without any apprehensions from the small garrisons which they contained, undoubtedly gave a severe blow to the old systems of fortification; and the new inventions in artillery have decided the fate of all places fortified on the old plan. But the wars of Napoleon taught a lesson to engineers, and led to the adoption of a new system, the efficacy of which has not yet been tried against the new artillery. It consists simply in the substitution of a large army for a defensive garrison. For this purpose, the defences are so enormously extended, that they cannot be invested, and are able to contain a force almost equal to the largest that can be brought against them. The two conditions under which a siege was formerly supposed to give promise of success were, first, a great superiority of force on the part of the assailants; and secondly, the possibility of so surrounding the

place that no reinforcements could reach it. In the absence of these conditions, Sebastopol, though hastily and imperfectly fortified, resisted for nearly a year. Of the fortresses composing the quadrangle, Verona alone is constructed in this manner. The time that Peschiera and Legnago could hold out may be easily computed, and a small force is sufficient to blockade Mantua. But Verona, defended by the whole Austrian army, is deemed impregnable, until by the fall of Venice and the occupation of southern Tyrol the communications with Austria are cut off. For this purpose, the French admiral in the Adriatic received orders to attack Venice, and was on the point of doing so (July 10th) when the armistice was signed. At the same time Garibaldi attacked the position of the Austrians on the Stelvio; and here, July 8th, the last action of the war was fought. The Austrian position on the heights was almost impregnable, and the Italians were repulsed by a very small force of *Kaiserjäger* and volunteers.

3. *The Armistice.*

In the first days of July an exchange of prisoners was effected, and a letter was written by Marshal Vaillant with the first hints of a truce. The Emperor of Austria did not attend to this proposal; and on the evening of the 6th, General Fleury was sent by Napoleon to Verona with direct proposals of an armistice; for the French expected an attack on the 7th, and turned out at three in the morning to meet it. Fleury had found Francis Joseph in bed. He got up, and promised an answer next morning. Meantime he telegraphed to Berlin, where Prince Windischgrätz was endeavouring to induce the Prussian Regent to act energetically on behalf of Austria, sending a pressing request to the Regent to know definitively what he intended to do. The Prussian government declined to give any positive answer.

On the arrival of this despatch, Francis Joseph agreed to the truce. General Fleury brought the news to the Emperor of the French about ten on the morning of the 7th; and on leaving Verona he spoke to the

officers whom he saw of the probability of peace.

The Paris newspapers that announced this news received the following *communiqué*: "It would be premature to attach too much importance to this announcement. There is no question of a diplomatic arrangement, but only of a military act." A similar warning appeared in the *Moniteur*, and orders came to press forward the French armaments as energetically as possible.

July 8. An armistice was signed at Villafranca between Marshal Vaillant and General Hess. Hostilities were not to recommence until August the 16th at noon. The armies to retain their actual positions, the works at Peschiera to remain as they were, but the place to be provisioned in two days.

On the following day Napoleon wrote to Francis Joseph proposing an interview, and laying down the conditions on which he was prepared to make peace, adding, that if these terms were deemed unsatisfactory, it would be better that no meeting should take place, as it would be painful to renew hostilities with one with whom he had just become personally acquainted.* Prince Alexander of Hesse was sent to Napoleon on Sunday the 10th to arrange the meeting.

Yet, on the same day, the Emperor Napoleon issued a proclamation to his troops, in which the conclusion of peace was made to appear still uncertain and improbable: "This truce will permit you to rest after your glorious labours, and to recover, if necessary, new strength to continue the work which you have so gloriously inaugurated by your courage and your devotion. I am about to return to Paris, and shall leave the provisional command of my army to Marshal Vaillant; but as soon as the hour of combat shall have struck, you will see me again amongst you in order to share your dangers."

4. *Peace of Villafranca.*

On the morning of Monday 11th July, the two Emperors met at Villa-

* This letter was the immediate cause of the conclusion of peace, and the suspicion of false play and mendacity on the part of the French emperor can refer only to it.

franca. After some ceremony, Napoleon entered the house first, saying, "Vous êtes chez vous," thereby giving the officers present a hint about the fate of Venetia; and in an interview of three-quarters of an hour settled the terms of peace, which were taken by Prince Napoleon to Verona on the evening of the 11th, and there signed by Francis Joseph, and then taken to Victor Emmanuel at Monzambano, who resisted a long time, and signed in great disgust. Prince Napoleon was eager for peace. The terms are as follows:

"Between his majesty the Emperor of Austria and his majesty the Emperor of the French it has been agreed as follows:

"The two sovereigns will favour the creation of an Italian Confederation.

"That Confederation shall be under the honorary presidency of the Holy Father.

"The Emperor of Austria cedes to the Emperor of the French his rights over Lombardy, with the exception of the fortresses of Mantua and Peschiera, so that the frontier of the Austrian possessions shall start from the extreme range of the fortress of Peschiera, and shall extend in a direct line along the Mincio as far as Grazio; thence to Scorzarolo and Luzana to the Po, whence the actual frontiers shall continue to form the limits of Austria. The Emperor of the French will hand over (*remettra*) the ceded territory to the King of Sardinia.

"Venetia shall form part of the Italian Confederation, though remaining under the crown of the Emperor of Austria.

"The Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena return to their States, granting a general amnesty.

"The two emperors will ask the Holy Father to introduce indispensable reforms into his States.

"A full and complete amnesty is granted on both sides to persons compromised in the late events in the territories of the belligerent parties.

"Done at Villafranca the 11th of July 1859."

Both emperors immediately issued orders of the day, announcing to their armies the conditions of the

peace. That of the Emperor of Austria is as follows :

" *Verona, 12th July 1859.*

" Trusting in the goodness of my cause, I engaged in the contest for the sanctity of treaties, relying on the enthusiasm of my people, on the valour of my army, and on the natural allies of Austria.

" My people I have found ready for every sacrifice; the sanguinary battles have displayed anew to the world the heroism and intrepidity of my brave army, who, inferior in numbers, after thousands of officers and men had sealed with their lives their attachment to their duty, look cheerfully forward, with unbroken strength and courage, to the continuation of the fight. Without an ally, I yield only to the unfavourable position of political affairs, in presence of which it becomes my first duty not to make useless demands on the blood of my soldiers and the sacrifices of my people. I conclude peace on the basis of the line of the Mincio.

" With all my heart I thank my army. I have had a new proof how unreservedly I can reckon upon it in future wars."

The Emperor of the French enters into political details with his soldiers. This is highly characteristic of that prætorian tone which the French army has assumed under the Empire, in which it has ceased to be a mere instrument, and has become a political power in the state:

" Soldiers,—The bases of a peace have been agreed on with the Emperor of Austria; the principal object of the war is attained; Italy will for the first time become a nation. A confederation of all the States of Italy, under the honorary presidency of the Pope, will reunite in one group the members of the same family. Venice, it is true, will remain under the sceptre of Austria; but it will be, nevertheless, an Italian province, forming part of the Confederation.

" The union of Lombardy to Piedmont creates for us on this side of the Alps a powerful ally, who will owe to us his independence. The governments that have taken no part in this movement, or are recalled to their territories, will comprehend the necessity of salutary reforms. A ge-

neral amnesty will remove all traces of civil discord. Italy, henceforth the mistress of her own destinies, can only blame herself if she does not progress in order and liberty.

" You will soon return to France; a grateful country will receive with joy the soldiers who have carried to so high a point the glory of our arms at Montebello, Palestro, Turbigo, Magenta, Marignano, and Solferino; who in two months have liberated Piedmont and Lombardy, and have only stopped because the conflict was assuming a magnitude no longer in proportion to the interests that France had in this formidable war.

" Be proud, then, of your success; proud of the results obtained; proud, above all, of being the beloved sons of France, which will always be a great nation as long as she has the heart to comprehend noble causes, and men like you to defend them."

5. *Imperial Explanations.*

Immediately after peace was signed, the two emperors returned home. On July 15th the Emperor of Austria published a proclamation addressed, " To my people."

" When all concessions that were allowable, and compatible with the dignity of the crown and the honour and welfare of the country, have been exhausted, and when all attempts at a pacific arrangement have miscarried, there is no room for choice, and what cannot be avoided becomes a duty.

" This duty placed me under the stern necessity of demanding from my people new and painful sacrifices, in order to place in a state of defence their most sacred interests. My faithful people have responded to my appeal; they have pressed forward unanimously in defence of the throne, and they have made the sacrifices of every kind demanded by circumstances with an eagerness which merits my gratitude—which augments, if possible, the profound affection which I feel for them—and which was adapted to inspire the assurance that the just cause in defence of which my brave armies went forth with enthusiasm to the contest would be victorious.

" Unhappily the result has not corresponded with the general effort,

and the fortune of war has not been favourable to us.

"The valiant army of Austria has, in this instance, again given proofs of its tried heroism and its incomparable perseverance, so brilliant that it has commanded the admiration of all, even of its enemies. I experience a legitimate pride in being the chief of such an army; and the country ought to feel indebted to it for having maintained vigorously, in all its purity, the honour of the Austrian flag.

"It is not less perfectly established that our enemies, in spite of the greatest efforts, in spite of the superior forces which they had for a long period been preparing for the conflict, have been able, even by making the greatest sacrifices, to obtain only advantages, not a decisive victory; while the Austrian army, still animated by the same ardour, and full of the same courage, maintained a position, the possession of which left perhaps a possibility of recovering from the enemy all the advantages that he had gained. But for this purpose it would have been necessary to make new sacrifices, which certainly would not have been less bloody than those which have been made already, and which have deeply afflicted my heart.

"Under these conditions it was my duty as a sovereign to take into serious consideration the propositions of peace which had been made to me. The consequences of this continuance of the war would have been so much the heavier, because I should have been obliged to demand from the faithful people of my dominions new sacrifices of blood and of money, much more considerable even than those which had been made up to that time. And, notwithstanding, success would have remained doubtful, since I have been so bitterly deceived in my well-founded hopes that, this contest not having been entered into for the defence of the rights of Austria only, I should not be left alone in it.

"In spite of the ardent sympathy, worthy of acknowledgment, which the justice of our cause has inspired, for the most part, in the governments and peoples of Germany, our natural allies, most ancient allies, have ob-

stinately refused to recognise the great importance of the grand question of the day. Consequently Austria would have been obliged all alone to face the events which were being prepared for, and which every day might have rendered more grave.

"The honour of Austria coming intact out of this war, thanks to the heroic efforts of her valiant army, I have resolved, yielding to political considerations, to make a sacrifice for the reëstablishment of peace, and to accept the preliminaries which ought to lead to its conclusion; for I have acquired the conviction that I should obtain in any event conditions less unfavourable in coming to a direct understanding with the Emperor of the French, without the blending of any third party whatsoever, than in causing to participate in the negotiations the three great powers which have taken no part in the struggle. Unhappily I have been unable to escape the separation from the rest of the empire of the greater part of Lombardy. On the other hand, it must be agreeable to my heart to see the blessings of peace assured afresh to my beloved people; and these blessings are doubly precious to me, because they will give me the necessary leisure for bestowing henceforth, without distraction, all my attention and solicitude on the fruitful task that I propose to accomplish—that is to say, to found in a durable manner the internal well-being and the external power of Austria by the happy development of her moral and material forces, and by ameliorations conformable to the spirit of the time in legislation and administration. As in these days of serious trials and sacrifices my people have shown themselves faithful to my person, so now by the confidence with which they respond to me they will aid in accomplishing works of peace, and in attaining the realisation of my benevolent intentions.

"As chief of the army, I have already expressed to it, in a special order of the day, my acknowledgments of its bravery. To-day I renew the expression of these sentiments. While I speak to my people, I thank those of their children who have fought for God, their Emperor, and their country. I thank them for the hero-

ism of which they have given proof, and I shall always remember with grief those of our brave companions in arms who have not, alas, returned from the combat."

The Emperor Napoleon arrived at Paris July 17th, and on the 19th received the congratulations of the great bodies of the state at St. Cloud. He replied as follows :

"Gentlemen,—Finding myself again in the midst of you, who during my absence have shown so much devotion to the Empress and to my son, I feel first of all the desire to thank you, and then to explain to you the motives of my conduct.

"When, after a successful campaign of two months, the French and Sardinian armies pitched their camp before the walls of Verona, the struggle was evidently on the point of undergoing a change in a military, as well as in a political point of view. I was fatally obliged to attack in front an enemy intrenched behind great fortresses, protected against any diversion on his flanks by the neutrality of the territories which surrounded him; and in commencing the long and sterile war of sieges I found in presence of me Europe in arms, ready either to dispute our success or to aggravate our reverses.

"Nevertheless, the difficulty of the enterprise would neither have shaken my resolution nor stopped the enthusiasm of my army, had not the means been out of proportion with the results to be expected. It was necessary to resolve boldly to break through the barriers raised by neutral territories, and then to accept the struggle on the Rhine as well as on the Adige. It came to this: to accept every where the support of revolution. More precious blood must have been shed, and enough has been shed already; in a word, to succeed it was necessary to stake what no sovereign ought to stake, unless the independence of his country is in danger.

"If, then, I stopped short, it was not from weariness or exhaustion, nor from abandonment of the noble cause I wished to serve, but because a louder voice spoke within my heart—'the interests of France.'

"Do you imagine it cost me nothing to put a break upon the ardour

of my soldiers, who, excited by victory, wished to advance?

"Do you suppose that it cost me nothing publicly in the face of Europe to curtail from my programme the territory which extends from the Mincio to the Adriatic?

"Do you imagine that it cost me nothing to behold noble illusions destroyed in honest hearts, patriotic hopes extinguished?

"To serve Italian independence, I waged war against the grain of Europe. As soon as the destinies of my country were imperilled, I concluded peace.

"And can it now be said that our efforts and sacrifices are a pure loss? No. As I said in my farewell address to my soldiers, we have a right to be proud of this short campaign. In four combats and two battles a powerful army, inferior to none in organisation and bravery, has been defeated. The King of Piedmont, once styled the Guardian of the Alps, has seen his country delivered from invasion, and the frontier line of his states extended from the Ticino to the Mincio. The idea of Italian nationality is admitted by its warmest opponents. All the sovereigns of the Italian peninsula understand at last the imperious necessity of salutary reforms.

"Thus, after having given a new proof of the military power of France, the peace which I have just concluded will be fruitful of happy results; the future will reveal them daily more and more for the happiness of Italy, the influence of France, the quiet of Europe."

6. *Resignation of Cavour.*

On his return to Milan, July 13th, Victor Emmanuel caused the following proclamation to be posted up :

"*The King to the People of Lombardy*—Heaven has blessed our arms. With the powerful aid of our magnanimous and valiant ally the Emperor Napoleon, we arrived in a few days, after victory upon victory, at the banks of the Mincio. To-day I come back among you to tell you the happy news that Heaven has granted your wishes. An armistice, followed by the preliminaries of peace, assures to the people of Lombardy their independence. According to your de-

sire, so many times expressed, you will henceforth form, with our ancient States, one single and free family. I will take your destiny under my direction, and hope to find in you that concurrence which the chief of a state needs in order to create a new administration. I will tell you, people of Lombardy, trust to your king. Established on solid and imperishable bases, he will procure happiness for the new countries which Heaven has intrusted to his government."

On the 12th July, Count Cavour resigned with his colleagues; and the Regent sent immediately for Count Arese, a nobleman supposed to have been in the confidence of Napoleon. But Count Arese failed in his attempt to form a ministry; and the task was intrusted, on July 14th, to M. Ratazzi, who succeeded in forming an administration consisting entirely of old colleagues or supporters of Count Cavour. The Emperor of the French was pacified by the assurance that the appointment of Arese would provoke a very strong anti-French movement in Italy, and that Ratazzi was the only man who could conciliate the Radical party.

The resignation of Count Cavour was the most significant demonstration which the conclusion of peace provoked. The author of the French alliance was the first to repudiate and condemn it. In acknowledging that he felt himself disappointed and betrayed, he gave the signal of the violent reaction which set in at once against the ally who had driven the Austrians from Lombardy.

It can hardly be doubted that Count Cavour not only occasioned the war by his ambition, but also very much contributed to its premature termination. The early successes of the allies brought out rapidly the difference and the inconsistencies that subsisted between their respective designs. Under cover of the French victories, the schemes for the aggrandisement of Piedmont in central Italy were pushed to maturity, so as to thwart the plan of establishing a Bonaparte dynasty on the throne of Etruria. Cavour had protested against the mission of Prince Napoleon, and his emissaries succeeded in frustrating the design with

which it was undertaken, and in preventing the French cause from deriving the smallest advantage from it. When the Prince reached the head-quarters of the Emperor, he was obliged to admit that he had failed, and that the Piedmontese party alone had been strengthened by his progress. Sardinian commissaries ruled supreme in Tuscany, in Modena, in Parma, and even in the Legations. This was more than the Emperor of the French was prepared for. He was willing to strengthen Piedmont at the expense of Austria, and as a bulwark against her; but it was not in his interest to allow her to become so powerful as to be a formidable neighbour to France, nor to suffer her to obtain any thing except by his own gift. The acquisition of the duchies by means of the revolutionary movement would have made the revolution supreme in the new state, and the appropriation of Bologna would have led to a hopeless breach with the whole Catholic world. So that Count Cavour seems to have overshot his mark.

The feelings of the King of Sardinia probably resembled those of his skilful minister. Before the commencement of the war the French Emperor had been much too slow for him. At one time, when he seemed to hesitate in the accomplishment of the design so long matured, and in the performance of promises often reiterated, the indignation of Victor Emmanuel was extreme. He threatened to publish the letters of the Emperor. He even talked of going to Paris to fight with him. At length he found himself once more on the Mincio, almost as far as his father had arrived with Italian troops alone. The first Napoleon with 40,000 men drove three Austrian armies out of Italy, and penetrated into Styria. His nephew seemed to have inherited his military genius and fortune. What might not be expected from such an ally! Such an opportunity of carrying his dominion to the Isonzo could never come again. Suddenly he was informed that his ally meant to stop, with his contract half performed, and to make peace before he had met with a single check, as if a great reverse had taught him the limits of his conquests. A neutral

power, the Emperor told him, obliged him to make peace. At first he spoke of carrying on the war alone, and continued his military armaments and levies. The Tuscan government received directions to keep their levies under arms for six months more; and the Tuscan contingent that had joined the grand army, having shown signs of returning loyalty when peace was made, were prevented from going home.

It seems hardly doubtful that less consideration was shown by Napoleon towards his ally than to his enemy. The King seems to have been consulted on the armistice without any intimation of the peace which was so soon to follow. The day after the armistice was signed Count Cavour arrived from Turin at head-quarters, and appears to have entertained no suspicions, or to have allowed them to be removed. It is said that he learnt the conclusion of peace from the passage of the telegram to the Empress through the telegraph-office at Turin, and immediately summoned the council of ministers, at which they determined to resign. The steps which led directly to the interview of the Emperors and the conclusion of peace seem to have been confided neither to the King of Sardinia nor to the government in Paris.

7. *Effect of the Peace in Italy.*

The news of peace were received in great part of Italy with frantic indignation. Garibaldi declared that he would throw up his commission. Victor Emmanuel prevailed on him to change his resolution, and even to persuade his followers to remain under the standard of Sardinia.

On the 13th of July, at Turin, the mob obliged the printsellers to remove the portrait of Louis Napoleon from their shop-windows, and that of Orsini was substituted. The *Indipendente* appeared with a black mourning border.

On the 14th, at Genoa, an actor who represented the French Emperor in *La Guerra o la Pace*, was overwhelmed with hisses, and with rotten oranges, potatoes, &c.

At Florence the people rushed to the printer's, and destroyed all the remaining copies of the newspaper that had announced the peace.

At Milan a report was spread that the news was false. When the truth of it was officially confirmed, the excitement of the people was so extreme that five persons are said to have gone mad.

The following address to Victor Emmanuel was circulated throughout the kingdom, and received numerous signatures:

"Sire,—The deep sense of disappointment, the profound consternation which was produced throughout the country by the unforeseen announcement of a peace so different from what it had a right to expect, has been somewhat mitigated by the universal conviction that that peace was not your work, and that the name of the First Soldier of Italian Independence still remains pure, glorious, and uncontaminated. . . . All can understand, sire, what your sufferings must be. Italy, whose cry of anguish reached your heart, now understands the irresistible eloquence of your silence."

A somewhat different tone prevails in Savoy, the most Catholic and Conservative, or, as we should say, Ultramontane province of the Sardinian dominions. Neither the spoliation of the Church nor the revolutionary war was to the taste of the Savoyards. Before the war broke out Cavour is said to have assured one of their deputies, that when peace should be concluded and the Austrian dominions in Italy annexed to Piedmont, it should be left open to the Savoyards to determine whether they were to remain under Victor Emmanuel or to be ceded to France. A petition has been handed about in Savoy, praying the King to permit that the province might be annexed to France. As no printer could be prevailed upon to print it, it is uncertain in what terms it is drawn up. Nor can we tell how far this demonstration has been made at the instigation of the French Government, or whether it is caused by aversion for the Piedmontese Government, or by the fascination which, as we know, the state of the French Church exercises over the Catholic inhabitants of some other countries.

8. *Attitude of the Neutral Powers.*

The unmistakable exhibition of po-

pular feeling throughout Germany, more especially in the smaller States, encouraged Austria to hope for assistance, which she did not receive. It did not seem possible that the princes or the Diet could resist the strong enthusiasm of the people.

This enthusiasm was not displayed in words alone. Though war-taxes pressed heavily on the people of Germany, they made extraordinary exertions and sacrifices for the support of the Austrian army. The Sisters of Charity in the Palatinate offered to send twenty-four of their number to nurse the wounded in Italy. The peasants of Upper Bavaria, hearing that there was a deficiency of straw for the wounded to lie on in the hospitals of Tyrol, drove innumerable cart-loads of their own across the frontier. Bavaria alone made a larger collection of money, lint, bandages, cigars, &c. than was contributed by the whole of Austria, where the Patriotic Fund did not exceed 40,000*l*. The inhabitants of the little Duchy of Nassau sent an offering of 2000*l*. to Verona. Even at Cologne similar collections were made on a large scale.

Nor was the sympathy of the German people exhibited only in this manner. We gave last month an extract from the diplomatic note of the Russian Government, attempting to pacify Germany. It was answered by the Saxon Minister, Von Beust, June 15.

"Prince Gortschakoff will know how to appreciate the considerations which induce us to manifest a certain reserve on entering on the subject. He will not consider a German government less excusable for permitting itself not to share the severe judgment passed on the conduct of the Austrian Government, which, according to the despatch of Prince Gortschakoff, is alone responsible for the calamities of war. . . . Unless we fail in the duty of impartiality towards a confederate government, it would be impossible for us to dwell on the episode of a congress, which was a mere phase, and not on the circumstances which preceded and brought about the war. If, instead of so doing, we regard the origin of the complications which caused the war to break out, we cannot forget

that the Austrian Government, having done nothing which could give offence to its neighbours or to any power whatever in Europe, was first of all disquieted, and afterwards menaced, in the peaceable exercise of its rights of sovereignty. It is still difficult for us not to entertain the conviction, that if such enterprises, instead of encountering the sympathies, had incurred the unequivocal blame of Europe, the scourge of war would very probably have been averted from humanity, even before the question of a congress was raised. . . .

"The despatch of Prince Gortschakoff reminds us that the French Government has solemnly proclaimed that it has no hostile intention towards Germany. It at the same time informs us that this declaration was received with ready assent by the majority of the Great Powers. We, however, remember a manifesto proclaiming the intention of delivering Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic. Has this declaration also obtained the ready assent of the Great Powers?"

A month later the Bavarian Parliament was summoned, in order to vote money for the military establishment, which had exceeded, in proportion to the population of Bavaria, that of every other European State. In their address in answer to the king's speech, the First Chamber said:

"The consciousness that your Majesty has fully discharged your federal engagements helps us to support the pain of our baffled hopes."

The Vice-President explained that it was necessary expressly to deplore the causes which had baffled the hopes of Germany; but that as they were so well known, it would not be necessary to define them.

The Chamber of Deputies said, in their address:

"Valuing above all things the interests and the honour of our Fatherland, we shall furnish your majesty with all the resources that the present condition of affairs demands. The course of events has painfully deceived the hopes which the enthusiasm and generosity of the people justified. In our sorrow we can at least find comfort in the reflection that Bavaria can look forward without reproach to the time when history shall call the present generation

to account. Never can we be diverted from the purpose which is that of all the Germans, or waver in our endeavour to unite them."

Without Prussia the Germanic Confederation is powerless; whilst at the same time it is only through Germany that Prussia is a great power. All the German States, and with the exception of the democrats, nearly all the German people, were ready to follow the lead of Prussia, provided they were led across the Rhine. Prussia accepted the lead, without entering into any engagements; and used her position only to neutralise the popular movement, and disappoint the general expectation.

July 2. The Diet resolved to place an army of observation on the Upper Rhine, under Prince Charles of Bavaria; and recommended at the same time that the whole federal army should be put on a war footing, and that a unity of command should be established.

July 4 and July 7. Propositions were made respectively by Prussia and Austria, which were referred to a commission, which had not decided when the preliminaries of peace were signed. They were withdrawn, July 16, when Austria proposed the reduction of the federal army to a peace footing.

Austria had proposed to give the command of the whole Federal army to the Regent of Prussia; offering to place under his orders 35,000 Austrian troops beyond her regular contingent. This offer was refused, on the plea that a sovereign prince could not consent to submit, as is the case with the federal commander, to the authority of the Diet. By this offer, Austria placed her influence in Germany at the feet of the Regent; gave him the command of 130,000 Austrian troops, and recognised the Prussian hegemony. When it was rejected, it was clear that Prussia was resolved not to go to war at any price; and it became clear, too, that in the presence of that resolution, the Confederation was unable to act.

The Prussian diplomatists declared that rather than be dragged into war in the wake of Austria, Prussia would retire from the Confederation. So fearful was the government of giving

offence to France, that a patriotic tragedy, *Ferdinand von Schill*, recalling the days of the French occupation, was forbidden in all the Prussian theatres.

There is no doubt that Prussia was resolved not to go to war for the maintenance of the Austrian power in Italy. They would not even offer their good offices to preserve it. June 27th, Baron Schleinitz writes to Count Bernstorff, that now only the moment for mediation had arrived. But against mediation Austria at that moment protested. Nevertheless from that moment a project of mediation was discussed between the neutral powers. Before any terms had been agreed upon, a French proposal was communicated by Lord John Russell to the Austrian government, of which we must give the somewhat confused history in his own words:

"The French ambassador had frequently spoken to me of terms of peace which he thought, after a considerable period of war, if fortune should favour the arms of France, might be proposed. I listened to those statements, and I said it was not likely that either the Emperor of the French or the Emperor of Austria would be prepared to make peace at that time, and that therefore any consideration of set terms of peace should be postponed. But he brought to me one day a written piece of paper containing certain articles, and said it was the wish of his government that those articles or terms should be submitted, under the sanction of the British government, to the Emperor of Austria; and he said he felt assured, though he could not give me official assurance of it, that those were terms proposed by the Emperor of the French. However, he said enough to show that if those terms were accepted by the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French would be ready to sanction them. I was going to a cabinet council at the time; and there I communicated to my colleagues what he had said. They one and all agreed that we could not make a formal communication of any such terms—that the period had not arrived when we could proffer our good offices. But as those terms were more moderate than, from

the proclamation of the French Emperor, one could have expected he would offer, they thought it would not be right to conceal them from the Austrian government, and therefore they commissioned me to give the paper containing the terms to the Austrian minister; and I communicated them to him on the same night. The honourable gentleman asks what Prussia said. Nothing whatever, for I never spoke to Prussia on the subject. He asked also what Russia said. To that I have to give the same answer: Nothing whatever, for I had no communication with the minister of Russia on the subject. The Austrian minister said it would be his duty to send the terms to his government, but wished to know my idea with regard to it. I said, 'The British government transmit them to you to be sent to the Emperor of Austria; but, as to offering any advice, we distinctly declare that we offer no advice or opinion regarding them. Austria may accept them or reject them, as it may deem best.' He said afterwards to me, 'I do not believe my government will accept these terms; but supposing they were accepted, and I got an answer saying that Austria was ready to treat on those terms, what then?' I said, if that happened, if we once knew that Austria was ready to treat on those terms, then we would offer ourselves as mediators, or in any other character Austria might prefer; and I said, 'If you would prefer that I should speak to the ministers of Prussia and Russia, and inform them of the terms, and that there would be no difficulty in proposing them as a basis of a peace, I am ready to do so.' I think it was our duty not to conceal from Austria that peace might be obtained on the terms proposed. If we had refused to communicate those terms, and if Verona and Peschiera and Venice had fallen, and Austria had been obliged to make worse terms than those which we had been asked to transmit, we should have exposed ourselves, I think, to severe animadversion. This was on the Wednesday. On the Sunday I received a note from Count Apponyi, saying that his government considered these propositions quite inadmissible. I

do not find fault with the hon. gentleman for making a confusion in the story, because he probably has heard it very inaccurately, and has only repeated it as he heard it; but at that time, on that very day, a further proposal was made to my noble friend on a smaller number of articles,—I think four,—which the French government requested us to communicate to Austria, and to communicate with a view to recommend them. My noble friend and I considered that question, and we resolved to ask our colleagues what was their opinion of that proposition. On the same evening, however, I received from Count Apponyi the note to which I have referred; and accordingly the next day there could be no doubt or difficulty in the Cabinet, because we were all agreed not to propose to Austria terms on which she was not willing to treat. These terms did not differ in substance, though they might in degree, from those which we had seen before; and we could never recommend to Austria terms upon which she had already declared that she would not treat. That was our conduct towards the Austrian government. I think in this statement the hon. gentleman will find an answer to all his questions. It is a very plain story, and it is one upon which the government is prepared to stand. Well, sir, there is much difficulty attending communications by telegram, and it is likewise very difficult for belligerent powers to know what is going on in the councils of neutrals; but it certainly did so happen that while, on the one side, the Emperor of Austria said that the neutral powers were considering terms of mediation which would probably have been more unfavourable to him than those which he obtained directly from the Emperor of the French, at the same time the Emperor of the French said that the German powers were so hostile to him, that if he had not made peace he would in a short time have had to make war upon the Rhine. These statements were rather statements of apprehension than of fact. It might never have happened that the neutral powers would propose any terms of mediation at all. They had never agreed upon any basis of mediation,

they had never even had any serious discussion of the terms of mediation. Prussia had made a proposal, to which the hon. gentleman alluded, and for not communicating which he finds fault with me. The fact was, that the Prussian minister took away his despatch, and particularly desired that it might be considered a confidential despatch, and one of which he did not wish a copy to be left in the office or communicated to the Government. To revert again, however, to the state of things which existed when peace was made. The Emperor of the French thought that war was impending upon the Rhine, and that that was the future which he had to meet. The Emperor of Austria thought that the neutral powers were considering terms of mediation; and these apprehensions—not any certain knowledge, because there were no facts upon which that knowledge could be founded—did operate upon their minds, and they used them as justifications for the peace which they made.”

This proposal was as follows:

“1. Italy her own mistress. 2. Confederation of all Italian states. 3. Sardinia increased by Lombardy and the Duchies. 4. Venice and Modena to form an independent state under an archduke. 5. Tuscany given to the Duchess of Parma. 6. A lay viceroy in the Legations. 7. A congress to organise Italy on these foundations, and respecting the rights which the popular wishes have obtained.”

There is this difference between the despatches of Lord John Russell and those of Baron Schleinitz, that while England desired to see Austria beaten in Italy, Prussia declared her anxiety for the preservation of her Italian dominions, but refused to assist in defending them. The mystery of the Prussian policy is to be explained partly by the fact, that Russia threatened the German frontier in case of a war with France, and partly by the difference of sentiment between the court and the ministry. It appears that the Regent himself was eager for action, and in taking leave of Prince Windischgrätz he is reported to have said that the Emperor of Austria had deeply hurt his feelings in showing so little con-

fidence in Prussia by the sudden conclusion of peace.

The result for Germany has been to expose to ridicule the helpless constitution of the Diet, and to prove the practical impossibility of a predominant influence of Germany in Europe. This is admitted even by the Prussian Government; and a movement is now going on in Germany for a revision and reform of the federal system, of the results and of the tendency of which it is too early to speak with certainty.

Little has transpired as to the designs and policy of Russia since the publication of Prince Gortschakoff's despatch. It is well known that that empire is not in a condition at present to give an energetic support to its advice. It appears, however, that the cordial agreement which subsisted between France and Russia is no longer so intimate, and it has been reported that a letter from the Emperor Alexander to the Emperor Napoleon, brought to the French camp by Count Schouwaloff, was instrumental in hastening the termination of hostilities.

9. Possessions of Austria in Italy.

The House of Austria had enjoyed, from the period of its elevation to the imperial throne, uncertain and insecure possession of several territories in the north-east of Italy. In the sixteenth century Milan became permanently a dependency of Spain; and portions of the province of Udine, about eighty square miles in extent, were annexed to the Austrian dominions of the House of Hapsburg.

For more than a century and a half, from the time of Charles V. to the War of Succession, only one addition was made, consisting of the very spot which was the scene of the battle in which Lombardy was lost to Austria,—the principalities of Castiglione and Solferino. In 1692, namely, the inhabitants of those territories rose against their duke, Ferdinand of Gonzaga, and expelled him. The Emperor Leopold instituted an inquiry into the justice of their complaints; and whilst it lasted, and it lasted long, refused to reinstate the duke or his son.

The Austrian domination in Italy dates properly from the War of Suc-

cession. The treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt restored most of the outlying dependencies of the Spanish crown to the family which had lost the crown of Spain itself.

Austria obtained the Duchy of Milan from the Oglio to the Sesia, including the territory of Novara and Alessandria; the islands of Sardinia and Elba, the principality of Piombino, and the kingdom of Naples.

The Duchy of Mantua had already been confiscated in 1708, as the duke had borne arms against the emperor, whose vassal he was.

More than one-third of Italy acknowledged the rule of Charles VI.

In 1718 Sardinia was exchanged for Sicily.

In 1735 France and Spain, aided by Sardinia, recovered the Milanese, Naples, and Sicily. The peace of Vienna gave Naples and Sicily to the Bourbons, Novara and Tortona to the House of Savoy, and Parma and Piacenza to Austria.

The Italian dominions of Charles VI., which in 1714 had reached 46,000 square miles in extent, had dwindled, at the accession of Maria Theresa, to about 6650.

The War of Succession in Austria led first to the surrender of all beyond the Ticino to Sardinia, in 1743; and the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle established a new branch of the Bourbons in Parma and Piacenza.

In 1773 the principalities of Castiglione and Solferino were finally purchased of the House of Gonzaga.

Francis of Lorraine, Grand-Duke of Tuscany, the husband of Maria Theresa, died in 1765, and was succeeded in Tuscany by his second son, Leopold, as Joseph, the eldest, was to inherit the Austrian crowns. Leopold, on succeeding his brother in 1790, was followed in the grand-duchy by his second son.

Ferdinand, the third son of Maria Theresa, married, in 1771, Beatrice, the daughter of the last male descendant of the House of Este, and obtained the right of succession in Modena.

This was the state of the Austrian dominions in Italy at the breaking out of the revolutionary war.

In 1797 the peace of Campo Formio deprived the Austrians of Lombardy, Modena, and Massa Carrara, which

belonged to the Duke of Modena by right of his wife. These states went to form the Cisalpine Republic.

But by this treaty Austria obtained more than she lost: the territory of Venice, bounded by the Adige, and the provinces of Verona, with the exception of Sanguinetto and Villafranca, and Rovigo; altogether above 8600 square miles.

The peace of Lunéville, 1801, took away all that Austria possessed beyond the Adige, and stipulated that the Duke of Tuscany should receive compensation in Germany for the loss of his duchy, as the Duke of Modena had been indemnified by the peace of Campo Formio. He received Salzburg, and afterwards Würzburg; and the Duke of Modena, Breisgau.

Finally, the peace of Presburg, 1805, gave all the Italian dominions of Austria to the kingdom of Italy.

The peace of Paris, in 1814, made the Ticino and the Po the boundary of Austria in Italy; and this settlement remained unaltered until the peace of Villafranca.

10. *The Belligerents.*

(1) *Austria.*

The Emperor Francis Joseph says truly, that he was able to obtain from his adversary better terms than would have been proposed by his allies. He loses by the peace of Villafranca neither his military position in Italy, nor the command of the Adriatic, nor any source of revenue to his exchequer, nor any of the dominions of the princes of his house. The loss of military prestige,—a loss which falls on the generals more than on the army, and on the Emperor himself most of all,—became merely a question of self-command. He has had the courage and energy to prefer this personal humiliation to a renewed effort, by which all might perhaps have been recovered, but which must have cost new losses and new sufferings to his subjects. At Villafranca he stipulated for the restoration of half the territory which was lost, that of his relatives, the Dukes of Tuscany and Modena. How this will be accomplished, it is too soon to predict. But it is to the honour of Francis Joseph's capacity, that in an hour's interview at Villafranca he succeeded in casting upon

his victorious adversary all the odium of the settlement, and inflicting a loss of popularity which equalled the loss of power he himself had suffered.

It is impossible to affirm that he has been supported in the present war by the sentiment of his people. The warlike feeling in Austria was tame in comparison with that in Southern Germany. One reason undoubtedly was the financial exhaustion of the country. The burdens imposed by the present war became almost intolerable to an over-taxed people. This led to a jealousy of the army. During the reign of the present Emperor, the army by which he reconquered his empire has become his first consideration, and has absorbed far more than its due of the national resources. As the great item of expenditure, it was regarded as the cause of those financial difficulties which have injured so much the prosperity and the happiness of the people. And this great engine, to which so much was sacrificed, proved, after all, unequal to its fame. From the first the army achieved nothing to satisfy the imagination of the vulgar; therefore the spirit with which the war commenced, and the enthusiasm which the Emperor's proclamation evoked, rapidly subsided, and, before the end, had given way to impatience and disgust. In the Emperor's proclamation after the peace, he recognises the importance of the disaffection at home as one of the causes which made him conclude it. His promise of reforms alludes to something more than this. Unfortunately for him, the war broke out when his government was in a state of transition. For ten years he has been labouring to consolidate and concentrate his power. The revolution of 1848 showed how weak were the bonds that kept his dominions together. It became essential to the preservation of the state that it should obtain some unity beyond the personal union in the person of the Emperor. For this purpose a series of measures, framed with great administrative ability, have successively appeared, by which a totally new organisation of the empire has been attempted. A man who, in 1848, was a young and obscure lawyer in Vienna, Alexander von Bach, has

been the originator and the leader in this great enterprise. It was necessary that a system of liberties and of local self-government should be carried out simultaneously with the abolition of the old absolutist system, against which the people rose, and which fell at the first shock in 1848. But the other process was more urgently needed; for the state had been on the borders of an abyss, and something was required to be done to avoid the recurrence of so great a danger. Without the necessary corrective, the measures needed for the establishment of unity would have led to an excessive centralisation. This was the great fault of the minister Bach, that he put off the execution of many reforms already determined on, but apparently not in harmony with his plan of concentration. Thus, in 1855, self-government and freedom were restored to the Catholic Church, and the greatest bulwark and security against centralisation was established. But four years have elapsed, and no corresponding measure has yet been taken to give a similar immunity to the Protestants; and yet such a measure was distinctly implied, not only in the spirit which conceded the Concordat, but even in some of its terms. There are still two irreconcilable tendencies and systems prevailing at the same time in Austria. There is the old absolutist spirit, which sacrificed the people to the bureaucracy, the Church to the State; and the new spirit, which animates the Emperor himself, and appears in the Concordat, but which he can find few instruments to carry out in the administration. The conflict between them will be long; but while it lasts, there are two vast classes of discontented persons,—those who are offended at the new measures, and denounce the “ultramontane” councils of the Emperor, and those who suffer from the difficulty which is encountered in carrying out the new system itself. Thus it happens that the Tyrolese, the most loyal and religious of the subjects of Austria, are as dissatisfied as the Magyar nobles and the rabble of the Italian towns. What modifications will be introduced in fulfilment of the Emperor's promise, it is hard to say. The names of the persons whom he

has summoned for the purpose of consulting them belong to very various parties. But we confidently hope that he will not allow himself to be driven from the course which he has adopted, because it has been so imperfectly pursued as to be regretted by the best and wisest of his subjects, or because it offends the notions and prejudices of that vast number of Austrians who have been bred up in the traditions of Josephinism.

Vienna, August 20. The official *Wiener Zeitung* of this day contains the following imperial decree:

"Count Rechberg, who retains his post as Minister for Foreign Affairs, is appointed President of the Cabinet; Baron Hubner is appointed Minister of Police; Count Golochowski, Minister of the Interior; Councillor (Geheimrath) Kempen von Fichtenstamm, Chief of the Police, is dismissed with a pension; Baron Bach, formerly Minister of the Interior, has been appointed Ambassador to Rome. The Ministry of Commerce is entirely dissolved; its duties are divided between the Ministries of the Interior, Exterior, and Finance."

The non-official portion of the *Wiener Zeitung* contains an article stating that there is a general feeling of anxiety in the public mind concerning the subjects which have been till now under serious deliberation by the Superior Council, and which are: 1. "Regulations of the control of the finances; 2. Free exercise of the Protestant religion; 3. The regulation of Jewish affairs; 4. The regulation of the municipalities. The representation of the provinces will later come under deliberation." The article concludes thus: "Too great caution in advancing is as much to be avoided as too much haste."

(2) *France.*

The Emperor of the French found opinions considerably changed on his return to France. He had started with the applause of the Republicans and Socialists of the Faubourg St. Antoine, who thought that he was going to revive in Italy the revolution he had suppressed in France. Though he has not yet ventured openly to disappoint these hopes, by restoring the Italian princes by force

of arms, there is little room to suppose that he has gained the goodwill of the French democracy. But his military success has made him sure for ever of the army; and the amnesty serves to give greater effect to the successes he has won.

July 28. The *Moniteur* announced that he was about to reduce his armaments by sea and land. This was for the sake of England; and it was announced in the afternoon with great effect by Lord John Russell in the House of Commons.

August 14 was the triumphal entry of the Emperor and his army into Paris. It is significant, that in the vicinity of the Bastille, where on his departure for Italy he received such an ovation, he was met on his return with greater coolness than at any other part of his progress.

August 17. A full and entire amnesty was granted to all persons sentenced for political crimes and offences, or who have been the objects of the measures taken for public safety.

Aug. 18. The *Moniteur* announced that all warnings given to newspapers would be considered as non-issued.

It is estimated that this amnesty will restore to France nearly 20,000 exiles. We hope more from a change of system, such as this appears to introduce, in France, than from the changes which are desired in Austria; for it is more needed.

August 20. The fortification of Antwerp was ordered by the Belgian Chamber of Deputies. In this France affects to see a violation of Belgian neutrality; and, it is said, will immediately post an army on the frontier.

11. *Revolt of the Swiss at Naples.*

July 7, a revolt of a part of the Swiss troops occurred at Naples; it was suppressed with considerable bloodshed and severity. The ostensible pretext was the removal of the arms of the Swiss cantons from their colours. About 500 men mutinied, and nearly 2500 refused to serve under the Neapolitan standard. They were immediately shipped off to Marseilles, on their way to their own country. There is no doubt that the Swiss in the Neapolitan service had been tampered with by

the revolutionary party after the taking of Perugia. It had called to mind their conduct in 1849, when they saved the Neapolitan throne, and vanquished the revolution in Sicily; and it had greatly increased their unpopularity as the upholders of the governments of southern Italy.

Among the 2290 Swiss who returned home after the revolt at Naples, there were not above fifty Germans. The first regiment of Swiss in Rome consisted, according to the official *Bundesblatt* of January 1, 1858, of 1293 men. Of these 640 were really Swiss, 180 Bavarians, 98 Wirtembergers, 150 Belgians, &c.

The events at Naples gave the death-blow to the Swiss mercenaries. The Swiss Radicals were at all times unwilling that their countrymen should serve as the chief supporters and instruments of legitimate governments; and that while democratic and revolutionary principles prevailed in their own country, they should be employed to suppress them abroad. Their service with the Pope was particularly hateful. The events at Naples destroyed even the ancient renown of the Swiss fidelity, and supplied a long-desired opportunity of putting an end altogether to this unpopular service.

An envoy was sent to Naples to inquire into the affair; and a law was passed by the Diet at Berne, July 30th, which provided as follows:

“Every Swiss is forbidden to enter those corps of foreign armies which are not to be regarded as national troops without permission from the Diet. The Diet can grant such permission only for the purpose of promoting the advantage of their own army.”

The measure was opposed, especially by Segesser of Lucerne, one of the best historians of Switzerland. The military fame of the Swiss had, he urged, been maintained for centuries by foreign service alone. It was an inconsistency to circumscribe the freedom and independence of their own countrymen, in order to protect that of the Italians.

12. *The Revolution in Italy.*

During the war the movement throughout central Italy was directed by Sardinian agents, for the purpose

of promoting the designed annexation to Sardinia. For this end Azeglio was sent to Bologna, Pallieri to Parma, Farini to Modena, and Buoncompagni acted as dictator at Florence.

The conclusion of peace arrested these designs, and converted the Sardinian propagandism into a purely insurrectionary movement. The failure of Sardinia to obtain the complete emancipation of Italy through the aid of France, gave in several places new energy to the revolutionary party.

The Piedmontese party had always been strongest in Tuscany. The chief men in Florence, both in literature and politics, belonged to it. Demonstrations of every kind were provoked in favour of annexation.

July 20. The municipality of Florence declared in favour of it by a majority of 18 to 5. Troops were sent to Bologna to aid the insurgents. When the war was over, and the French Emperor insisted on the recall of the Sardinian commissaries, measures were every where taken that by their departure the Sardinian cause should not suffer. Buoncompagni remained at Florence until July 30th. He then left his power in the hands of Ricasoli, the most active leader of the Piedmontese party in Tuscany. At the same time, the Marquis Lajatico, who had played the chief part in the revolution of April, was sent to London to obtain the concurrence of the English Government in their plans. These were, first, to be annexed to Piedmont, by which was understood a kingdom of northern Italy, including the duchies and perhaps the Romagna; or, secondly, to receive a sovereign of the house of Carignan; or, thirdly, to be placed under the Duchess-Regent of Parma.

July 28. The Grand Duke of Tuscany abdicated in favour of his son. An envoy conveying a notification of the accession of the Grand Duke Ferdinand was sent to Paris, and the young sovereign himself was invited to come, and was favourably received by the Emperor.

At the beginning of August a French envoy, Count de Reiset, was sent to Turin and to the capitals of central Italy, to endeavour to promote by pacific influence the resto-

ration of the banished princes, or at least to ascertain that, by pacific means, it could not be accomplished.

The provisional government of Tuscany summoned a convention, to be chosen according to the electoral law of May 3, 1848, by which all who pay ten francs of taxes are admitted to vote. By this means the bulk of the population was excluded, and the aristocratic character of the Tuscan revolution is maintained. Strict injunctions were also sent to all the municipal and communal authorities as to the candidates to be chosen.

August 8. The conferences commenced at Zurich, which were to complete the work of the peace of Villafranca. Count Colloredo represents Austria, M. de Bourqueney France, and M. Desambrois Sardinia. Slow progress appears to have been made in the negotiations. Meantime the course of events makes the fulfilment of the agreement entered into at Villafranca for the restoration of authority in central Italy more difficult every day.

August 11. Cardinal di Pietro, formerly nuncio in Portugal, succeeded Cardinal Antonelli as President of the Council of State. Cardinal di Pietro has been frequently spoken of as the most likely successor of Cardinal Antonelli in the more important office of Secretary of State. It is difficult as yet to say how far his appointment may be considered as a concession to the opponents of his colleague.

August 16. The newly-elected assembly declared, on the motion of the Marquis Ginori, that the house of Lorraine has ceased to reign in Tuscany. It does not appear that the motion was based on an accusation of tyranny. The Tuscan family cast in their lot with Austria, and must stand or fall with the Austrian power in Italy.

In Parma Count Pallieri persuaded the people that they were, under all circumstances, to remain with Piedmont; and the omission of Parma in the preliminaries of Villafranca confirmed the illusion. The Piedmontese authorities were not recalled until August 5th.

At Modena the Sardinian commissary, Farini, exhibited great activity in raising troops and organising

an army. The Grand-Duke had, on his departure, taken his army with him. When, therefore, Farini was recalled by the Sardinian Government, he was chosen Dictator of Modena; and he appears to have taken the lead in arranging the resistance of central Italy by means of the insurrection alone. He organised a league with Tuscany and Parma, and it was determined that the three armies should be united. The Tuscan contingent, on its return from the Mincio, was retained, in order to form part of the federal army. Garibaldi was appointed commander. An assembly was called at Modena, elected by universal suffrage. It met on August 16th.

August 17. Farini accepted the dictatorship of Parma and Piacenza.

Meanwhile a French army remains in Lombardy, whether with a view to restore order, or to fish in troubled waters, has not yet appeared.

Bologna is covered with placards bearing the words, "Evviva Vittorio Emanuele nostro legittimo Ré." The town is full of Sardinian agents, and Azeglio did not retire before he had done what he could to secure the interests of his master. A loan has been raised by the provisional government; and Mezzacapo, with a force of volunteers, is awaiting the advance of the Papal troops from Ancona.

August 20. The annexation to Piedmont was unanimously voted by the national assemblies of Tuscany and Modena.

On the same day it was announced that a defensive league had been concluded between all the states of central Italy, signed also by Prince Ercolani on behalf of the Legations.

13. *The Revolution and the Church.*

The revolt of Perugia was promoted and assisted by the leaders of the revolution in Tuscany. June 19th, 400 muskets were sent by the Sardinian Commissary at Florence, Buoncompagni. Before the expected military aid could arrive from Tuscany, the town was attacked by the Swiss under Colonel Schmidt, on the evening of June 20th.

After a resistance of three and a half hours, in which the Roman troops lost eleven men killed and

thirty-five wounded, whilst the loss of the insurgents is said to have amounted to double the number (20 killed), the insurrection was overcome. As the first victory of order over the revolutionary movement, this event very naturally caused the greatest excitement all over Italy.

The Pontifical army amounted at the beginning of the war to 15,239 men and 1200 horses. In the course of three months about 850 men and eight officers deserted.

On the Feast of SS. Peter and Paul, the Pope, Colonel Schmidt, and a monk, were burnt in effigy at Milan.

At Turin, for an article on the taking of Perugia, the *Armonia*, the chief Catholic newspaper in Piedmont, was prosecuted, and its appearance suspended until the judgment should be pronounced. The *Cattolico* of Genoa has been since suppressed.

In the Consistory of June 20th, the Pope confirmed the appointment of the Archbishop of Milan and the Bishops of Pavia and Crema, which Francis Joseph had made before the breaking out of the war. But the Act of Confirmation did not contain the usual addition, "ad nominationem Sacræ Cæsareæ Majestatis Francisci Josephi Primi Austriæ Imperatoris," &c.

The Sardinian Government protested, before the preliminaries of peace were agreed upon, against these nominations.

On June 18th, the Holy Father issued an encyclical letter touching on the affairs of Italy:

"The seditious movement which has lately broken out in Italy against the authority of the legitimate princes, has passed like a flame of fire from the states adjoining our pontifical dominions, even into some of our provinces. Moved by the sad example of others, and excited by foreign influence, these provinces have withdrawn from our paternal rule, and at the instigation of a few, have even sought to place themselves under that Italian Government which during these last years has shown itself the enemy of the legitimate rights of the Church and of her sacred ministers. While we reprobate and grieve for these acts of rebellion, by

which a part only of the people in those disturbed provinces so unjustly corresponded to our fatherly solicitude and care, and while we openly declare that the civil power is necessary to this Holy See, in order that without impediment it may exercise its sacred authority for the good of religion (which civil power the crafty enemies of the Church of Christ endeavour to tear away); to you, Venerable Brethren, we have recourse by letter, that we may find some comfort for our grief. . . .

"For the rest, we openly declare that, clothed with strength from on high, which Almighty God, moved by the prayers of the faithful, will grant us in our weakness, we are ready to undergo every danger and every bitterness rather than abandon in the least part our Apostolic duty, or permit any thing to be done contrary to the sanctity of the oath by which we bound ourselves, when, God so willing, we mounted, although unworthy, this Supreme Chair of the Prince of the Apostles, the rock and defence of the Catholic faith."

At the Consistory of June 20th, the Holy Father delivered an allocution, in which he said:

"Venerable Brethren, — To the most heavy grief which oppresses us, as well as all good men, on account of the war stirred up between Catholic nations, there is added an exceeding sorrow for the lamentable troubles and disturbances which, in some provinces of our Pontifical rule, have lately occurred by the nefarious agency and most sacrilegious daring of impious men. You well know, Venerable Brethren, that we are speaking sorrowfully of the guilty conspiracy and rebellion of the enemies of our and this Holy See's sacred and legitimate civil power, which most crafty men dwelling in these our provinces have not feared to plot, foster, and carry out by secret and wicked associations, by basest designs, framed with men of neighbouring districts, by the publication of fraudulent and calumnious libels, by the preparation and introduction of foreign force, and by sundry other perverse frauds and arts. . . .

"No one is ignorant at what these rebels against the civil power of

this Apostolic See always chiefly aim ; what they wish, what they desire, what they seek. For all know that, by the special design of Divine Providence, amid such a great number and variety of temporal rulers, the Roman Church also possessed a temporal dominion subject to no one, in order that the Roman Supreme Pontiff, the Pastor of the whole Church, never at any time subject to any ruler, might be able, with fullest liberty, to exercise over the whole wide world the supreme power and authority received from Christ our Lord Himself, of feeding and governing the whole of the Lord's flock, and might also be able more easily, from day to day, to spread our Divine religion ; to meet the various wants of the faithful ; to give timely aid to those seeking it ; and to achieve all the other good ends which, according to time and circumstance, he might recognise as appertaining to the greater good of the whole Christian commonwealth. Therefore the bitterest enemies of the temporal dominion of the Roman Church strive to attack, undermine, and destroy the civil power of that Church and of the Roman Pontiff, which has been established by a certain heavenly dispensation, and by ancient possession through so many successive centuries, and by every other most just and best law, and which, by common consent of all peoples and princes, even non-Catholic, has been always held and defended as the sacred and inviolate Patrimony of the Blessed Peter, in order that, having robbed the Roman Church of her patrimony, they may depress and vilify the dignity and majesty of the Apostolic See and of the Roman Pontiff ; and may with more ease bring upon our most holy religion the most destructive warfare and the greatest of injuries, and thoroughly uproot religion itself, if ever that could be. This always has been aimed at, and is aimed at by the most wicked counsels, plots, and frauds of those men, who long to pull down the temporal power of the Roman Church, as a long and most sad experience proves clearly and openly to all men.

"Wherefore since we, by the charge of our Apostolic office, and being

bound by a solemn oath, have the duty of watching with the greatest vigilance over the safety of religion, of preserving quite intact and inviolate the rights and possessions of the Roman Church, and of asserting and vindicating the liberty of this Holy See, which is plainly identified with the interests of the whole Church, and also of defending its sovereignty, with which Divine Providence has endowed the Roman Pontiffs for exercising free control over the whole world, and of transmitting it whole and inviolate to our successors ; we cannot avoid vehemently condemning and detesting the impious and nefarious daring and endeavours of our rebellious subjects, and opposing to them a strong resistance. . .

"We protest against all those things which the rebels have dared to do in the places above mentioned ; and by our supreme authority we condemn, reprobate, rescind, and abolish all and every the acts at Bologna, at Ravenna, at Perugia, and elsewhere, in whatever manner named and done by these rebels against our and this Holy See's sacred and legitimate sovereignty ; and we declare and decree these acts to be void, wholly illegitimate, and sacrilegious.

"Further, we call to the memory of all men the greater excommunication and other ecclesiastical penalties and censures inflicted by the Sacred Canons, the Apostolic Constitutions, and by the decrees of General Councils, especially the Tridentine (sess. 22, cap. xi. de Reform.), and to be incurred, without any declaration, by all those who may dare in any manner to attack the temporal power of the Roman Pontiff : into which we moreover declare all those to have fallen miserably who at Bologna, at Ravenna, at Perugia, and elsewhere, by act, or by counsel, or by assent, or in any other way, have dared to violate, disturb and usurp our and this Holy See's civil power and jurisdiction, and the Patrimony of the Blessed Peter

"Supported by this confidence in God, we are also sustained by the hope that the Sovereigns of Europe, as in times past so now, will use all their endeavours with united zeal and counsel to defend and keep en-

tire our and this Holy See's sovereignty, since it is of the greatest importance to each of them that the Roman Pontiff should enjoy the fullest liberty, in order that the tranquillity of conscience of the Catholics residing in the dominions of these sovereigns may be properly protected. Which hope is increased, because the French troops now in Italy, according to what our most dear Son in Christ the Emperor of the French has declared, not only will do nothing against our and this Holy See's temporal dominion, but will defend and preserve it."

June 30th, Cardinal Morlot, the Archbishop of Paris, issued a pastoral to his clergy, appointing a *Te Deum* for the victory of Solferino, in which he says:

"May a peace glorious and durable come to crown a war conducted with so much heroism, brilliancy, and splendour,—a war which was not undertaken with ambitious views or to foment disturbances, least of all to sap the rights and the power of the august and venerated Head of the Holy Church; but for the purpose of establishing peace and order in Europe, by satisfying and appeasing aspirations which are deemed just and legitimate."

July 5th, Cardinal Rauscher, the Archbishop of Vienna, published a pastoral letter, for the purpose of encouraging the people to assist the wounded. He says:

"The sufferers are our countrymen and our brothers; they are the defenders of the throne and of the empire, of our altars, and of our domestic hearths: for a victory of the open injustice which the hostile armies bear on their banners would be felt in every circle down to the dwelling of the poorest inhabitant, and yet would be but the occasion of new conflicts and immeasurable confusion."

As a sign of the solicitude which was felt throughout the Church for the safety of the Holy See in the present war, we extract the following passages from a pastoral letter of Archbishop Leahy, of Cashel:

"As God from time to time permits great calamities to befall the nations of the earth in punishment of their sins, it may be that the flames

of the unnatural war which has now broken out will spread and involve all Europe. If so it shall be, nevertheless we may abide the issue without any fear for the Holy Father, nay with the full confidence that God will turn all to the glory of His name; for, looking to the course of His providence, particularly to the special care He has taken of the Holy See in the worst of times, we may without rashness predict that at the conclusion of this war, whenever it comes, although some who now march at the head of victorious armies may be humbled and fallen, Rome will still remain, and the States of the Church will remain, and the successor of Peter will remain holding mild sway over both. But, should the worst happen,—should wicked men seize upon the temporal possessions of the Holy See, and reduce the Roman Pontiff to the apostolic poverty of Peter when he said to the lame man at the Beautiful Gate of the Temple, 'Silver and gold I have none' (Acts iii. 6),—should this happen, what then? Would the spiritual supremacy which Christ gave to Peter and to his successors over the whole Church come to an end, as some vainly imagine would be the case? No. Useful as the temporal possessions of the Church may be (and useful they undoubtedly are for the easy, the peaceful, the effective administration of the affairs of the universal Church), whatever becomes of them, of one thing we are certain with all the certainty of faith resting on God's own word—that the spiritual supremacy of the Roman Pontiff will last as long as the Church itself—that is, for ever. . . . Come, then, what may—even though the hand of the spoiler tear away from the Holy Father his ancient possessions—even though his oppressors deprive him of his personal liberty, yea and of his life, his spiritual supremacy will survive every vicissitude."

And Archbishop Cullen says to his clergy, on the feast of St. Peter's Chains:

"Peace is not as yet definitively concluded, and Italy is still convulsed. Attempts of the most wicked character are made by revolutionary and secret societies, as well as by

wily and infidel statesmen, to rob the Pope of his temporal authority, which is so necessary for the free exercise of his spiritual powers. Were the Pope subject to any other sovereign, he would be obliged to yield, in the management of the affairs of religion, to the wishes of that sovereign, or undergo continual persecutions, as we learn from the history of the first seven centuries of the Church, when innumerable pontiffs were either martyred by pagan emperors, or exiled and afflicted even by the Christian rulers of the East and West."

And the whole of the Irish Episcopate expresses itself as follows:

"The Holy Father is profoundly afflicted by the troubles excited in Italy through the machinations of wicked men, at once the enemies of the Holy See and the disturbers of all order, who, casting off allegiance to their lawful sovereign, as they had already cast off the restraints of religion, are seeking to disturb the peace of the Pontifical States. Nor, as it would seem, have these lawless men wanted the sympathy, if even the direct encouragement, of those who from their position should be the friends of order. Catholic Europe, the Catholic world, has been shocked to see that unscrupulous statesmen, contrary to the principles of justice and international law, which they themselves are the loudest to invoke at other times, and from no assignable motive save that of a deadly animosity to the Holy See, would fain despoil the Roman Pontiff of those dominions which he has held and holds by a title the oldest as well as the most sacred of any in Europe. Long ages before any of the present dynasties of Europe were thought of, Central Italy, from sea to sea, enjoyed a high civilisation under the mild sway of the Roman Pontiffs; and the princes and peoples of Christendom, so far from grudging them the patrimony of Peter, protected their persons and defended their possessions as well, that the Head of the Church, being the vassal of no one, the enemy of no one (which it were not meet the common Father of all should be), and so being placed far above all local or personal considerations that else could fetter his free-

dom of action, might be perfectly independent in administering the affairs of the universal Church."

This almost universal alarm of the Catholic Church was completely justified by the events that were passing in Italy. The Jesuits were the first to recognise and to experience the irreligious spirit that animates the Italian patriots. They retired out of Lombardy as soon as the allies invaded it. They were expelled from Bologna, Forli, Ferrara, and Faenza. At Ferrara their house was plundered.

Farini, then Sardinian commissioner at Modena, decreed as follows:

"1. The Society of Jesus not being tolerated in the states of his Sardinian Majesty, the colleges and houses of that society, in the provinces over which our commission extends, are dissolved and suppressed.

"2. The members of the society who are not natives of the provinces aforesaid, must leave them within the space of four days.

"3. The property of every kind, movable or immovable, belonging to the society, is confiscated."

In Lombardy the secular clergy displayed in various places their joy at the defeat of the Austrians. An address was presented to the Emperor Napoleon by the clergy of Brescia, in which he is hailed as their deliverer.

It does not appear that any similar feeling has been shown in favour of Piedmont.

The policy of France and of Piedmont have been completely distinct, sometimes discordant, on most points during the war. But their disagreement is most conspicuous in their relations with the Church. Whilst Piedmont has been openly and avowedly hostile not only to the temporal power of the Pope, but to the exercise even of his spiritual authority, the Emperor Napoleon has consistently pursued the very opposite course.

July 4. The *Siècle* received a warning from government that it was not to go on with its abuse of the Pope, and with its efforts to convert a war for the independence of Italy into a revolutionary movement.

In spite of this, and of other facts of the same kind, misgivings arose

in the minds of many French Catholics, and some difference of opinion has shown itself amongst them. It is perhaps not too much to say that the war had the effect of alienating in some measure from the Emperor those who were his most valuable supporters, and of conciliating for a time the good-will of some of his opponents.

Whilst the party of which the *Univers* is the organ has always disliked Piedmont, both for its liberalism and for its treatment of the Church, the liberal Catholics in France have been equally adverse to Austria for its absolutism. The Concordat has not reconciled them to the Austrian government, and the conduct of Piedmont towards the Church has not entirely destroyed the interest and the admiration which it excited as a constitutional state. While, then, the party of the *Univers*, that is, the mass of the French Catholics, were opposed to the war, a considerable minority were reconciled to it by the prospect of glory for the arms of France, and of humiliation for Austria. For to those who maintain that there is a natural alliance between Catholicism and those political forms by which in our day freedom is supposed to be assured, the example of Austria now, and the example of Spain of old, are especially hateful. The writings of M. de Montalembert, for instance, contain many proofs that he is scarcely inclined to do more than scant justice to either of these Powers.

Two episodes of the war may serve more effectually than official acts or public declarations to show the spirit in which it was undertaken.

M. About obtained his first literary success on the same field on which he has now acquired a more extensive renown. In *Tolla* he improved the occasion afforded by an event in the history of one of the great Roman families to construct a novel out of the conventional figures of wicked princes and profligate *monsignori*. The *Question Romaine* bears to *Tolla* somewhat of the relation of the *Key to Uncle Tom's Cabin*. The spirit is the same; the same general views lie at the foundation of each. But in one they are the background of a touching story, in the other they

are made up into an elaborate argument. Since the appearance of *Tolla* M. About has been employed as a purveyor of light reading in the service of the imperial court, and his performances have obtained the honours of the *Railway Library*. His knowledge of Rome and his skilful pen recommended him last winter as a fit and proper person to investigate and describe the state of things there, and to prepare men's minds for the events that were to follow. It was intended that he should speak out where serious considerations imposed a certain reserve on the discreet authors of *Napoléon III et l'Italie*, and supply the key by which the official pamphlet was to be interpreted. Accordingly his letters from Rome began to appear in the *Moniteur*. Their tone gave, very unexpectedly, offence to the nuncio at Paris. His remonstrance was immediately attended to, and M. About received orders to stop his impertinent correspondence, and to return home, where, if his strictures on Roman affairs were to be continued at all, they could only be tolerated in the shape of a pamphlet, published on his own responsibility, and without the *imprimatur* of the government. M. About obeyed, and submitted his book, when it was completed, for correction to the same exalted hands to which M. de la Guéronnière's writings owe their celebrity. Even now, after it had received the last alterations and additions at the Tuileries, such was the tender solicitude of the French government for the feelings of a court which enjoyed its alliance and protection, the book was not permitted to appear in France. It was set in type at Paris, and then sent across the frontier for publication in Belgium. There was some difficulty and delay at the French custom-house, but at length it was admitted, the booksellers being at the same time warned to dispose of their stock as expeditiously as possible. New complaints were made, this time, we believe, by the Archbishop of Paris; and again the French government acceded to the demands that were addressed to it. The sale was stopped, the remaining copies—it is not stated whether they were numerous—were summarily seized

by the police, and it is even said that one bookseller was prosecuted.

The other highly characteristic and significant fact is the attempt which was made to use the Hungarian exiles against Austria. The negotiations with Kossuth for this purpose commenced as soon as the war had been planned between the Emperor and Cavour in the autumn of last year. Some difficulties arose, and other refugees, and amongst them General Klapka, entered more readily into the plan of a revolt in Hungary. Kossuth at length agreed, on condition that a Russian prince should receive the Hungarian crown. He started with money supplied by the French government; but though he saw Prince Napoleon, he was not admitted to an audience with the Emperor. Solferino had been won, and he was already thinking of peace. Victor Emmanuel also refused to see Kossuth; but he had many interviews with Pietri, the head of the secret agents of the Emperor in Italy, and was well received by the people. July 11th he received a popular ovation at Acqui. The preliminaries of peace were signed before Kossuth had been called upon to accomplish any thing. He retired to Switzerland. His friends obtained of the French government the insertion of an article in the *Patrie*, justifying the Hungarian revolution as a legitimate movement, and declaring that Kossuth is no revolutionist, but a patriot.

The Hungarian Committee at Genoa had, however, been active in distributing handbills in the Austrian army; and they succeeded in seducing some of the Hungarian soldiers from their allegiance. A proclamation to the Hungarian nation was approved by the Emperor of the French, but the time for its publication did not come.

July 12. A protest was published by the Government of the Holy See against the proceedings of Sardinia, of which the following is a part:

"Amidst the fears and anxieties arising from the present deplorable war, the Holy See appeared to have grounds for tranquillity in the many assurances received, to which was added that the King of Piedmont,

by the advice of the Emperor of the French, his ally, had refused the offer of the dictatorship of the revolted provinces of the Pontifical States. But it is grievous to observe that events turn out otherwise, and that facts occur every day under the eyes of the Holy Father and his Government which render more and more unjustifiable the conduct of the Sardinian Government towards the Holy See,—a conduct which clearly shows an intention of usurping a considerable part of its temporal dominions. After the rebellion of Bologna, which his Holiness already had to deplore in his allocution of the 20th June last, that city became a harbour for many Piedmontese officers, who came from the neighbouring Tuscany and Modena, also with the intention of preparing quarters for Piedmontese troops. Thousands of muskets were brought in from those foreign States to arm the revolted and the volunteers, and cannons were brought to increase the commotion of the rebellious provinces, and to embolden the disturbers of order. These open violations of neutrality, joined to an active coöperation in maintaining the outbreak in the States of the Church, have been crowned by a more important violation, which renders quite illusory the refusal of the dictatorship—the nomination of the Marquis Massimo d'Azeglio as Commissary-Extraordinary in Romagna, as results from the decree of his Royal Highness the Prince Eugene of Savoy, lieutenant of his Sardinian Majesty, dated June 28, and from the letter of Count Cavour of the same date, to direct the concurrence of those provinces in the war, under the specious pretext that the so-called national movement should not degenerate into disorder, attributing to him by that means an office encroaching upon the territorial rights of the sovereign. And things proceed with such rapidity, that the Piedmontese troops have already entered into the Pontifical territory, having occupied Forte Urbano and Castel Franco, where Piedmontese riflemen and part of the R. Novi brigade have arrived. And all this either to oppose a valid resistance to the Pontifical troops which might be sent to resume the usurped power in the rebel provinces, or to

create new obstacles to the execution of this just design.

"Finally, to complete the usurpation of legitimate authority, two engineer officers, one of whom is a Piedmontese, were sent to Ferrara to mine and destroy the fortress. Such abominable attempts, manifesting a flagrant violation of the rights of nations, under many regards, can but fill with bitterness the mind of his Holiness, and cause him an indignation as strong as it is just, not without surprise at seeing such enormities committed by the Government of a Catholic sovereign, who nevertheless followed the advice of his august ally in not accepting the offered dictatorship. Every attempt, as yet, to prevent or remove the series of evils having proved vain, the Holy Father, mindful of his duty to preserve his States and the integrity of the temporal dominion of the Holy See, essentially connected with the independence and free action of the Supreme Pontificate, protests against the violations and usurpations com-

mitted even in spite of the accepted neutrality, and desires that such protest be communicated to all European Powers; trusting that they, in the justice which distinguishes them, will support him, and not allow to go on such an open revolution of the right of nations and of the sovereignty of the Holy Father; and that they will not hesitate to coöperate in vindicating the rights of this sovereignty, for which purpose he invokes their assistance and protection."

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the offer of the Presidency of the Italian Confederation should have been received by the Holy Father with some distrust. It is understood that, in reply to the letter brought to him from the Emperor Napoleon by M. de Meneval, he declared that he could not accept the offer until he was accurately informed of the details of the proposed arrangement, and until Italy should be pacified, and the insurgent provinces restored to their allegiance.

